Rubber enterprises in the Brazilian Amazon, 1870-1930. by da Silva Bentes, Rosineide
LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON
RUBBER ENTERPRISES IN THE BRAZILIAN AMAZON, 1870-1930
By
ROSINEIDE DA SILVA BENTES
THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
UMI Number: U615818
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U615818
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
7 lOSu
ABSTRACT
This thesis examines seringais (rubber estates) on the Brazilian Amazon from 
the perspective of capitalist social relations of production in the period from the 
1870 to 1930. It is divided into four parts. The first part introduces the subject. The 
second part considers the social relations of land property and the selective way of 
privatising land to argue that seringaI is private property and that there was a free 
labour market. The third part discusses the engagement and the forms of 
controlling and disciplining labour. The fourth part focuses on profitability and 
capital accumulation by demonstrating that (a) the local investors had their own 
project of economic political changes, (b) this and a converging view on the use of 
natural resources constitute decisive elements in their decisions of re-investments. 
Rubber enterprises were usually run as partnerships and they invested mainly in 
the production of the Fina Hard Para kind, which was considered the best quality 
and commanded the highest price at that time, and in the diversification of 
economic activities.
As this thesis demonstrates, the social relations of production in seringal are 
capitalist due to the following features: (a) they are organised to produce 
commodities for profit in order to ensure capital accumulation; (b) they are 
characterised by the command of capitalists over subordinated forms of free labour; 
(c) this command is based on the private ownership of the main means of rubber 
production. The specific features of the relations of production in seringais are 
basically twofold: (a) the employment of different forms of subordinate free labour, 
including waged and salaried, in which seringueiros (rubber tappers paid by results 
instead of by work time) were predominant and (b) the geomercantile privatisation 
and use of natural resources, involving a converging interaction with nature.
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PART ONE: Introduction
Chapter 1:
The Problem and The Context
There is a hiatus in the literature on the definition of entrepreneurial production of 
rubber in Brazilian Amazonia due to looking at it from the perspective of ‘free land* 
and/or non- or pre-capitalist relations of production.
The perspective of ‘free land’ or ‘empty territory’ emerged in the 1950s and 1960s 
when accounts of Brazilian Amazonia generally stressing its large geographic size 
and its proportionally small number of inhabitants as well as supposing a regional 
economy characterised exclusively by temporary and unsystematic extractive 
activities, concluded that rubber production rested upon temporary encampment.1 
According to Prado Junior2 Amazonia would be an area of extraction of natural 
resources, with irregular human occupation, so that it would not represent a subject 
of economic history.
The emphasis on nature or non-occupied or non-privatised nature, ignoring the 
local society, persisted throughout the 1970s-1980s by means of official and 
academic interpretations. On the one hand, the mathematical equation (that is, 
physical extension divided by the number of inhabitants) supported the military 
governments’ view of the region as an empty territory. On the other hand, Marxist and 
non-Marxist approaches focusing exclusively on recent migratory flux to the region 
built varying interpretations centred on the notion of ‘frontier’ of human occupation or 
of mercantile/capitalist economy in which the common element is the sweeping aside 
of Amazonian History.3
1 Prado Junior 1956, pp. 246-47; Furtado 1959, pp. 61-62; see also 1968; Werneck Sodre 1979.
2 Prado Junior op.cit.
3 The so called ‘frontier peasantry’ scheme is based not only on the notion that there was non­
privatised land or ‘free land’ in Amazonia. More than that, it is based on a particular notion
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In this context, historical investigations into the rubber economy by Pacheco de 
Oliveira4 and Weinstein5 seem quite innovative, although these interpretations too 
were guided by notions of Amazonia as a 'free land’. The former argued that the 
existence of free land would have led to difficulty for capitalists establish their 
command over rubber production such that they instead established commercial 
relationships as the only form of controlling the workforce. This was accepted and 
interpreted by the latter as pre-capitalist relations of production.
Weinstein6 refers to seringais as large estates and mentions the privatisation of 
rubber fields in the oldest municipalities in Para. Yet, she considers large estates as a 
phenomenon of the 'later boom years’ in upstream rivers areas, while familial 
smallholders (with small tracts of land) would have occupied rubber fields in Para. 
Most importantly, the view of familial smallholders from the perspective of pre­
capitalism and the notion of free land (in the sense of the existence of non-privatised 
land) moulding work relations constitute the central explanatory elements.
Santos’7 historical research surpasses the idea of nature or non-privatised nature 
defining economy or society. He searches for the causes of economic features in 
social relations by focusing on the native society’s economic-political interconnections 
nationally and internationally. Furthermore, he mentions the emergence of rubber 
estates after the 1850s, surpassing the notion of rubber fields as ‘free land’ occupied
about Amazonian history or, more precisely, it is marked by the presumption of an absence 
of history before the 1950s. In this sense, ‘free land’ became a particular way of looking at 
the region so long as the central idea is that before the 1950s Amazonia was characterised 
by both non- effective and permanent occupation of land and the absence of mercantile 
relationships. This view is combined with a dualistic approach in which south east Brazil is 
the ‘centre’ and Amazonia the 'periphery'. Consequently, the focus is concentrated 
exclusively on recent immigration from other regions of Brazil, which is assumed to have 
happened in stages; first peasants, then, capitalist investments after the 1960s. 
Consequently, recent Brazilian immigrant peasants are supposed to be pioneers of the 
permanent occupation of land (and/or of mercantile relationships and ‘integration’ of 
Amazonia in the ‘national economy’) so that the main issue in the region is supposed to be 
the relationship between peasantry and capitalism. This scheme was analysed critically in 
my previous historical research (1987-1991) the results of which were presented in Bentes 
February 1992 and 1996.
4 Pacheco de Oliveira 1979.
5 Weinstein 1983, chapter one, and 1984.
6 Weinstein 1983, p. 45.
7 Santos, R. 1980.
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only temporarily.8 However, the idea of cycles of exporting commodities suggests 
discontinuity of the rubber economy after the period 1870-1913, which he classifies 
as a rubber boom.
Martinelo9 criticises the notion of discontinuity. Yet, he reproduces Santos' neo­
classical approach, giving secondary importance to relations of production and 
stressing external investments. Continuity in rubber production is visualised by 
focusing on the so-called 'battle of rubber1, resulting from USA investments, during 
the Second World War.
A few masters dissertations10 represent interesting attempts to focus on 
entrepreneurial rubber production as a permanent enterprise. But old dogmas remain 
such as seringal being a simple mercantile undertaking and of non- or pre-capitalist 
relations of production leading to the secondary importance given to the sphere of 
production.
In my previous historical investigation, undertaken during the period 1987-1991,111 
came across the gap in existing literature on the definition of entrepreneurial rubber 
production which was not deeply tackled because the focus was on the emergence of 
peasantry in Amazonia in order to question the ’frontier peasantry' scheme. Seringal 
was focused on finding out if seringueiro could or could not be defined as 
autonomous familial producers.
Thus, the views of rubber production, as defined by 'free land’ or as non- or pre­
capitalist, remain essentially unquestioned.
The discussion which follows I intend to be my contribution to this debate. Seringal 
is defined as opposed to both (a) the supposition of temporary encampment or 
temporary commercial enterprise and (b) the view of non- or pre-capitalist relations of 
production. From the 1848 (particularly from the 1870s) onwards, the entrepreneurial
8 Actually, the privatisation of rubber fields was mentioned previously by Reis 1953 and 
Bonfim 1954.
9 Martinelo 1988.
10 Paula, J.1980 ; Duarte, H.1987; Silva, A. 1982; Pinto de Oliveira, 1985.
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production of rubber emerged and expanded under the form of seringal, which has 
three interconnected meanings. First, it is synonymous with a large estate, being 
private property in the modem sense. Second, it characterises capitalist social 
relations of production. Third, it means rubber fields or Hevea forest.
The social relations of production in seringal are capitalist because of features 
such as: (a) they are organised to produce commodities for profit in order to ensure 
capital accumulation; (b) they are characterised by the command of capitalists over 
subordinated forms of free labour; (c) this command is based on the private 
ownership of seringal as an estate and as a business. The specificity of these social 
relations of production are basically two fold: (a) the employment of different forms of 
subordinate free labour, including wage and salaried, in which seringueiros (rubber 
tapers engaged as labourers paid by results instead of by work time as for instance 
salaried labourers) were predominant and (b) the geomercantile privatisation and use 
of natural resources, involving a converging interaction with nature.
The problem was focused by doing a historical investigation on seringal in the 
Brazilian Amazonia in the period from the 1870s to 1930 (see the discussion on 
sources).
Interpretation of the results necessarily involves the discussion and definition of 
terms to apprehend the generic and specific meaning of seringal and to express the 
argument clearly, which is our concern in what follows. The rest of the chapter deals 
with historical sources and the outline of the thesis.
Issues in the Historiography
The debate on the rubber economy has revolved more around theoretical 
principles than historical research on social relations of production.
11 Bentes, February 1992 and 1996.
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The free land approach ignores social relations of production and the entire 
historical process of capitalism in rubber production due to the priority given to the 
assumption that the existence of ‘free land’ would favour the flourish of peasantry. 
Accounts of the privatisation of rubber fields by the traditional historiography12 are 
neglected or not questioned. And when Velho13 refers to seringal as a simple 
temporary mercantile undertaking, he ignores even Santos’s14 recent reference to it.
Moreover, results from the few attempts to analyse the privatisation of land are 
given secondary importance. For instance, investigation of the privatisation of rubber 
fields in a few municipalities in Para revealed familial smallholders and small and 
large-scale seringalistas15 (landowners in rubber yields,). However, this was not used 
to define the difference between peasant and entrepreneurial property and, most 
importantly, to find out who had effective control over rubber fields and the 
importance of this in the process of emergence and consolidation of an internal free 
labour market.
The traditional historiography16 is more narrative-descriptive than social science 
based. This literature gives important information on rubber production. Its weakness 
is the notion of seringal as a mercantile undertaking, resulting from the view that 
seringalistas would personalise commercial-usury capital not very keen on investing 
in production. In chapter four, I contest this view by demonstrating that the rule of 
seringalistas/merchant-seringalistas (merchants or commercial houses owning and 
running seringais indirectly by means of managers or in partnerships) as 
commanders of relations of production was deeper than their supposed absenteeism 
suggests. Actually, the descriptive account of the administrative organisation and
12 Reis, 1953; Quintiliano 1963; Bonfim 1954
13 Velho 1983, p. 33.
14 Santos, R. op.cit.
15 Weinstein 1983, p.46-49.
16 Reis 1953; Quintiliano op.cit.; Bonfim op.cit.; Santos, R. op.cit.
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division of labour in seringal by Reis17 seems to contradict the idea of a simple 
mercantile undertaking.
The historiography attempting to focus on seringais as productive enterprises in 
the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s is more social science based and reveals 
interesting features about the rubber economy in Acre. However, this literature has 
revolved around theoretical dogmas such as the automatic association of seringal 
with non- or pre-capitalist relations of production18 originated from two approaches. 
On the one hand was the emphasis on commercial relations from the perspective of 
aviamento (the regional denomination for buying on account) and debt, which is 
interpreted according to the Marxian definition of capitalist relations of production,19 
and so is considered as evidence of compulsory labour.20 On the other hand, was the 
focus on seringal from the perspective of enterprise in which the Weberian view on 
capitalist enterprise as synonymous with rational authority in opposition to supposed 
pre-capitalist ‘irrational’ authority or administration, which is based on the notion of 
economic processes as non-social phenomena, resulted in two biased 
interpretations. First, items of the internal regulations referring to aspects of social 
relations, not strictly linked to the process of rubber production, are considered ‘extra- 
economic’ so that seringal is defined as a particular case in which non-capitalist work 
relations would be combined within an economic organisation.21 Second, the 
interference of seringalistas’ individual character, materialised in a few cases of 
abuse of power over labour or even violent reaction to labour abscondment and non­
payment of debt, is viewed as evidence of an insane’ or ‘evil’ system of work.22
17 Reis op.cit.
18 Paula 1980 and 1981; Silva, A.op.cit.; Duarte, H. op.cit.
19 Paula op.cit.
20 Paula, J.1980 and 1981; Silva, A. 1982; Duarte, H.1987.
21 Teixeira, C. 1980 pp. 72-79, who absorbed well the Weberian sense of economic processes 
as non-social phenomena. See also Littler 1982, chapter 4, who analyses Weber’s view on 
bureaucracy and bureaucratisation in order to focus on the labour process.
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The neo-classical technical-economic approach focuses on the rubber economy 
from the perspective of the Western notion of civilisation and progress, arguing that 
local investors failed to adapt their enterprises to the standard of modernity and 
progress represented by the modern technology of large-scale monocultural rubber, 
but divergent views exist about the reasons for that.23 This approach ignores the 
seringalistas’ own project of economic and political changes and gives no evidence 
about how local capitalists invested and re-invested their profit, how they 
consequently changed or did not change rubber production, and why.
Our previous focus on work relations in seringais24 constituted a subsidiary issue 
in a historical investigation on the emergence of peasantry in Amazonia, which did 
reveal important points for the discussion of the matter since it raises questions to the 
‘free land* approach, demonstrates that rubber tapers were not familial autonomous 
producers in rubber estates and, most importantly, this first approach to the subject 
did point out weaknesses in the thesis of non- or pre-capitalist work relations in 
entrepreneurial rubber production and made clear that the subject demanded 
systematic investigation.
Issues Raised in, and the Contribution of the Literature to the Effort to Build 
Workable Definitions and Concepts
The organising element in our argument is a workable definition of capitalist social 
relations of production. This was built by confronting the problems in the prevailing 
interpretations of seringais and the findings of the historical investigation with the 
debate on the definition of capitalist relations of production. The reference to this is 
necessary to mention the contribution of the literature and make precise our 
argument.
22 Euclides da Cunha 1946 and 1986; Calixto 1993.
23 Martinelo op.cit. pp. 52-53; Dean 1989.
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Two basic ideas subterraneously or explicitly govern the prevailing interpretations 
of seringais: (a) his reference to ‘colonies’ as 'free land’ favouring the flourishing of 
peasantry25 and obstructing the capitalist mode of production;28 and (b) Marx’s view 
on history as a succession of modes of production in which the definition of capitalist 
relations of production is centred on wage labour so that money invested in 
production would become capital only when it is used in the exploitation of wage 
labour in order to obtain surplus.
A quick reference to the problems in such interpretations is crucial in the 
exposition of our argument.
Problems of the view of 'Colonies’ as ‘free lands’
The view of ‘colonies’ as ‘free land’ involves different concepts and notions. First of 
all, even considering that at least four notions of history have been found in Marx’s 
work,27 this view is linked to the common conception of changes, as governed by 
impersonal structures or 'mechanisms’ leading to predictable historical results, 
placing a central role on the technological changes. The consequent developmental 
notion of history links technological ‘evolution’ to transformation in exchange relations 
from use value to exchange value, interpreting industrialism as the last stage of the 
development of exchange value, being qualified as the superior development of 
human beings and the starting point of history.28
According to Muszynski,29 the central idea in this developmental concept of history 
is that all production, everywhere and at all times, creates use-value. It is exchange 
value that transforms production and, ultimately, use value itself. Assuming exchange
24 Bentes, February 1992 and 1996
25 Marx, 1989 p. 247.
26 Macpherson op.cit. p. 61.
27 Holton 1981.
28 See this view in Marx, 1973 p. 193 and 1974 pp. 112-13, and the study by Muszynski 1996 
p. 53.
29 Muszynski op.cit.
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value-industry is the starting point of History, then use value/non-industrial societies 
would represent pre-history in which human capacity developed only to a slight 
degree and at isolated points.30 Consequently, societies such as the First Nations are 
referred to as ‘tribes’ as opposed to societies or nations, and ‘primitive’ or ‘mere hunting 
and fishing peoples lie outside the point where real development begins’31 in contrast to 
'sophisticated,' 'civilised' peoples of industrial societies.
This simplistic view of human societies is inspired both in (a) the Western notion 
of civilisation and (b) the liberal economy. The term 'Western notion of civilisation’ 
refers Eurocentric and monoculturalistic interpretations of world history,32 built in 
nascent industrial Western Europe, according to which civilisation was the result of 
an evolution of methods of human beings mastering nature:
'By accumulated changes, some good, some bad, human society developed to the stage 
that historians define as civilisation. This was based on five crucial discoveries: 'how to 
control fire, how to plant seed and grow crops, how to tame and use work-animals like dog, 
ox and horse, how to smelt iron and other ores to make tools and weapons, and how to 
use the wheel to move heavy loads'.33
McLeish34 stresses that the level of technological sophistication, insofar as the 
cultural and societal aspects play a secondary role, is the only criterion defining 
civilisation in the Western definition. According to Berki35 a simplistic view of human 
societies by the liberal economy stems from the notion of rationality as synonymous 
with Western capitalist’s rationality whereby the human being is reduced to and 
conceived of as the ‘rational’ wealth-maker in opposition to supposed 'irrational’ and 
‘unconscious’ human beings of previous Western non-industrial societies and non­
western civilisations.
30 Marx, 1973 p. 158.
31 Grundisse 1973, p. 107; see also Muszynski 1996, pp. 51-62; Giddens 1997, p.229;
32 See an interesting debate on civilisation and Eurocentrism in Randall, 1940; Toynbee 1946; 
Quigley 1961; Wilkinson 1987; Frank, A & Gills, B. 1996. See comments on this literature 
on page 30 and footnote 84.
33 McLeish 1991, p. 125.
34 Ibid.
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Further evidence of the influence of such simplistic views of non-industrial 
societies in Marx’s thought is his concept of use value, which is associated with 
necessity and with the supposed ‘domination’ of nature over human beings in a cycle 
in which supposedly simple hunting and fishing peoples were caught trying to 
assume group survival without any great development of the knowledge that would 
later allow them to ‘master1 nature and, with it, ‘necessity’.38 This concept converges 
two notions. First, an a-historical view of human beings in which the Western 
capitalists’ efforts to 'master1 nature are conceived of as an expression of a superior 
stage of a generic and universal human ‘nature’. Second, people who do not 'master* 
nature are considered ‘primitive’, ‘unconscious’ and ‘irrational’, expressing somehow 
the conception of non-devastated nature as a symbol of wildness or absence of 
civilisation, which was brought about by the Western Notion of civilisation.37
The discriminatory character of such a view is revealed by Mecleish’s38 argument 
that in South America, the First Nations built cities several times the size of London at 
the time of Henry VIII. They had a written language (in the case of the Mayan 
hieroglyphics), produced artworks and jewellery, their calendar and science 
surpassed that of European scholars of the same period and as far as arithmetic was 
concerned, they were about a thousand years in advance of Europe. The First 
Nations in Amazonia not only had a method for extracting latex but also for 
manufacturing it into different rubber by-products, which was registered as early as 
1511.39 The French, English, Germans and North Americans only got to know about 
their manufacturing methods and started efforts to learn and adapt their methods to 
large-scale commodity production by the middle of the 18th century by means of a
35 See discussion on this matter by Berki, 1988. p. 59
38 Grundisse op.cit.
37 Thomas (1983, p. 25) shows that in Tudor and Stuart England ‘human civilisation was 
virtually synonymous with the conquest of nature’. And the idea of nature as meaning 
uncivilised men governed the actions of migrants Englishmen in the 17th century (Ibid p. 15). 
Finally, he says that 'Man’s domination over nature was the self-consciously proclaimed 
ideal of early modern scientists’ (Ibid p.29).
38 Ibid.
39 Coates 1987 pp. 4-10; Woodruff, 1958, pp. 1-2.
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report by Fresneau, who learned the methods from a man in Para.40 However, 
producers in Para had long since been modifying and adapting these methods to 
commodity production. Since the beginning of the 18th century they had been making 
pumps, syringes, small animal figures, balls, and other small articles for exporting.41 
As long ago as the beginning of the 19th century, small sale manufacturing had been 
established in Belem for producing waterproof articles such as ammunition bags, 
shoes, coatings and bottles, as well as syringes and balls to export to Portugal and 
the USA.42 Finally, Meggers43 mentions the cities of the First Nation, their tools and 
techniques of production, conservation of food etc.
The question, then, is how Westerners and Marx saw them. It is clear that they 
looked at them from the point of view that their level of technological sophistication 
did not fit the Western concept of civilisation. They controlled fire and cultivated crops 
but did not use horses, oxen or other domestic animals as work-beasts, nor did they 
have metal tools or weapons and wheels, expect on a few toys.44
McLeish argues that in looking at them in this way, Europeans 'failed utterly to 
understand’ that in no way were they 'inferior to the culture of the European incomers'; 
and they '(...) condemned its practices as satanic perversions and proceeded to plunder and 
destroy. Patterns of life and thought that had evolved over thousands of years were brought to 
an end in less than a generation by European firearms, explorers and Christian 
missionaries’.45
Miles46 does not consider this a ‘failure’, but an intentional act of class 
subordination, identifying the destruction of the First Nations with the destruction of 
feudal-peasantry in Western Europe. Thus, civilisation would be used as a tool to 
subdue those the Western European capitalists and State powers wanted to shape
40 Ibid.; Drabble, 1973.
41 Ibid; Whittleesey, 1931 p. 1.
42 Cruz 1973 p. 310; Mour§o 1989, p. 25; Santos, R. 1980; Weinstein, 1983; Coates op.cit.; 
Marin, 1985 p. 248; Dean op.cit. p. 32.
43 Meggers 1977.
44 McLeish op.cit. p. 126.
45 Ibid p. 126.
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as labour, not just outside but also inside Europe. Indeed, class subordination in 
Western Europe involved the destruction/subordination of feudal-peasantry just as 
the process of making labour in the American continent 
disorganised/destroyed/subordinated the First Nations. However, the later process is 
specific because it involves the invasion of territories occupied by peoples organised 
according to nations -  with proper economic-political-cultural organisations, having 
diversified languages etc. In this case, it is implied that the Western concept of 
civilisation denied the status of civilisation to those societies. Muszynski47 mentions 
the Western capitalists’ auto-denominations as 'civilised races’ in opposition to 'savage' 
natives48 or ‘harbingers of civilisation’ applies to peoples without religion or culture, 
therefore, interpreting the forced integration of aboriginal peoples into wage labour as 
part of the ‘civilising’ process in British Columbia.49
These are crucial processes revealing the biased and simplistic character of 
Marx’s reference to ‘colonies’ as ‘free land’. This involves three meanings or notions: 
(a) of the Western capitalist expansion abroad as the ‘colonisation’ of ‘empty’ 
territories, which has been reinforced even by the interesting recent debate on 
modern property by McPherson,50 (b) of the First Nations as ‘primitive’ and 
‘uncivilised’ peoples; and (c) of the absence of land property as monopoly.
In Capital the reference to 'colonies’ as ‘free land’ favouring the flourishing of 
peasantry and obstructing the capitalist mode of production was used as an example 
to enforce Marx’s thesis that land property as a monopoly of one class and the 
consequent expropriation of the people from the soil would be a necessary pre­
condition for the birth of the capitalist mode of production.51 In stating this he
46 Miles 1993 pp. 89-91.
47 Musynski 1996.
48 Ibid. p. 95.
49 Ibid p. 54.
50 See the debate on The Modern Theory of Colonisation’ by Marx op.cit. and Macpherson 
1978, chapter 5.
51 Marx, 1989 Part VIII; Macpherson 1978, p. 68-71.
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mentioned wage-labour52 and one must question how this emerged in colonies 
considering that it was supposed to be a propertyless workforce, emerging from a 
situation of land being monopolised. Thus, instead of confirming his thesis, Marx's 
example raises questions to it.
Recent studies have raised important questions to this postulate. First, the 
emergence and spread of peasantry or familial producers in the USA has been 
explained not as a mechanical result of free land, but in the context of capitalism after 
the second half of the nineteenth century.53 Second, the ’frontier peasantry’ 
approaches to focus on Amazonia (see footnote 3) are questioned by my previous 
research,54 which revealed important points: (a) the sweeping aside of Amazonian 
history by these approaches; (b) peasantry in Amazonia as a phenomenon brought 
about by the historical process of capitalism so that it is not pre-capitalist as feudal- 
peasantry was in Western Europe; (c) the emergence of peasantry after the middle of 
the 18th century, not as a result of ‘free land’ but linked to (1) the immigration of 
familial producers of food to the internal market, (2) official support to native families, 
and (3) the landless’ resistance to be turned into wage labour; (d) Amazonia was not 
‘free land’ but the territory of the First Nations, which was cleared from their 
occupation by a process of geomercantile privatisation of land in which 
entrepreneurs tended to privatise the best lands; so, (e) recent immigrant peasants 
are not ‘pioneers’ either of permanent occupation of land or of commercial relations.
Finally, the results of the present investigation raise questions to the supposition 
that in ‘colonies’ the separation of labour and their root, the soil, would not yet exist.55 
The privatisation of rubber fields is demonstrated to be a process re-affirming the 
historical pattern of privatising land in Amazonia (chapter 2), which was initiated by 
the freeing of land from the First Nations, and linked to the multiple historical process
52 Macpherson op.cit. p. 61.
53 Abramovay, R. 1992, capitulo 5; Malagodi 1995, pp. 150 and 319-323.
54 Bentes op.cit.
55 MacPherson op.cit. p. 70.
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of making the labour required by setting up enterprises to produce commodities 
(chapter 3).
Another finding was that the biased view on people who do not ‘master1 nature 
served as ideological tool in important processes regarding rubber production in 
Amazonia in the 19th and beginning of the 20th century. This was manifested in the 
ideas espoused by a British Consul56 during the First International Exposition of 
Rubber, in London, in 1908, on the converging interaction between human beings 
and nature in seringais, without the massive destruction of nature. The non­
devastated native Hevea forest was associated with ‘wildness’ or an ‘inferior stage of 
technological evolution’. This view emerged at a time when the Western notion of 
civilisation had been enforced by the Spencerian theory of the 'survival of the fittest’, 
which Bowler57 demonstrated to be a re-interpretation of Darwin’s evolution theory 
according to mainstream ideas and principles governing British imperialism after the 
1870s. So, ‘wild’ or non-industrial societies also meant unfit ones. Unfit people 
interacting with ‘wild’ nature were contrasted with those who had mastered nature 
and were considered the fittest in the triumphant view of the pattern of civilisation and 
progress represented by large-scale monocultural rubber.
The re-edition of the Western notion of civilisation in this matter was apparent. The 
consular correspondence responding to criticisms of the report classifies the 
seringalistas> demands for interventionism by the central government as ‘childish’,58 
which means the identification of seringalistas with the First Nations. This term 
emerged in the evolutionary discourse of the 19th century to refer to the First 
Nations/remaining nations as not well developed human beings or ‘inferior species’, as 
discussed in chapter three. The common element between them was the use of 
methods of extracting latex and making rubber not based on the idea of ‘mastering
56 F.O. and The Board of Trade. Diplomatic and Consular Reports -  Brazil (Report on the 
Trade of the Consular District of Para), 1908, p. 21.
57 Bowler, 1992.
58 F.O. 368/274 (1909), letter by Mr. Casement of November 7,1908.
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nature’. Thus, the classification of ‘childish’ and the reference to seringais as 
‘desolated swamps and forest1 - so incompatible with the modem notion of private 
property (see chapter two) - express the British Consul’s depreciatory view about 
people who do not ‘master’ nature,59 which at that time was being used in the 
attempts to sweep aside local rubber production, as discussed in chapter five.
Difficulties in the definition of capital centred on wage labour
In chapter four, it is demonstrated that seringais engaged different categories of 
labourers and, particularly in distantly located seringais until around 1912 immigrant 
labourers. Their engagement involved initial debt and the obligation to settle this 
before leaving the estate.
This particular feature has been improperly interpreted as compulsory forms of 
labour,60 labour immobilisation61 or pre-capitalist relations of production,62 which are 
views inspired in authors viewing slavery as a mode of production,63 or non- 
capitalism,64 or identifying indebted immigrant labourers in coffee plantations in S. 
Paulo with debt and peonage and indentured labour65 or with forms of servitude.66
The interesting point in such accounts is the explanation of the end of slavery as a 
result of multiple historical processes such as the conjuncture of constantly 
decreasing sugar prices after the middle of the 18th century, technological changes 
and the abolitionist movement in Brazil, particularly the passive resistance of African
59 This is a notion not mentioned by Anderson (Anderson, B. 1990) in his interesting 
discussion on nationalism. He interprets the metropolitans’ discrimination against ‘Creoles’ 
(the author uses this term to refer to descendants of Europeans born in Spanish colonies) 
in the colonial bureaucracy of Spanish colonies in South America, linked to non-devastated 
nature, as a distortion of Rousseau’s and Herder’s statement that climate and ecology have 
a constitutive impact on culture and character.59
60 Silva, A. op.cit. p. 23; Paula, J. op.cit. p. 30.
61 Pinto de Oliveira, L. 1985.
62 Silva, A. op.cit.; Paula, J. op.cit.; Pinto de Oliveira op.cit.; Duarte, H.1987
63 Gorender, 1985.
64 Dias, 1970.
65 Holanda, S. 1951; Dean 1976, chapter 4. See discussion on this matter in Lamounier 1993 
p. 11-13.
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slaves by means of the organisation of quilombos (which were villages organised by 
fugitive slaves in distant places).
However, these accounts are inspired by the conception of history as a succession 
of modes of production and by the definition of capitalist relations of production 
centred on wage labour.
These are conceptions permeating even studies on sharecropping contracts which 
argued against the identification of indebted immigrant labourers in coffee plantations 
with debt peonage.67 The focus on sharecropping contracts from the perspective of 
‘transition’ to free labour or free labour market hides important differences among 
different regions of Brazil. At the same time, these studies over-emphasise the 
prohibition of traffic in slaves in 1852, giving secondary importance to the multiple 
internal historical processes mentioned by previous studies. Lamounier68 does 
consider differences between the use of different categories of labourers in Cuba and 
in Brazil. However, she works on the notions of ‘transition’ and 'experiments’ with 
different categories of labour, and despite arguing that a 'free labour market’ might 
not have been the final end envisaged by 19th century planters, she does not deal 
with the theoretical issues on the table.
The idea that entrepreneurs started to ‘experiment’ with different categories of 
labourers only after the traffic prohibition is quite unsustainable when it is taken into 
account that this constituted a constant practice in Amazonia from the very beginning. 
In my previous research, and in chapter three, it is demonstrated that slave labour was 
never the exclusive type of labour, and it was not even the predominant one. From the 
beginning, non-slave and free labourers were predominant and the number of free 
labourers increased gradually, particularly after 1755, when the enslavement of natives
66 Viotti da Costa 1982, pp. 104-105.
67 Stolcke, 1988 and Stolcke and Hall, 1983.
68 Lamounier, 1993.
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was prohibited. In addition, colonial production employed wage labour in administrative 
jobs, and Furtado69 mentions that this was a common feature all over Brazil.
Regarding seringais, although there are a few historical references to the use of 
slave labour in arranchamentos, that is expeditions to extractive areas situated in terras 
devoiutas, before the middle of the 19th century, no records have been found of such a 
practice on rubber estates. In contrast to sugar and coffee plantations, rubber estates 
were not a mix of slave/free labour enterprises, changing to a system of free labour 
later. From the beginning, rubber estates were based on different categories of free 
labour.
As discussed in chapter three, seringueiros were not properties of the commander 
of the process of production. On the contrary, they were free labourers and, as such, 
they were responsible for their own keep even during the period between harvests and, 
in the case of immigrants, from the time they left their homeland.
The focus on work relations centred on indebtedness has not just ignored the fact 
that initial debt resulted from a loan to be re-paid with interest, it has also inevitably 
associated this with a view on both the interference of the boss’s subjectivity and 
individual character and of oppression in general as ‘abnormal’ or incompatible with 
capitalism. This results from approaches interpreting economic processes as non­
social phenomena and associating capitalism with ‘civilisation’, well-being, ‘rationality’ 
and the absence of violence/oppression in opposition to non- or pre-capitalism. In the 
discussion on this matter, I have referred to studies mentioning different levels of 
violence/oppression and interference of boss’s subjectivity and individual character, for 
instance in England and on rubber plantations, not from a comparative perspective but 
as an argument to the point that the historical process of capitalism does involve those 
elements.
In seringais, debt did not mean labour immobilisation since there was an increase in 
labour rotation over time and oppressive elements can be understood in the context of
69 Furtado, 1959.
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fragile labour bargaining power at that time. Moreover, the results of the investigation 
show that in seringais commercial relations and indebtedness did not define work 
relations. Rather, they were historical circumstances. Work relations were defined by 
the ways the command of production were exerted or, in other words, the ways 
labourers were engaged, controlled and disciplined. Seringais employed different 
categories of free labour in which the direct producers of rubber are defined as 
seringueiros, being labourer or peasant-workers, who were engaged as single workers, 
specialised producers of rubber and as subordinate labour paid by results. They were 
not autonomous producers. Appropriately, owners were called patrao, which means 
boss, instead of patronage, as discussed in chapter four, characterising perfectly the 
class relations in seringais. The term seringalista is largely used in this thesis as a 
means of connecting landowner and boss.
These features require reference to be made to the broad controversies on the 
definition of capitalist relations of production.
First, the developmental/dualistic controversy on the definition of capitalism in 
which on the one hand, one defends the thesis of ‘colonies’ as non- or pre­
capitalism70 based on both the Marxian definition and the over-emphasis on nation­
state approaches from the perspective of a developmental and dualistic view.71 This
70 Defended by Banaji, 1972 and 1977; Brenner 1977 and 1985; Rey 1971 and 1975; Brewer 
1990, chapter 10.
71 This is a view originated in the triumphant view of industrialism/modern technology as an 
expression of ‘superiority’, ‘advance’ and ‘development’ so that social inequalities and 
poverty are associated with non-industrialised countries or regions. The problems of the 
‘development’/’underdevelopment’ approaches are not directed linked to our theme. 
However it is worth to mention two points, which are quite apparent in Brewer (1990). On 
the one hand, he does not consider the negative effects of modem technology in 
industrialised countries such as air pollution, acid rain, decreasing quality of food, noise etc 
in the evaluation of living conditions (In Europe just 1% of the lands is left in its original 
state, while 99% is exploited or 99% of the original forest/nature has been destroyed as 
mentioned by Buckley, 1992). On the other hand, he centres his argument on the 
questionable assessment that the benefits of increased productivity allowed by modem 
technology and by capitalist relations of production have not been shared with the working 
class and other groups in ‘underdeveloped’ countries but it would have been shared in 
‘developed’ or ‘advanced’ countries. The latter would be guaranteed by trade union 
organisations and by bourgeois democratic institutions (Brewer, op.cit. p. 8-9). The effort to 
define the differences between Western countries and Latin American countries as the 
‘backwardness’ of the latter compared with the former, hides the fact that the benefits of 
increased productivity allowed by modern technology/industrialism have not been shared
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approach resulted in both (a) the view that capitalism started in industrialised S. 
Paulo and then expanded to the rest of the country in a linear expansion of space 
until it reached Amazonia, which is identified with 'free land’ and the 'frontier1 of 
commercial/productive capital,72 sweeping aside its History; (b) the approach of ‘later 
capitalism’73 which considered that before the emergence and spread of industry in S. 
Paulo the Brazilian economy was a simple commercial colonial economy. On the 
other hand, the opposing interpretations question neither the triumphant view of 
industrialism/modern technology nor the nation-state developmental/dualistic 
approach. They simply try to explain ‘underdevelopment’ or ‘dependent capitalism’ as 
an element brought about by capitalist relations of production-trade. This is a very 
interesting point posited by Frank74 and other theorists of the 'dependency theory’.75 
Criticisms of this theory have been concentrated on the ambiguous and imprecise 
concept of ‘dependency’ due to the hesitation ‘between a national approach and a 
class approach’.76 Finally, Wallerstein’s77 alternative definition of capitalism is weak 
due to (a) the notion of a world-system as an impersonal structure, and (b) the 
secondary importance given to social relations of production, resulting from the 
erroneous argument that in regions with dense ‘indigenous’ populations in South 
America, the direct producers would not have been deprived of their ownership of the
with the working class in general and other social groups anywhere in the world. Actually, 
capitalist production is not meant to share benefits but to profit in order to ensure capital 
accumulation. Moreover, the author considers neither the critical view on triumphant 
interpretations of the historical process of capitalism in Britian by Cain and Hopkins (1994) 
nor the debate on increasing poverty and social inequalities in England (There plentiful 
literature on this. See for instance Green, 1995; Kaur, Lingayah and Mayo, 1997 and 
Edwards, P. and Flatley, J. 1996).
72 This is one of the most important views in the ‘frontier peasantry’ scheme previously 
mentioned.
73 Mello, 1987; Cano, 1981.
74 Frank, 1967, 1969 and 1978.
75 Joining Frank op.cit. works by Maurine, 1973; Cardoso, 1972 and 1977; Cardoso & Falleto, 
1970; Santos, T. 1973 can be considered.
76Weffort, 1978; Figueiredo, 1978.
77 Wallerstein, 1974, 1983.
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means of production.78 This view sweeps aside the previously mentioned historical 
process regarding the First Nations.
Second, the controversy over the definition of capitalist relations of production in 
the debate on rural enterprises in post-colonial Brazil whose weakness is the 
reluctance to use historical findings on work relations based on different categories of 
labour to contest the Marxian definition of capitalism.79 The result has been two 
opposing interpretations: the thesis of non-capitalist and capitalist natures of 
agricultural production. Therefore, while some stress the distinctive features of the 
organisation of work in rural enterprises to argue for their non-capitalist nature, others 
oppose this by using the Marxist argument that those relations of production were 
integrated and part of the broad process of capital reproduction, being capitalists from 
the broad perspective of capital expansion. Thus, even when they do not look like 
capitalists they would be work relations re-defined by capital expansion.80
Studies on sharecropping labourers on coffee plantations, previously mentioned, 
have tried to shift from this debate by ignoring the theoretical issue on the table. 
Coffee plantations continued to use non-wage labour even after the 1880s. Even 
after the end of slavery, in the period from 1888 to 1930, familial producers 
represented 50 to 75% of the workforce on coffee plantations, and wage labour was 
contracted only on a small scale and for performing specific tasks.81 Finally, sugar 
and coffee plantations employed wage labourers even when they were mainly based 
on slave labour.82
78 Wallerstein, 1983 pp. 9-10.
79 The strongest example of this is Palacios’ (1980) interesting study on haciendas in 
Colombia. His expectation of wage-labour as the developmental ‘normal’ and ‘necessary’ 
form of capitalism account for both his conclusion that haciendas not based exclusively on 
wage labour seemed abnormal and difficult to define and his perplexity, questioning why 
the farmer did not adopt wage-labour as the only category of workforce as would be the 
normal development (Ibid p. 120).
80 Bruit, H. 1982.
81 Sallum Junior, 1982. See also Lamounier, 1993.
82 Furtado, 1959.
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Thus, the literature questioning Marx, directly or indirectly, is quite useful in order 
to build a workable definition of capitalist social relations of production. Changes in 
historical83 and international historical84 thoughts in the 20th century, stressing a 
multicultural historical view, which is more adequate than the Eurocentric approach to 
understand the cultural-economic-political multiplicity and diversity which characterise 
human history, have permeated the debate on the definition of capitalist social 
relations of production in the countryside in many ways.
Malagodi85 discusses Marx’s problematic view on the country economy, 
expressed in two points: (a) the conception of capitalism in the country as an 
extension or development of a mode of production regarded as originating in the 
urban environment, and (b) the internalisation of the theory of rent as the only way of 
focusing on the rural economy, resulting in Marx’s problematic conception of forms of 
production other than capitalist/wage-labourers as remnants of the past or as a bad 
formation of capitalism.66
The problem in this interesting discussion is the explanation for Marx’s view on 
relations or forms of production other than capitalist/wage labour as a simple result of
83 Iggers (1997, Introduction) discusses changes in historical thought in the 20th century, 
bringing about (a) the idea of a plurality of civilisations (one of the first authors to speak 
about it was Spengler 1926); (b) a shift from a sequence of events to the examination of 
conditions during a specific time period (Bloch, 1964; Braudel, 1972-74); (c) the new idea 
that even a specific epoch did not constitute an integrated unit or that historical times varied 
with the subject of study, each with a different speed and rhythm (Braudel op.cit.); (d) the 
notion that even within a set social framework, differing conceptions of time co-existed or 
competed (Le Goff 1980, Thompson, 1967) and (e) new histories sometimes integrated into 
a larger narrative, but often apart from it, resulting from claims by minorities excluded from 
historical narratives (women and ethnic minorities). Particularly the studies on different 
identities, implied in the recognition of different cultures interfering in human history, raise 
questions about the Marxist emphasis on the central role of politics and economics as the 
locus of power and exploitation (Iggers op.cit. p. 8).
84 The debate on civilisation and Eurocentrism (Randall op.cit.; Toynbee op.cit.; Quigley 
op.cit.; Wilkinson op.cit.; Franc, A. & Gills op.cit.) argues a fundamental continuity between 
the ancient and modem world even when the specificity of capitalist relations of production 
is considered (Ekholm and Friedman, 1996 p. 71); and stresses a multicultural historical 
approach. The weakness in this debate is the use of the traditional notion of system and the 
dualistic view of centre-periphery to explain ancient societies.
85 Malagodi, 1985.
86 Malagodi op.cit. p. 241 and p. 423.
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the theory of rent. In the classical economy,87 consideration of the rural economy only 
by means of the theory of rent results from the concern to explain economic 
processes only when capital investment occurs and from the point of view of that 
investment. In Marx, on the contrary, the concentration on capital investments, 
identified in the relationship between capitalists/wage labourers, results from and 
involves, two basic issues: (a) the contradiction expressed in the attempt to define 
capital as social relations of production, resulting from his criticisms of the classical 
economists’ focus on the economy as natural phenomena and not as social 
phenomena, at the same time as he conceived changes as governed by universal 
permanent forces as a sort of ‘law’ of nature; and (b) the translation of this notion of 
changes into a developmental notion of History in which the relationship between 
capitalists/wage labourers is regarded as the 'law of motion’ so that this would 
necessarily be generalised, eliminating any other form or social relation of production.
In the 1970s, criticisms of the notion of economic processes as non-social 
phenomena resulted in the first proposition of an institutional approach by 
economists.88 Clark89 argues that Marx uses the classical economists’ theory of 
natural value (instead of social value) to explain the economy, expressed in his 
explanation of prices in which offer and demand are conceived of as a sort of natural 
law regulating all the economy, reproducing the explanation of prices independent of 
society and history. This would be the weakness of the so-called 'transformation 
problem’90 since it is attempted to explain economic processes by looking for an 
invariant measure of value in which the Marxian contradiction would have been 
treated as a purely logical problem, as if the forces that order society and the 
economy were universal.91
87 The analyses on classical economy consulted were the following: Green,R. 1992; 
Aspromourgos 1995; Malagodi 1993 and 1995.
88 See on this Clark (Editor), 1995 and Tool, M. (Editor) 1993.
89 Clark, 1995 p. 38.
90 See on this: Young, 1978; Pack, 1985; Potier, J. 1991;
91 Clark op.cit. p. 35.
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However, the author proposes an institutional approach to meet a disciplinary 
concern of preventing economic theory's march to irrelevance,92 renewing the 
conception of ‘economic/economy’ as an impersonal matter, separated from the 
‘social’.93
Institutional approaches by neo-classical studies on enterprise represents a step 
beyond previous neo-classical approaches due to the incorporation of the idea of 
economic processes being political.94 However, according to Adelman,95 the 
emphasis on the motives governing individual decision-making under different 
proprietary regimes, reproduces the old a-historical view on capitalist social relations, 
originated in the ontological problem of focusing on entrepreneurs as individuals 
representing a supposed human ‘nature’. Adelman’s contribution to the debate is in 
the use of the notion of property relations rather than rights, emphasising social 
relations giving substance to the right to use property, not vice versa.96 However, he 
is concerned with differentiated patterns of ‘development’ and refers to social 
relations from the perspective of ‘agents’ without define this. Finally, institutional 
studies on rubber estates in Malaysia give a descriptive account in opposition to 
native smallholders, centred exclusively on the technology of large-scale 
monocultural rubber on a structure of plantation,97 giving secondary importance to 
social relations of production.
Studies tackling the influence of a developmental notion of History in the Marxian 
definition of capitalist relations of production represent a step further in this debate. 
The previously mentioned developmental notion of History had been said to involve 
the generalisation of findings on the specific historical process of industrial capitalism
92 Clark, 1995.
93 The same author shows that actually the classical economists’ conception of economy as a 
discipline looking at ‘ordering’ or ‘stable’ elements in society in opposition to ‘social 
sciences’, which would deal with elements of ‘disorder1 and ‘instability’, governs the 
economic focus on institutions in which institutions have been identified with persistent 
forces of the society (Ibid).
94 Harris, J.; Hunler, J. and Lewis, C. (Editors) 1995.
95 Adelman, 1994.
96 Ibid p. 12.
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in Britain as ‘laws’ of capitalism, without distinguishing between the specific and the 
generic features of it.98 At the same time, capital is conceived of as an English 
phenomenon, something criticised as not standing up, even considering that England 
assumed the hegemony in the process of industrialisation.99 Moreover, Marxists and 
non-Marxists have contested the definition of capital as synonymous with 
industrialism.100
The new element in Musynski’s101 work is the stress on Marx’s view on the 
relationship between capitalists/wage labourers as the 'law of motion’ as a result of a 
conscious search for the law of motion or how capitalism contained its own seeds of 
destruction.102 As a result, the new element in the historical process of capitalism in 
England -  the relationship between capitalists/wage labourers -  was detached from 
historical conditions and interpreted as having the ‘laws of motion’ or containing the 
general force governing historical changes. This developmental notion of History 
implies the expectation of social homogenisation into capital/wage-labour in which 
work relations other than capitalist/wage-labourer would disappear for sure.
According to Muszynski103 this is the reason why Marx’s focus on rural society is 
centred exclusively on the capital/wage-labour relationship or in the process of 
proletarianisation. This view is shaped by Marx’s search for signs of capital/wage- 
labour or ‘pure’ capitalism regarded as expressions of modernity or a superior stage 
of development, signs of civilisation and bearer of the seeds of transformation to 
another mode of production, rather than aiming to explain capitalism as it appears in 
the real historical process.
97 McHale, 1967 p. 63; Barlow, 1978, p. 1.
98 This has been mentioned by Holton op.cit. and in the debate from the perspective of 
criticisms to Marx’s Eurocentrism in Amin, 1989; Bernal, 1987; Frank and Gills, 1996.
99 Wallerstein op.cit.
100 Wallerstein, 1993; Cain and Hopkins, 1983; Malagodi op.cit. pp. 239-240.
101 Muszynski, 1996.
102 This would be the contradiction between productive forces and social relations of 
production, which would be resolved through class conflicts, enabling the transformation of 
capitalism through revolutionary class struggle into, first, a socialist and, ultimately, a 
communist, society (Muszynski 1996, p. 254). See also Berki op.cit. p. 130; Giddens op.cit.
103 Muszynski op.cit.
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Consequently, the Marxian definition of capitalist relations of production does not 
stand up when pitted against the varying and multicultural character of the historical 
process of capitalism. Actually, there is no sign of homogenization in this. The debate 
on peasantry shows that the very expansion of capitalism has created conditions 
enforcing the emergence of peasants and forms of familial producers,104 transforming 
migration into a survival strategy of peasants,105 and involving the emergence of 
peasant-workers as a stable hybrid social condition of being peasants and 
proletarians at the same time, thereby presenting a specific identity.106
Our previous investigation into the emergence of peasantry in Amazonia, as 
already mentioned, revealed that the historical process of capitalism in the region 
involved multiple processes.107 The initial process of freeing land from the First 
Nations, which was also a process of making the labour required by setting up 
enterprises to produce colonial commodities, destroyed the First Nations as such, but 
resulted in multiple phenomena such as the survival of remaining nations, the 
emergence of peasantry and of different categories of free labour, including wage 
labour as discussed in chapter three. This is a range of transformations engendered 
by the historical process of capitalism, which is different from the historical process of 
capitalism in Britain where feudal-peasants were destroyed completely. In Amazonia, 
there were no feudal-peasants, but the First Nations, so that they were the societies 
prior to capitalism in the region, while remaining nations, peasantry and different 
forms of free labour resulted from, and are an intrinsic part of, the historical process 
of capitalism.
104 Abramovay op.cit.; Malagodi, 1995.
105 Garcia Fr. 1990; Woortmann, 1990; Meillassoux, 1977; Menezes, 1985.
106 Menezes (1995) demonstrates this in North East of Brazil. Holmes (1983) and Sozan 
(1976) understand that the peasant-worker phenomenon is not new but goes back to the 
17th century in Italy and in Hungary, constituting a theoretical and historical category of a 
relatively stable socio-economic nature.
107 Bentes, February/1992 op.cit., Parte II, chapters 2 and 4.
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This material raises questions about the assumption that there was just merchant 
capitalism in ‘colonies’.108 A transformation in the way production was organised and 
commanded was on course since 1615-16 in Amazonia. At the same time, and as 
part of the same long historical process of the birth of a capitalist interdependent 
transnational economy, capitalism was forged in the region, not just as mercantile 
capital, but as a social relation of production governed by the aim of profiting in order 
to ensure capital accumulation.109 This indicates the need to consider such processes 
as early capitalism. This implies recognition that in Western Europe capitalism is a 
phenomenon forged through transformations in feudal society. However, this was just 
one of the multiple historical processes in which capitalism was built as a 
transnational inter-dependent economy.
Finally, evidence of non-social homogenization into industrialist/proletariat 
relationships and the existence of coercive/oppressive work relations is given even in 
relation to the historical process of capitalism in England where Marx concentrated 
his analysis. Feminist approaches110 have stressed Marx’s concept of capital as 
based on the European male working class, ignoring the brutal character of child and 
female labour in England during the industrial revolution. Considering capital as 
synonymous with wage labour, Cain and Hopkins state that in England until at least 
1914
“(...) capitalist activities in the service sector were accompanied by services which were not 
in themselves capitalist. In fact, all forms of capitalism attach services and servants to 
themselves and may also be subject to rulers who are not capitalists either”.111
Moreover, economic historical literature has shifted from the definition of 
capitalism centred on wage labour by considering the character of commodity
108 Wallerstein op.cit; Holton op.cit
109 There are plenty evidence on investments in new technology of sugar and rum production, 
for instance, in colonial Amazonia, as mentioned in Bentes op.cit. appendix 1. Cruz (1964, 
pp. 35-37) mentions that in 1751 there were 24 ‘real’ sugar mills in Para, which means 
those mills based on the most sophisticated technology at that time.
110 See an interesting discussion of this literature in Muszynski op.cit. 29-31. See also Kuhm, 
A. and Wolpe, A. 1978, and McDonough, R. and Harrison, R. 1978.
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production to maximise profits and rent in order to ensure capital accumulation112 or 
simply by considering profitability.113
However, the debate on the concept of class goes further because it questions the 
use of impersonal structures or categories of analysis. Thompson114 argues that 
‘class in its modern usage arises within the 19th century industrial capitalist society’ 
with its ‘class institutions, class parties, class culture, etc.’.115 He refers to that as the 
‘mature concept of class’, which is specific in relation to the previous sense of class. 
He mentions the difficulty of using the category class in the sense it has in industrial 
society for analysing societies prior to it in England.116 In these quotations there is an 
implicit insight to class, not as a static and formal category of analysis but as a 
historical phenomenon. Yet, he focuses on the experiential historical process of class 
formation,117 without distinguishing between the two notions of class implicit in his 
work: (a) class as a social condition; (b) class-consciousness, both of which are 
historical phenomena. Yet, one clear facet of class is that it is a social condition in 
which the individual is inserted many times without his/her will. Another thing is 
his/her consciousness and political behaviour regarding this condition of class.
Muszynski’s118 work expresses the conjuncture post-1960s in the USA119 in which 
Marxist conceptions of class appeared inadequate due to the increasing awareness 
of other social divisions such as gender, race, ethnicity, and life style. Actually, she 
questions the notion of class as an impersonal phenomenon by arguing about the 
influence of subjective elements of social relations such as discrimination of gender, 
age and race in relations of production in the fishery industry in British Columbia. She 
amplifies the Marxian concept of class, using the concept of patriarchy, arguing that
111 Cain and Hopkins op.cit. p. 27.
112 Sabato, 1990.
113 Miller, S. 1990.
114 Thompson, E. 1978.
115 Ibid pp. 133-65.
116 Ibid p. 148.
117 Ibid, p.149.
118 Muszynski, 1996.
119 See on this Iggers op.cit. p. 6.
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the boss’s attitude originated in the Western patriarchal mentality with regard to 
gender, race and age to a great extent influenced the categorisation of labour, 
according to which labourers were valued, receiving different levels of salary.
Workable Definitions and Concepts
Three basic definitions or terms guide our argument such as:
(a) Capital as a Social Relation of Production Historically Built
The workable definition of capitalist social relations of production guiding our 
argument is that this is a relation of production historically built and defined by (a) 
production organised to produce commodities for profit in order to ensure capital 
accumulation; (b) social relations of production characterised by class relations in 
which class refers to the opposing social conditions of owners versus workers, 
owners/propertyless of the means of rubber production (rubber fields and the 
enterprise) and commanders of the organisation/process of production versus 
subordinate labour. Relations of class are necessarily influenced by 
objective/subjective elements of social relations and by specific historical 
circumstances. Therefore, capitalist relations of production can never be expected to 
be homogenized into the pattern of industrial relations of production in Western 
Europe.
(b) Geomercantile Privatisation of Land
The seringalistas’ class condition of owner of the means of production and, in 
general, the influence of the social relations of land property in the emergence of the 
labour market for seringais was understood by using the term geomercantile 
privatisation of land. This was a term used in my previous research to express the
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highly selective way of privatising land in Amazonia.120 Selectivity assumes a particular 
meaning in the effective appropriation and incorporation of rubber fields in rubber 
production because it was defined not just by location/soil fertility as before, but by 
location/density and species of gum. That is, the Hevea forest itself was transformed 
into land-forest to be appropriated according to private property in the modern sense.
The term geomercantile privatisation of land involves three different social 
elements: (1) the social relations of land property in which access to the best lands 
was socially unequal since the best lands tended to be privatised by entrepreneurs, 
who, besides privatising the best lands, created strategies to prevent direct producers 
from doing the same, so influencing the emergence and consolidation of a free labour 
market, as discussed in chapter three; (2) in this relation of property, land was 
appropriated as private property in the modem sense; (3) the converging relation with 
nature in which the search for profit does not necessarily imply ‘mastering’ or 
'dominating’/destroying nature.
MacPherson’s concept of modern property was adopted because it fits the 
features of seringal as estate when he defines modern property as individual 
ownership, being a right enforced by the State instead of by custom or convention as 
in previous societies, as well as an ‘(...) individual right unlimited in amount unconditional on the 
performance of social functions, and freely transferable (...)’.121 Moreover, the author’s 
discussion of private property stresses the distinctive feature of Marx’s accounts of 
private property in relation to the liberal views: the social implication of the private 
ownership of the means of production. That is, the historical transformation of the 
means of production in Western Europe into private property of the class 
commanding the process of production independent of any social requirements.
However, this is a point linked to the interpretation of the special condition of land 
as the monopoly of one class in England as a supposed ‘law’ of capitalism or the
120 Bentes op.cit.
121 MacPherson, 1978 p. 10.
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necessary pre-condition for the birth of capitalist relations of production. The 
consequent view on ‘colonies’ as ‘free land’ is contested in this thesis, first of all by 
demonstrating that there was no ‘free land' in Amazonia but instead a long, slow 
historical process of freeing the land from the First Nations’ occupation followed by a 
selective privatisation of land by Westerners, and second, by taking into account that 
this does not determine capitalist social relations of production as a mechanical result 
but it does constitute one important element in the long and multiple historical 
process in which the labour demanded by entrepreneurial commodity production was 
forged.
The selective view of nature resulting from the converging relation with nature was 
debated by classical economy by means of the theory of differential rent. Ricardo122 
defines rent as 'that compensation which is paid to the landowner for the use of its 
original and indestructible powers.' Rent would be the difference between the 
produce obtained by the employment of two equal quantities of capital and labour. 
The extra gain above the average profit obtained in the best quality land would stem 
from the difference between the cost of production in the best quality land and market 
prices since prices would be determined by the highest cost of production in lower 
quality lands.
According to Malagodi123 the problem with this theory is that it considers the rural 
economy exclusively from the point of view of capital, ignoring other forms of rent or 
production. Marx’s theory of absolute rent, which tried to explain investments other 
than capitalist ones would not stand up and his contribution to the discussion on rural 
issues would be restricted to the improvement of Ricardo’s theory of differential rent 
when he raised questions such as natural fertility and location being historical 
conditions as long as technological changes can modify them, and he distinguished 
surplus from profit. The author concludes that of the entire debate on the rural
122 Ricardo, D. 1962, chapter II, On Rent.
123 Malagodi op.cit. pp. 139-148 and 441-42.
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economy by means of differential rent, including classical economy and Marx, only 
the Ricardian theory of differential rent stands up, since the historical context in which 
it was built is taken into account and from the point of view that it explains why 
capitalists invest in land and with the consideration that it focuses only on land of 
superior quality, which can propitiate the generation of capitalist rent.124 It does not 
mean that capital investment would necessarily generate homogenisation of the 
entire economy into capitalist production. His statements are useful for drawing 
attention to the existence of different forms of production in the country economy, 
particularly peasantry, as previously mentioned. Yet, the author reproduces the 
Marxian contradiction of trying to explain capital as a social phenomenon at the same 
time as conceiving it as governed by laws, as was previously mentioned.
Besides ignoring other forms of production, the theory of rent is based on the 
notion of the economic process as a non-social phenomenon. This is apparent in the 
attempt to explain prices as mechanical results of the cost of production in the lower 
quality land in which prices are not looked at as socially built.
Moreover, the classical theory of differential rent expresses the particular historical 
process of capitalism in rural England, where the extra gain in the best land was 
converted into rent to be paid to landowners. Although there is evidence of rent in 
rubber fields, it was not a significant feature, at least until the 1920s, as discussed in 
chapter two. Thus, the extra gain generated in conditions of superior quality of soils 
or advantageous situation appears not as rent, but as favouring superior profitability 
that justified the appropriation of distant lands. Every time the price of a product rose 
it favoured the transformation of new layers of soils or forests into valued lands 
because higher prices could cover the high cost of transport from distant lands to 
consuming centres and ports of exportation.
124 Idem; see also Malagodi, 1993 and s/d.
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(c) The Double Movement: English Rubber Dealers versus Serinaalistas
This term ‘double movement’ refers to the relationship of seringalistasAnerchant- 
seringalistas versus foreign rubber dealers, which was focused because the 
seringalistas’ responses to the foreign rubber dealers’ movements towards the rubber 
economy revealed important points such as (a) their project for rubber economy; and
(b) the reasons for it.
Our argument is that the discussion on work relations is not enough to prove 
capitalist relations of production. It is necessary to demonstrate profitability and 
capital accumulation.
This matter has been neglected by the literature for different reasons such as the 
view of seringalistas as simple traders-usurers not keen on investing in production or 
the notion that seringalistas failed to adapt their enterprises to the pattern of 
modernity and progress represented by the modern technology of monocultural 
rubber.
I do not deny that seringalistas did not adapt their enterprise to the standard of 
modernity and progress represented by large-scale monocultural rubber. What I 
argue is that the literature does not consider the seringalistas' own project of 
economic and political changes. Did it include large-scale monocultural rubber? 
Actually, the literature does not give evidence about how seringalistas invested or re­
invested the profit they got from rubber and why they did so. Although this matter 
requires to be researched in its own right, the subject is referred to by considering 
these actors’ own project of economic and political changes for the rubber economy 
and by showing re-investments, changes and capital accumulation in one seringal 
located in the most important stretch rubber producer in Acre State (see discussion 
on sources).
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Their project was not readily achieved, but was built and changed over time 
according to the way they conceived and responded to obstacles to profitability and 
capital accumulation imposed by the historical circumstances in which they were 
making decisions. One of the main historical circumstances imposing obstacles to 
the retention of profit from rubber production by seringalistas was the way they were 
related to foreign rubber dealers. They depended on services of exportation-shipment 
monopolised by foreign rubber dealers until around 1906, who also offered a 
considerable part of the credit available for rubber production, and used this position 
to impose low prices on local producers and in fact used it to provoke constant 
oscillations in rubber prices in Belem, as discussed in chapter five.
The relationship between local-foreign capitalists has been the object of 
controversy, which has to be mentioned in order to be precise in our argument.
At least three nation-state approaches can be identified. First, was the ‘theory of 
development’ and ‘structural dualism’125 at the end of the 1950s and beginning of the 
1960s. Furtado126 gives a brilliant account of the way the commercial treats with 
England affected the Brazilian exporting economy indirectly. Yet, the nation-state 
approach results in a sort of ‘external’ link between nations rather than inter-class 
interdependent relationships.
Second, was the ‘dependency theory’127 which emphasises features of what it calls 
'dependent capitalism’ such as industrialisation unable to produce means of 
production, which would characterise technological dependency, the presence of 
foreign corporations and so on. But it presents many difficulties as has been largely 
discussed.
125 Furtado, 1954; 1959; 1960; see also comments by Lewis s/d.
126 Furtado, 1959 cap. 17 and 19.
127 Frank, 1967; Maurine, 1973; Cardoso, 1972; 1977; Cardoso & Falleto, 1970; Santos, T. 
1973.
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Third, was Gallagher’s and Robinson's thesis of the imperialism of free trade.128 
This approach presents practical difficulties to apprehend the relationship 
seringalistas/merchani-seringalistas versus foreign rubber dealers. For instance, 
Graham129 uses generic terms such as ‘Latin America’, ‘Brazilians’, and ‘British’. The 
converging class interests among certain Brazilian and English capitalists around the 
principle of economic liberalism are interpreted as an ‘imitation’ of English 
imperialistic values. This represents the generalisation of actions by a few Brazilians 
and English businessmen to Brazilian and British citizens. At the same time, it 
expresses the interpretation of features of capitalism as nation-state imperialism. 
Capitalistic rationality and principles are misunderstood as ‘values, attitudes and 
institutions of the expansionist nation infiltrate and overcome those of the recipient one.’130 
The consequence is that the convergence of class interests between a few Brazilian 
and English businessmen is over stressed and qualified as 'the native collaboration’, 
ignoring the long history of convergence/divergence of interests, involving conflicts 
between English and Brazilian capitalists as well as between the diplomacy of both 
countries, as discussed in chapter five.
Cain and Hopkins131 recognise the importance of the recent thesis revealing the 
play by local societies in resisting imperialistic forces or negotiating with them. 
However, these attempts have been interpreted as claims that the fundamental cause 
of imperialism are to be found on the periphery itself. As a result, different authors 
have been trying to downplay the role of economic change in the metropole and to 
shift causation to the periphery.132
The point to be stressed is that the nation-state approaches have sustained 
Eurocentristic explanations of the world, confusing different matters. That is, if the
128 Gallagher, J. & Robinson, R. 1953.
129 Graham, 1976.
130 Graham 1969, p. 29.
131 Cain and Hopkins, 1993 pp. 9-10.
132 Cain and Hopkins mention Platt and their own works as attempts in this direction (Ibid. pp. 
10-15).
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cause for the imperialistic movement by the British empire towards others countries 
and civilisations is to be found in the metropole it does not imply that it can explain 
exploitative relations as an intrinsic element of the expansion of capitalism. 
Capitalism after the second half of the 19th century had long been a broad matter in 
which the imperialism of Western European powers constituted just one element to 
be considered.
Moreover, even the debate based on nation-states approaches has raised 
important questions. Taylor133 stresses well that imperialism in the 19th century had a 
special character and that empire means rule over others in which the imperial power 
has, or thinks it has, superior strength and civilisation. Although the English diplomats 
and rubber dealers thought they were superior and English rubber dealers did want to 
rule the local economy, they rule neither Amazonia nor the rubber economy. Actually, 
English rubber dealers controlled around half the rubber exported from Amazonia, but 
in partnership with the Germans and Portuguese. Platt134 pointed out the 
distinctiveness between imperialism and imperialistic incidents involving a few British 
investors in different countries and times. He disagrees with the qualification of 
imperialism, even the so-called ‘imperialism of free trade’ to talk about South 
America.135
Finally, the Western/North American capitalists’ movement towards the rubber 
economy in Amazonia has to be distinguished from their home State own movement 
towards this economy. Bowler136 stresses the Western European powers’ own 
imperialism in which science and technology had a prominent role. He mentions the 
British Imperialist power’s effort to control technologies through natural science as a 
fundamental element in the movement towards the rubber economy in Amazonia. In 
this process, science as an instrument of power, and social science as creator of
133 Taylor, 1976.
134 Platt 1973.
135 Platt, 1968 and 1973.
136 Bowler op.cit. p. 310.
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ideological tools able to guarantee this power, is crucial, such as the idea of 
progressive evolution constituting one of the most important ideological tools of 
imperialism, forming a natural foundation for the belief that European civilisation was 
the highest point of human achievement destined to spread its value around the 
world by conversion or conquest
This allows important distinctions to be made. First, the distinction between the 
movement by foreign rubber dealers, closely supported and influenced by their home 
States, and the movement by the British State and second, the renewal of the 
Western notion of civilisation through Spencer’s theory of the ‘survival of the fittest’ as 
ideological tools, as previously mentioned. Our concern here is with the actions of 
rubber dealers rather than with European powers.
The alternatives to nation-state approaches are basically two. First, the debate on 
the ‘colonial system’,137 which breaks the national fence. However, it is based on the 
notion of ‘system’ formed by impersonal structures, imposing difficulties on analysing 
social relations, and the over-emphasis on the dynamics of international capitalism 
does not allow an understanding of the specificity of internal social relations.
Second, the Marxist debate on imperialism138 has incorporated the idea that the 
capitalists’ opposing view and practical actions in exploitative relations abroad is an 
intrinsic element of the birth, consolidation and permanent expansion of capitalism. 
The ways it has been done changed over the time. Imperialism has been identified 
with the formation of monopolies and cartels, supported by European powers after 
the 1870s.
However, the way and the motives and ideologies governing foreign rubber 
dealers and Western powers movement towards rubber economy are different 
subjects from the effective relationship seringalistas/merchanl-seringalistas versus 
foreign rubber dealers. The convergence of class interests between them manifested
137 Novaes, 1974 and 1989.
138 See debate on Marxist theories of imperialism in Brewer 1990.
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in their common pursuit of profit in order to ensure capital accumulation cemented 
their commercial-financial relationship around rubber production-exportation in 
Amazonia.
Yet, their relationship also involved divergent interests, provoking clashes. 
Seringalistaslmerchanl-seringalistas constituted different segments of the capitalist 
class in relation to foreign rubber dealers. The former invested in the sphere of 
production, which involved interests linked to the place where their enterprises were 
based while the latter was personalised in merchants and financiers, who invested in 
mobile business, easily transferable to anywhere else, their capital being in the form 
of money and boats, mostly.
The movement by foreign rubber dealers clashed with internal economic and 
political processes, including the specific forms of profiting and accumulating capital 
by seringalistas/merchani-seringalistas. The reaction to it, designing a double 
movement, involved many actions, including the demand of interventionism to the 
central government as well as influencing the decisions of re-investments by the 
capitalists investing in rubber production.
Those issues drove our attention to Polany’s notion of double movement because 
the relationship between seringalistas/merchant-seringalistas and foreign rubber 
dealers is essentially an interclass relationship. This perspective implies recognising 
the importance of the indirect influence of foreign rubber dealers insofar as 
seringalistas built their project of economic-political changes and decisions of re­
investments, to a great extent acting-reacting to their movements towards rubber 
economy. Yet, the emphasis is on the crucial role played by local investors at the 
same time that the historical circumstances they were dealing with are considered.
However, Polany’s139 notion of double movement has to be re-thought in order to 
be workable. His notion implies a more complex view of capitalist society insofar as it 
is characterised not just by class conflicts but also by interclass clashes sustained by
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different capitalist ideologies. But the emphasis is on markets and institutions to 
explain economic processes in which the law appears to determine social processes 
rather than expressing patterns of social relations. As a result, Polany140 emphasises 
ideologies rather than the creators of it, or the social relations within these ideologies 
are built.
Consequently, the first specificity of the notion of double movement used here is 
the shift of emphasis from ideologies and institutions to the social relationship 
between the native landed capitalists and the foreign rubber dealers. The English 
rubber dealers were prominent since, in partnership with the Germans and 
Portuguese, they controlled around half of the rubber exported from Amazonia at the 
same time as being hegemonic in the shipment of rubber to Western European ports 
until the 1910s. Thus, the focus on the double movement is achieved by 
concentrating on the double movement of English rubber dealers versus 
seringalistas/merchant-seringalistas. On the one hand, the English rubber dealers, 
using the principle of economic liberalism, aimed at the establishment of a self­
regulated market, as their ideology, and adopted largely laissez-faire and free trade 
methods.’ On the other hand, the local landed capitalists, using the principle of social 
protection, aimed at the conservation of productive organisation, immediately affected 
by the deleterious action of the foreign rubber dealers, used productive legislation, 
restrictive associations, and other instruments of intervention as their methods.
However, this interclass relationship was a transnational interclass relationship, 
necessarily involving a certain level of State allowance/intervention. English rubber 
dealers did not enter the country as autonomous newcomers. On the contrary, their 
investments were allowed by changes in internal legislation and were linked to the 
internal struggles against colonial inequalities which were marked by the absorption 
of the principle of liberalism in a re-defined manner by the nationalism sustaining
139 Polany, K. 1975.
140 Ibid. p. 132.
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those struggles. At the same time, foreign rubber dealers entered the country under 
rules established in commercial treaties. Thus, the relationship 
seringalistas/merchant-seringalistas cannot be understood just from the perspective 
of the English or other foreign powers economic-political expansionism whatever form 
they assumed. The dynamics governing the Brazilian State allowance and 
intervention in this relationship is a fundamental element.
The Brazilian State allowance and intervention in the relationship 
seringalistaslmerchant-seringalistas was defined in the policy of the so-called First 
Republic (1889-1930), whose policy prioritising the national economy and giving 
secondary importance to regional economies to a great extent stopped seringalistas 
of power in the face of foreign rubber dealers, frustrating their demands for 
interventionism and leaving them practically alone in their decisions on re-investment.
Moreover, being a transnational interclass relationship, it involves particular 
ideologies. The English rubber dealers’ principle of economic liberalism was mixed 
with the Spencerian principle of the ‘survival of the fittestTprogress by struggle’ and with 
imperialistic mentality. They moved in both directions. They did make efforts to sweep 
aside local capitalists, imposing prices, causing deep oscillations of prices and 
attempting to prevent the establishment of new regulations in the rubber economy, as 
well as attempting to impose their principles and authority, disrespecting Brazilian 
institutions. The notion of imperialistic mentality is useful because it expresses 
imperialistic behaviour even in a situation of non-existence of imperialism. In 
Amazonia, the statement by Platt141 that British traders and investors themselves 
neither sought nor expected government intervention does not stand up. They asked 
for British military intervention in internal political processes such as ‘a cabanagem> in 
the 1830s, justifying it as protection for their businesses in which they acted together 
with certain local capitalists and government in a clear convergence of class interest, 
as discussed in chapter five. And they asked for commercial treats with the Brazilian
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government to place them on equal terms with other foreign traders, whose 
governments had commercial treats with Brazil. In the 1910s they emphatically 
requested the British government for diplomatic intervention on issues relating to the 
internal rubber economy, as discussed in chapters five and six, using nationalistic 
arguments. These historical facts deny the supposition that British traders and rubber 
dealers took the principle of economic liberalism seriously. On the contrary, it was 
used as an ideological tool to try and prevent the establishment of internal regulations 
in the Amazonian rubber economy.
The Historical Investigation and Sources Used
Due to the available sources and the aim of selecting a subject of analysis 
workable in a reasonably short time, the search for the specific features of capitalist 
relations of production in seringais emphasised an objective element, namely the 
seringalistas’ class condition which was manifested in their private ownership of the 
means of rubber production, their command of the process of production of rubber 
(including command over the labour process, demands/proposals made to the 
government and effective decisions on re-investments/changes in seringais).
Thus, it was attempted to identify who the capitalistas were? How did they subdue 
(or interact with) nature and labour? Which issues did they face in doing so? How was 
production organised and commanded? What does it tell us about the definition of 
relations of production? Who were the labourers? How were they made or did they 
make themselves historically?
The investigation of the private ownership of rubber fields was based on the 
analysis of documents regarding the privatisation of the most important areas of 
rubber production in Para State and in Acre, which are illustrated in map 1, such as:
141 Platt, 1968.
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Map 1: The Most Important Areas Producers of Rubber in Para and in Acre States, and Seringal ITU in Acre River District
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(a) the nine most important municipality producers of rubber in Para; (b) the Acre 
River District which comprises the stretch having the densest rubber fields and being 
the most important producer of rubber in Acre State.
The first area was defined using statistics of rubber production by the Revistas da 
ACP. Next, to be carried out was an analysis of the ‘registers of squats’ and title 
deeds regarding the privatisation of rubber fields located in those municipalities in the 
archives of the ITERPA (Instituto de Terras do Par£), in Belgm. A total of 2,927 
properties producing rubber were found in the municipalities Afug, Anajgs, Altamira, 
Cameta, Chaves, Curralinho, Gurupa, Itaituba and Melgago. The periods in which 
these properties were legalised vary slightly in each municipality as is discussed in 
chapter three.
However, priority was given to the Acre River District, called Alto Acre 
Departamento in the administrative division of the Acre Territory in 1912,142 
comprising areas accessed by the rivers Abuna, RapirrS, Iquiry, up Acre, Xapury, 
Riosinho and Alto Antimary. In 1912-13, this Department produced an average of 
around 5.000.000 kilos of rubber annually, which was higher than the sum of the 
production of Alto Purus and Alto Jurug Departments together.143 The most important 
concentration of rubber trees was found along Acre river, particularly in its middle and 
up courses.144 In this stretch the most opulent seringais were set up.145 The Acre- 
INCRA (Instituto Nacional de ColonizagSo e Reforma Agrgria)’s investigation on the 
legal situation of seringais in Acre State, implementing Law no. 6383 of 7/12/1976, 
came across with 105 early seringais in Acre River District.
142 The Decree 1.181 of 15/02/1904 and Decree 5.188 of 07/04/1904 gave the first 
administrative organisation of Acre as a Federal Territory, which was alterated by the 
Decree 6.901 of 26/03/1908. The Law no. 9.831 of 23/10/1912 divided the Territory into 
four Departments such as Alto Acre, Alto Purus, Alto Jurug and Tarauacg (Chaves 1913, 
p. 17).
143 Ministgrio da Agricultura, Industria e Commgrcio. Relat6rio do Dr. Oswaldo Cruz., 1913, p. 
21; Chqves 1913, p. 18.
144 Euclides da Cunha, 1976; Labre, A. 1887; Tocantins 1961, p. 129; Chaves op.cit., p. 18; 
Ministgrio da Agriculture, Industria e Commgrcio op.cit.
145 Ministgrio da Agriculture, IndOstria e Commgrcio op.cit, pp. 14-30.
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Data were collected using two forms (see appendixes 1 and 2). The completed 
forms were analysed using Excel spreadsheet version 5, later converted to the 
version 7. The analysis of variables whose definition demanded crossvariables was 
done by means of the program Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS), 
version 6 because it is an easier means of analysis.
Records on legalisation of seringais and on lawsuits about land disputes in Acre 
River District in the years 1903-04 in Arquivo Nacional do Rio de Janeiro constituted 
an interesting complementary source.146
The investigation on social relations of production in seringaI was centred 
particularly in Acre River District for two reasons: (a) the INCRA-Acre lawsuits give 
information not just on land affairs but also on the economy, topography etc. of the 
105 early seringais along the stretch of the most important producers of rubber in 
Acre, which results from systematic investigation carried out by a group comprised of 
agronomists, lawyers, historians, economists, sociologists and topographers into the 
records of Registry Offices and official institutions in Bolivia, Manaus, Rio de Janeiro, 
Rio Branco and Xapury as well as into private records kept by seringalistas’ families;
(b) the availability of documents in accountancy of some of those early seringais in 
the Museu da Borracha in Rio Branco/Acre. These sources were compared with 
historical literature mentioned in the bibliography.
Another primary source was the register of firms in the Juntas Commercials in 
Para and in Acre.147 The records contain information about the business and changes 
over time.
In the records of the Registered Office Cartbrio Chermont (CC) in Belbm the 
investigation was concentrated on deeds relating to transactions by export houses 
and casas aviadoras, supplying credit in cash and in kind to seringais in Acre River 
District such as deeds of partnership, deeds of transfer, deeds of loan, etc, in the
146 Arquivo Nacional do Rio de Janeiro, SDA 001.
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period from 1812 to 1932.148 Finally, lawsuits149 about rubber economy were analysed 
in the Archives of the Court of Justice in Belem (Tribunal de Justiga do Estado, TJE) 
as well as books on Commercial Law in the Library of the TJ E.
The analysis of these records was useful for selecting one seringal for detailed 
analysis on work relations, profitability and capital accumulation - Seringal ITU- 
Palmares. This was a middle size rubber enterprise, initially producing around 100 to 
120 tons per year, which was reduced to around 80 tons later as a result of the 
splitting up of the property, originally having 40,592,0554 ha,150 situated on both 
banks of the Acre river, in the stretch having the densest rubber fields in Acre (see 
maps 1 and 2). The available accountancy records of this estate cover three 
important periods: (a) the year 1910, when rubber prices reached a peak, followed by 
increasing production, as discussed in chapter five; (b) the years 1913-15 until the 
middle of 1916, which represent the deepest decrease in prices, provoking economic 
difficulties and bankruptcies in the region; (c) the year 1930, which can be considered 
a period in which the economic changes implemented in seringais in response to the 
difficulties imposed by low rubber prices were consolidated.
A seringal’s accountancy records were composed of the following: (a) Livro de 
Conta-Corrente (Balance of current account); (b) Diario do Seringal (Diary of 
commercial transactions, payment of salary and any other movement by the firm); (c) 
Livro de Balango Geral Annual (Yearly Balance Sheet); (d) Livro caixa (Balance 
Sheet concerned with the movement of cash only); and (e) borrdes, which were 
notebooks containing fiscal notes and/or receipts, listing goods, quantities, dates,
147 Junta Commercial do Para (JUCEPA), Registro de Firmas; Junta Commercial do Acre 
(JCA), Registro de Firmas.
148 Cartorio Chermont (CC), Indice de EscrituragSo.
149 Tribunal de Justiga do Estado (TJE), Autos Civis.
150 In 1983, the INCRA-Acre’s investigation on the legal situation of early seringais in Acre 
resulted in the recognition of an area of 27,207,77 ha as being the legalised extension of 
seringal ITU-Palmares. This means that an area of 13,384,28 ha of terras devolutas (non­
privatised lands legally under the condition of State lands) were incorporated to the estate. 
This matter is better discussed in chapter 2.
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M ap 2: Seringal ITU and Neighbour Estates
S LKJ.M iAI. 
BOM I I H  l i o
Source: Acre-INCRA 1983.
SERIN'f. KL 
SANTA 
SIAKRINA
islorts Total Area (ha) Legalized Area(lvj) Excluded Area(ha)
I Seringal Gaviao
II Seringal ITU-Pal mares
III Seringal Remanso
IV Seringal S. Gabriel
V  seringal S.Ldo Remanso
Total Area
12.608,80 11.629,69 979,11
40.592,05 27.207,77 13.384,28
39.717,67 39.717,67
11.460,00 11.460,00
5.269,80 5.269,80
110.008,33 90.015,13 19.993,19
prices etc. I came across all these books for the years mentioned, with the exception 
of borroes.
The main heir of the seringal ITU - who was born there, studied agronomy in Rio 
de Janeiro and was in charge of the enterprise after the 1950s - today is alive and 
well at 94 years old. He remains lucid and holds private records about the estate. 
Apart from access to his private records, he was interviewed (open interview) in order 
to sort out doubts about terms used by accountants in the old documents and to 
clarify points relating to the records.
Seringal ITU was administered by the owner and his descendants individually or in 
partnership since the last decades of the 19th century until recently, illustrating the 
continuity of rubber production in Amazonia.
The analysis of the theme, availability of labour, was based on my previous 
historical investigation already mentioned and was mostly based on historical 
documents from archives in Bel6m, including reports by the President of the Par£ 
Province in the period 1838-1907, and historical literature. The way labour was 
engaged, disciplined and controlled as well as changes in these matters were 
focused on by concentrating in the analysis on the accountancy documents of the 
Seringal ITU such as the Diary of the Seringal for the years 1910,151 1913152 and 
1930.153 The Diary was an accountant’s book, on manuscript, containing all the 
movements of current accounts of labourers and owners as well as of the 
commercial-financial houses and/or banks the seringal ITU performed transactions 
with. The Diary, as well as the Balance, were presented to the judge in charge of the 
matter in Rio Branco who evaluated them, confirming or not the legality of those 
documents and of all accountancy documents of the seringal. In bearing the judge’s 
signature and meeting all the legal requirements these documents could be
151 Seringal “ITU", Dterio de 1910.
152 Seringal “ITU”, Dterio de 1913.
153 Seringal Itu, Diario de 1930.
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considered valid and used as proof in lawsuits and trials. All the accountancy 
documents analysed bore the judge’s signature.
The labourers’ current accounts contain data such as type of commodities 
produced, prices, time and means of sale, kind of employees and the way they were 
remunerated, transactions among labourers, and the way they were engaged and left 
the seringal. However, the Diary does not describe the labourer’s shopping, rather 
mentioning monthly shopping only and giving the total amount of it. The description of 
goods was done in borroes as previously mentioned. Accordingly, it was not possible 
to define to what extent the oscillations of foodstuff prices affected the seringueiros' 
remuneration rather than only the oscillation of rubber prices.
The analysis of the seringueiros and salaried/wage-labourers' current accounts 
was done using samples. Since the main concern was not just finding out features of 
work relations but also changes over time, the criterion for the sample was the 
permanence in the seringal at the beginning of February 1910 and at the beginning of 
March 1913, when the accounting years started. It was found that a total of 64 
seringueiros worked in Seringal ITU at the beginning of the accounting years of 1910 
and 1913. This represents 32% of the total of 202 seringueiros in 1910 and 40% of 
the total of 160 seringueiros in March 1913. The sample for 1930 is composed of 65 
seringueiros, representing 30% of the total of 215 seringueiros in that year. This 
sample was selected at random considering that the proportion of remaining 
seringueiros from 1913 was minimal -  just two of them. The sample of salaried and 
wage labourers represents 30% of the total of 27 in 1910. A higher rotation was found 
among the salaried workers compared to seringueiros. Some of them went out and 
came back so that in 1910 the salaried sample refers to 7 salaried workers because 
the account of one of the eight considered had no movement in 1910 but had in 
1913. Of the eight making up the sample only two remained in the seringal 
throughout the year 1913 because it happened that one became a rubber taper in 
this year and five left. Actually, the number of wage labourers increased from 27 in
56
1910 to 40 in 1913 and to 52 in 1930. As the focus is on seringueiros who were paid 
by results, wage labour is mentioned only to specify seringueiros' condition.
These samples were analysed using Excel spreadsheet version 7.
At the same time, analysing the total labour’s current accounts focused questions 
such as the degree of labour rotation and the way they left the enterprise.
The commercial-financial house within the Seringal ITU acted as three different 
businesses at the same time -  banking, commercial house and as the head office of 
the rubber enterprise. Considering that seringaI is focused from the perspective of 
social relations of production, the Diaries were analysed aiming to answer questions 
such as: What do these data reveal regarding the relations of production? What does 
this suggests in relation to the theoretical debate on relations of production in the 
rubber economy? What was the specificity of seringueiros, as labourers paid by 
results, in comparison with waged and salaried workers?
The data from the Diaries were compared with and complemented by the historical 
literature on the matter, particularly that by Cabral154 and Ferreira de Castro,155 who 
reported work relations in a seringal in Acre River District in 1897-1907 and along 
the bank of Madeira river around 1913-14, respectively, from the perspective of 
workers. In addition, publications by merchant-seringalistasi156 gave statistical and 
general information on the main issues in the rubber economy, and particularly on 
rubber production in Acre River District. The statistics available on immigration to 
Acre have been quite well evaluated in various thesis -  they are mentioned by 
Santos (1980) and Martinelo (1985), and exhaustively analysed by Calixto (1993) and 
in masters dissertations.157 The latter were considered an important source because 
a masters dissertation in Brazil has to be based on original research and supported
154 Cabral 1949.
155 Ferreira de Castro 1955.
156 Neves, 1981; Mendes, 1910; Chaves op.cit.
157 Pinto de Oliveira, L. (1985); Duarte, E. op.cit.; Paula op.cit.
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by a theoretical framework. As a result, there are quite a few dissertations containing 
plenty of original information.
The double movement of English rubber dealers versus seringalistas/merchant- 
seringalistas was visualised by the analysis of the following records: (a) the records 
of the Associagao Comercial do Para (ACP) such as minutes, correspondence, 
books, collections of articles on rubber published all over the world; international 
journals on rubber; the association’s printed annual reports and the monthly 
journals;158 (b) the Revista da Associagao Commercial do Amazonas (ACA); (c) 
official correspondence by the Governments of Par£ in the records of the Arquivo 
Publico do Para, in Belem;159 (d) the records of Patecio do Itamaraty in Rio de 
Janeiro such as consular correspondence and reports by The Brazilian General 
Consulate of Liverpool and its representative in London;180 (e) records of The 
Public Record Office - Kew, in London, such as correspondence by The British 
Consulate in Para; correspondence by the British Legation in Petropolis and in Rio de 
Janeiro; (f) Printed Annual Report by The British Consulate in Para for the period 
1910 a 1916, at the LSE Library.
When compared with those sources, particularly with confidential consular 
correspondence, the Printed Annual Report by the British Consulate in Par£ ended 
up being a strongly political-ideological source.
Local newspapers available were also investigated (see bibliography).
Outline of the thesis
The discussion is organised as follows.
Part two: deals with the social relations of land property, geomercantile 
privatisation of rubber fields and the emergence of an internal labour market
158 See Bibliography.
159 See Bibliography, Manuscripts.
160lbid.
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In chapter two it is argued that from 1848-50 to the 1870s rubber fields were 
privatised according to seringais as synonymous with large estates and reproducing 
the traditional geomercantile pattern of privatising land in Amazonia, being a 
privatisation concentrated on the best lands, which tended to become the private 
property of entrepreneurs. However, this was specific because rubber fields were 
privatised not as land-soil but as land-forest.
In the third chapter, the geomercantile privatisation of land initiated in 1615-16 is 
evaluated as a long process, being an important element of the social relations in 
which a free labour market was built in Amazonia. However, this market was not wide 
enough to meet the increasing demand for labour by distant seringais in Acre 
territory. This demand was met by means of private recruitment of immigrant labour 
or by means of the official immigration of labour after the 1870s-1880s. The 
recruitment of labour or immigration supported by official policies to seringais in Acre 
is a process leading to the emergence and consolidation of a local labour market, 
which is apparent, particularly after the 1910s.
Part three: focuses on work relations in seringais: engagement and forms of 
controlling and disciplining labour.
In the fourth chapter, it is argued that social relations of production in seringais 
were defined by the ways labour was engaged, controlled and disciplined. The 
command of production by the owners, manifested in administrative procedures, 
defined the sort of labour to be engaged: seringueiros according to the definition 
previously mentioned. These procedures and evidence of seringueiros' strategies of 
bargaining power, clearly reveal the capitalist character of relations of production in 
seringais.
Part four: discussion on profitability and Capital Accumulation.
The first task was to understand the seringalistas’ project of economic-political 
changes in chapter five. The investigation on the double movement of English rubber 
dealers versus seringalistas revealed: (a) the manipulation of rubber prices by foreign
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rubber dealers, provoking constant deep oscillations and causing uncertainty; (b) the 
seringalistas' responses to this in demanding interventionism by the central 
government, reveal their concerns with the control of the market-banking system, 
taxation, system of transport and offer of labour rather than with monocultural rubber.
In chapter six it is argued that seringalistas/merchani-seringalistas’ project of 
economic-political changes as well as their geomercantile view on the privatisation 
and use of natural resources played a major role in their decisions on re­
investments. So, they invested in technological improvements governed by 
converging relations with nature. At the same time, they increasingly diversified 
economic activities, combining rubber production with a commodity production for the 
internal market or the production of different commodities for the international market. 
Moreover, they used to run their rubber enterprises in partnership in order to cope 
with the risky nature of the business, particularly before the 1930s when there was no 
national market for rubber. In this way they guaranteed profitability and capital 
accumulation.
60
PART TWO: Seringal as Estates and Labour Availability: Social Relations of 
Land Property, Geomercantile Privatisation of Rubber Fields and the 
Emergence of an Internal Labour Market
Chapter 2
SERINGAL AS PRIVATE PROPERTY
The subterraneous ideas governing the classifications of seringal as temporary 
encampment161 or mercantile undertaking162 are in great extent those presented by the 
British diplomat in the Consular District of Par£ in the First International Exposition of 
Rubber in 1908, which was published by the Foreign Office.163 He attempted to 
mischaracterize seringal as private property arguing that: (a) the term estate as 
definition for rubber enterprises in Amazon would not stand up because it would not be 
legally enforced as private property; (b) there would be no permanent occupation of 
rubber fields. To question these arguments is crucial to demonstrate that seringal was 
private property in the modern sense. This requires focusing on two important aspects. 
First, the privatisation of rubber fields as a highly selective process as the search was 
not for land-soil but for land-forest of the best species of gums. Second, to a large 
degree the best Hevea forest became the private property of entrepreneurs rather than 
of the direct producers of rubber, which represents the continuation of a historical 
pattern of social relations of land property in Amazonia.
In order to present the argument clearly, the chapter is organised as follows: (a) the 
historical circumstances in which seringal or rubber estate emerged; (b) the notion of 
seringal as private property in the modem sense; (c) the geomercantile privatisation of 
rubber fields as land-forest and its consequences on the concept of benfeitoria by 
Brazilian law; and (d) the geomercantile privatisation of rubber fields in which the best 
Hevea forest became to a large part the private property of entrepreneurs.
161 Prado Junior op.cit.
162 Velho op.cit. p. 33.
163 F.O. and The Board of Trade 1908, pp. 21-22.
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The Historical Circumstances For the Birth and Expansion of Seringais
Seringais emerged in the period from 1848 to the 1870s. This period was 
characterised by the conjuncture of increasing demand and shortage of rubber in the 
international market, resulting in a general tendency towards rising prices, which 
endures until around 1912 (as is discussed in chapter five). This constitutes one of 
the main circumstances favouring the emergence of seringais: that is by turning 
rubber fields into valuable land-forest to be sold or used as the means of producing the 
commodity rubber. Another fundamental circumstance in the emergence and spread of 
seringais was the encouragement of large-scale production of raw material by 
international capital, and particularly, the encouragement towards the privatisation of 
rubber fields by the local governments.
The North American and Western nascent industries in by-products of rubber 
were heavily dependent on rubber from Amazonia, which was the sole supplier to the 
international market until the 1880s, as can be seen in chapter five. The increasing 
demand for raw material by these industries contrasted with the limited supply since 
initially it was produced to supply pioneering processes in small-scale manufacturing 
in Amazonia. Since the beginning of the 18th century, local producers had been 
made pumps, syringes, small animal figures, balls, and other small articles for 
exporting.164 And since the beginning of the 19th century small manufacturers had 
been established in Belem, producing waterproof articles such as ammunition bags, 
shoes, coatings and bottles, as well as syringes and balls for export to Portugal and 
the USA.165 Only in 1844 did Amazonia begin to export raw material (oversized rugby
164 Coates 1987, pp. 4-10 and 14; Drabble 1973; Whittlesey 1931, p. 1.
165 Cruz 1973 p. 310; Mourao 1989, p. 25; Santos op.cit.; Weinstein op.cit; Coates op.cit.; 
Marin 1985, p. 248; Dean op.cit. p. 32.
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footballs of rubber) and in 1855 nearly all of it was unworked raw material for 
industrial use.166
This change represent a positive response to the foreign capitalists’ efforts to 
make Brazilians produce raw material instead of continuing to manufacture rubber 
products. These efforts were manifested in learning/transferring local manufacture 
methods to their new factories and in offering basic services to the production of raw 
material such as easy credit,167 services of commercialisation-exportation and after 
the 1860s even the internal steam navigation was carried out by an English 
company, given easier access to most distant seringais'6*
Under these circumstances, the production of rubber for export increased from 
only 185.251 Kilos of manufactured gum in 1836-37 to more than one thousand Kilos 
(1.466.550) of raw material in 1850-51 and to 3.500.000 kilos in 1863.169 The United 
Kingdom imported 381 tons in 1850 and it has been estimated that the amount of 
rubber consumed rose twenty-fold in the 28 years between 1850 and 1878.170
The increasing practice of exporting raw material goes hand in hand with the 
bankruptcy of local rubber manufacturers.171 And the positive response to the 
encouragement of raw material production can be explained by the Brazilian 
capitalists’ pursuit of profit in an economy exposed to instability, a result of 
dependency on exporting primary products.
First, this legacy of the colonial period contrasted with the struggles of the 
Brazilian governments and segments of the upper class for political-economic 
autonomy in the face of European colonialist powers in the period after the political
166 Coates op.cit. p. 43.
167 ACP, 1884; F.O. and Board of Trade, Diplomatic and Consular Reports -  Brazil -  the Trade 
of Pard District, 1901, p. 4; Santos op.cit. pp. 134-36; Martinelo op.cit. pp. 31-32.
168 Grahan 1969, pp. 30-31.
169 See Cordeiro, 1920 Apud Universidade Federal do ParS (Org.) p. 26; see also Santos op.cit. 
and Martinelo op.cit.
170 Coates op.cit. pp. 43-4.
171 Santos, R. op.cit.; Weinstein op.cit. and Marin s/d.
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independence of Brazil from Portugal, in 1822. The dependency on export products 
resulted in severe economic fluctuations due to an international market which was 
strongly influenced by the interference of European colonialist powers or by 
monopolies from these nations.
Second, the legacy of the colonial period was manifested not just in the 
dependency on export products, but also in commercial treaties. Furtado172 
demonstrates that the process of impoverishment and political difficulties 
experienced in the 1830s and 1840s, provoked by fluctuating international markets 
but also aggravated by the indirect influence of commercial treaties held with 
England, was a legacy of colonial policy.
Third, the consequent difficulties were particularly stressed in north-east and in 
Amazonia. In south-east they were minimised due to the emergence of the coffee 
export economy in the 1830s. In the north-east, however, the main export economies 
- sugar and cotton - were intrinsically affected by the persistent falls in price.173 The 
decrease in sugar prices and the resultant social effects, which began in the last 
quarter of the 18th century, continued throughout the first half of the 19th century, and 
beyond. In Amazonia, sugar producers had to deal not just with decreasing sugar 
prices but also with difficult transport to export ports and with the discouraging policy 
of Pombal from 1751 to 1777, which gave priority to the sugar economy in the 
Northeast.174 In response to these difficulties, a gradual shift from sugar to rum 
production occurred,175 which became a stable economy in the long term.176 Sugar 
was exported only until 1864 in gradually smaller quantities, and later this production 
was not even enough to supply the internal market.177 By 1860, Amazonia already
172 Furtado 1959.
173 Furtado, op.cit.; Wemeck Sodre, N. 1976; Cano, W. 1981.
174 Bentes 1992, appendix I.
175 Ibid.
176 See on this economy Anderson, S. 1991.
177 Bentes op.cit.; Cordeiro op.cit. and Lima 1986 p. 159.
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imported sugar and coffee.178 The export economy, whose main products were 
cocoa, rice, cotton and different extractive products, was characterised by price 
fluctuations through the first half of the 19th century.179 The local manufacture of 
rubber by-products did not receive any special incentives from the government and 
there was no credit system for agricultural production.180
In such conjuncture, local capitalists saw the international capitalist’s promotion of 
raw material production as an opportunity to increase their capital. The increasing 
rubber prices and the offer of easy credit and basic services to raw material 
production attracted investors. In 1868, rubber had already assumed the leading 
position in the export economy.181
The expanding entrepreneurial production of raw material favoured the 
valorisation of rubber fields.182 Nevertheless, the privatisation of rubber fields is a 
direct result of the local governments’ incentive. They encouraged the privatisation of 
rubber fields as an aim to tackle specific issues. First, they aimed at stopping and 
preventing the destruction of natural resources since the predatory exploitation of 
non-privatised rubber fields by arranchamentos continued until the 1850s and in less 
scale until the 1860s. According to the local government, the environmentally 
irresponsible exploitation of rubber fields by arranchamentos was a direct result of 
non-ownership,183 considering that seringalistas, on the contrary, preserved their 
natural resources. Moreover, arranchamentos produced rubber in poor economic 
and hygienic conditions.184
178 ACP, Relatdrio Anual de 1868 pp. 15-16.
179 Cordeiro op.cit.; ACP, Relatdrio Anual de 1867; ACP, Relatdrio Anual de 1868; ACP, 
Relatdrio Anual de 1869; ACP, Relatdrio Anual de 1870; See analysis on the economy in 
1872-78 in: Para. Presidente da Provlncia 1878a, p. 106.
180 ACP, Relatdrio Anual de 1868 pp. 15-16.
181 Ibid. See also Reis 1953; Cordeiro op.cit.; Santos, R. op.cit.; Martinelo op.cit.; Weinstein 
1983.
182 Reis op.cit.; Bonfim op.cit.; Santos,R.op.cit.
183 Bentes February/1992 op.cit.
184 Cordeiro, op.cit, p. 17.
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Second, the government tried to solve the shortage of foodstuffs. The demand for 
food constituted one of the main justifications for the official policy of immigration of 
familial producers of food from the middle of the 18th century onwards, this being 
one of the most important historical conditions for the emergence of the peasantry in 
the region.185 This persisted throughout the 19th century and was aggravated by the 
increased production of rubber, particularly in the 1870s-1910s.186 The emergence 
and spread of large-scale production of rubber engendered a tendency towards a 
shortage of cereals and a high cost of living.187 The reasons for this are multiple. 
Rubber production attracted investors and labourers from the agricultural economy, 
leading to a decrease in the production of cereals.188 At the same time, rubber 
production provoked rising demand for foodstuffs since the population increased 
owing to the immigration of labour to this activity, and a considerable proportion of 
entrepreneurial production of rubber emerged as a specialised activity, demanding 
food in the local market. As can be seen in chapters six (Table 20), until the 1920s 
around 67% of the original seringais in the most important rubber producing area in 
Acre produced rubber only. According to the ITERPA’s records, in Para, around 
41.5% of the early seringais located in the nine most important rubber producing 
municipalities produced rubber only. The President of Para Province analysed this 
situation as an inversion of the previous economy because different from other 
country enterprises, which used to supply food to the internal market, rubber estates 
demanded it.189 The ACP’s report of 1870 mentions that in this year there was a
185 Bentes op.cit. and 1996.
106 Ibid. and Lima, E. 1986.
187 See on this matter Cordeiro op.cit.; Lima op.cit.; Bentes op.cit. Reports and speeches by 
the Presidents of the Para Province are quite emphatic on this, for instance Para. 
Presidente da Provfncia 1870, pp. 39-40, 1870a, p. 33, 1880, p. 56, Fala 1883, p. 66, 
Mensagem 1893 and Mensagem 1897, p. 22.
188 Para. Presidente da Provlncia agosto/1858, p. 6 and 1863, p. 12.
189 Para. Presidente da Provlncia, 1871.
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shortage of cereals.190 In 1872 the President of Para Province reported an increase 
in the importation of foodstuffs.191 This was tackled by means of both (a) besides the 
policy of immigration of labour from 1870 to 1910, the local government adopted a 
policy of immigration of peasants and small entrepreneurs,192 and (b) the 
encouragement of the entrepreneurial privatisation of rubber fields not to produce 
rubber only but to make rubber in association with the production of cereals.193
Third, the governments were concerned with settling the population and stopping 
migration. It was not only seringais in Para which were absorbing labour. The 
increasing production of rubber and urban activities in other Provinces also attracted 
and absorbed labour and investors from Para. There are no statistics available before 
1872, but the statistics for the following period show that from 1872 to 1890 Para lost 
around 32,000 inhabitants through migration to Amazonas, Acre and Roraima.194 The 
census of 1920, covering the period from 1872 to 1890, shows that while the 
population of Manaus, the capital of Amazonas, increased by 32%, the population of 
Betem, the capital of Para, dropped by 19%.195
Finally, the governments aimed to increase public income by selling non-privatised 
rubber fields and by taxing rubber economy. Before 1891, local government 
channelled those proposals to the central government, which was in charge of land, at 
the same time that they encouraged the privatisation of rubber fields by offering public 
support to the immigration of labour to seringais, by implementing policies towards 
remaining nations, by subsidising internal navigation etc. as previously mentioned. The
190 ACP, Relatdrio Annual de 1870.
191 Para. Presidente da Provlncia, 1872.
192 On the Policy of immigration of peasants and small entrepeneurs to the Bragantina 
microregion in 1870s-1910s see Penteado 1967, De Lima op.cit.; Moraes, R. 1984, 
Carneiro da ConceigSo, M. 1990.
193 See reports by the President of Para Province and proposal by Silva Coutinho analysed by 
Calixto op.cit. p. 84. See also chapter seven.
194 See the evaluation of the available statistic by Calixto 1993, pp. 83-92; see also Santos 
op.cit.
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governments of Amazonas Province did so also aiming to increase population and 
expand the economy in a conjuncture of economic and political hegemony of Parg in 
Amazonia.196 The privatisation of rubber fields in the area now called Acre State, 
following the waterways, represents an expansion of the process of privatisation of 
rubber fields in Amazonas State, which was supported by the governments of the 
Amazonas Province.197 In 1891, the administration of land was transferred to the 
States’ governments as a result of the inauguration of the Republican political system 
in the country. The governments of Par£ and Amazonas States passed legislation 
encouraging and legitimising the privatisation of rubber fields.
Seringal as Private Property
In 1908, it was argued that the term ‘estate’ as a definition for rubber enterprises 
in Amazonia could not be corroborated as it would not be legally enforceable as 
private property.198 On the contrary, I argue, that seringal is synonymous with ‘estate’ 
since it is private property in the modern sense. In Par£ State rubber fields were 
located on old slavery property, State properties, peasantry property and in terras 
devolutas.199 Seringais were set up in terras devolutas. This is the legal definition for 
non-privatised lands, meaning that free land does not exist in legal terms, non­
privatised lands were owned and administrated by the State. The privatisation of 
terras devolutas involved different steps. At first, the future owner had to occupy the 
area effectively according to the law, that is, in accordance with size in hectares and 
giving evidence of permanent residence and economic exploitation of the land, which
195 Ministgrio da Agricultura Industria e Commgrcio -  Diretoria Geral de Estatlstica. 
Resenciamento do Brazil (realizado em 1 de setembro de 1920) -  Vol. IV (1a. Parte ) -  
POPULAQAO. Rio de Janeiro, Tipografia da Estatlstica 1926, pp. X e XII.
196 Calixto op.cit. p. 86.
197 Ibid.
198 F.O. and The Board of Trade 1908.
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is called benfeitoria in juridical terms. The land had to be measured and provisory 
title deed had to be required in governmental institutions that were located far away 
in towns or, more usually, in cities such as Belem, Manaus or Rio de Janeiro.200 
Later, the provisory deed would be re-placed by a definitive title deed, which had to 
be registered in Registry Offices also located in those cities, insofar as Brazilian 
property law foresees that every property has to be registered in a Register Office in 
order to be recognised as a legal property.201
This resulted in a time-consuming bureaucratic process.202 In the meantime, 
between the requirement of title deed and the expedition of it by the State, the rubber 
enterprise was installed and started to work normally from the point of view of a 
private business.
There are two issues revolving the legalisation of seringais: (a) the geomercantile 
way of privatising rubber fields as land-forest, raising questions as to the definition of 
benfeitorias in Brazilian law; (b) the question of domain in Acre, involving historical 
circumstances with regard to sovereignty, since it was originally a Bolivian territory; 
and (c) even when Acre became Brazilian territory, the question of domain was 
specific to this State because the lands had the legal status of a frontier region.
The Geomercantile Feature of Seringais: Questions about the Definition of 
Benfeitoria
The process of privatisation of rubber fields from the middle of the 19th century 
onwards represents the persistence of the geomercantile pattern of privatising land in
199 Bentes 1992 Part II, chapter 2.
200 Acre was a Federal Territory so administrated by central government located in Rio de 
Janeiro, the capital of Brazil until the beginning of the 1960s.
201 See Magalh3es 1977 for a comprehensive analysis of the Laws called Lei Hipotec&ria 
1.237 of 24/09/1864, Dec. 169-A of 19/1/1890) and 370 of 2/5/1890; modified by the Dec. 
4.657 of 9/2/1939, the called Law of public negiisters.
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Amazonia. Demonstrating this requires a quick reference to the notion of 
geomercantile privatisation of land in Amazonia, which was discussed in my previous 
research. Selective appropriation of land was not brought about by the capitalist 
privatisation of land. Also, the First Nations had a selective way of 
occupying/appropriating land. They preferred the fertile soils along the bank rivers for 
producing subsistence products. This is a matter of agreement even among divergent 
analysis on The First Nations in Amazonia. For instance Clifford Evans, Betty 
Meggers, Donald Lathrap and Engracia de Oliveira agree that the most populated First 
Nations were concentrated along fertile bankrivers.203 Devevan204 estimates the 
population of the First Nations in Amazonia, Central regions of Brazil and the north 
east Atlantic cost as 6.8 million. In Amazonia he estimates a high density of 14,6 
inhabitants per square kilometre in varzeas areas, and only 0,2 inhabitants per square 
kilometre inland.205 Even considering that they used to barter (particularly tobacco) with 
European travellers in the period from 1500 to 1615-16,206, the geographic pattern of 
land possession did not express capitalist purposes. Their production was not the 
production of commodity in order to optimise profit and accumulate capital. They 
produced for self-consumption. Consequently, the question of location in relation to 
markets, ports and waterways was not posed. Location as a criterion stems from 
Western capitalist purposes. The Portuguese selected lands suitable for both 
producing commodities for the international markets, and for their geopolitical 
purposes. They were entering an inhabited territory and wanted to guaranteeing their 
effective control over the region, eliminating Western competitors. Accordingly, from
202 Reis 1953, p. 79.
203 Engracia de Oliveira, 1983 p. 148; Meggers 1977 pp. 156-157 quoted from Bentes op.cit.
204 Devevan 1976 p. 230.
205 See on this debate also Carneiro da Cunha 1992 pp. 9-24.
206 The practice of bartering by The First Nations all of Brazil in the period from 1500 to 1580 is 
analysed by Marchant 1942. But in Amazon Region the relationship between The First 
Nations and European based on barter was, extended until 1615-16 when Portuguese
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1615 onwards, the Portuguese invaded the territory by founding military posts at 
strategic points in the entire region,207 which combined the search for the best land with 
the expulsion of The First Nations. By this way the geomercantile privatisation of land 
was initiated.208
Therefore, selectivity expresses the entrepreneurial view on nature in a context in 
which the fluvial technology of transport was the most practical and the fastest as 
well as the technic of production were not based on heavy machines and agro­
toxic.209 In these circumstances entrepreneurs tried to maximise profit by rationalising 
space and the use of natural resources to reduce investments and the cost of 
production. The extensive fertile soils of varzeas, which are irrigated by the annual 
river flood, combining the best natural fertility of soils210 with the best location in 
relation to proximity and facility of transport to ports and consuming centres. The 
fertile varzeas were the first to be taken from the First Nations and transformed into 
individual ownership by the Portuguese.211 This preference for fertile lands along river 
banks close to or with easy access to local markets and export ports was still clear in 
1950 when IBGE (Fundagao Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatlstica) published 
a map showing the distribution of Amazonian population (see map 3).
In this context, changes in export commodity prices favoured the transformation of 
.different extension of soil into land, which were privatised, sold or used as the means 
of producing agro-extractive commodities, designing a kind of ecological-economic 
zone. At first, entrepreneur privatised lands proper for producing agricultural
initiated the appropriation of land and set up of enterprises in the Region (Bentes 1992, part 
II, chapters 2 and 4).
207 Reis, 1942.
208 Bentes op.cit.
209 Ibid.
210 On fertile varzeas and the extension of the piroper soild for agriculture in Amazonia, see 
Nascimento and Homma 1984, p. 25.
211 Bentes op.cit.; Bates 1979, p. 127.
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Map 3: Population Distribution in the Brazilian Amazon According to the IBGE Census of 1950
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exporting commodities.212 Then, they started to invest in pastoral economy, 
privatising lands with natural grass where they did not need to plant grass, reducing 
investments.213 The existence of particular municipalities in Para characterised by 
agricultural-pastoral economies214 results from this geomercantile privatisation of 
land.
Yet, the geomercantile privatisation of rubber fields is peculiar. In the selection of 
land to be privatised seringalistas considered the criteria of location to local markets 
and port of exportation, conditions of transport and navigability as the previous 
landowners had. However, it was the prevalence of the best species of gum that 
determined the selection of land.215
According to IBGE statistics216 rubber fields in the Amazon river vale and its 
branches comprise an area of around one million square miles. Around half of it is in 
the Brazilian Amazonia, with the most important rubber fields situated in Par£, 
Amazonas and Acre States. However, the extension in land-soil is not fundamental 
to understand the logic governing the privatisation of rubber fields in Brazilian 
Amazonia. The density of the best species of gum being the factor in the selection of 
land to be privatised meant that the forest of rubber plants itself was turned into land 
so that land signified land-forest instead of land-soil. Although some of the best 
species of gum could be found on dry land, it was along the riverbanks that the
212 Bentes op.cit, appendix 1. Many authors mention areas were agriculture was performed 
even if they do not work with the notion of geomercantile privatisation of land to apprehend 
it such as: Salles, 1971; Edwards 1847, p. 130; Wallace 1939, p. 173; Bates 1979, p. 102; 
Cordeiro 1920, p. 16; Bastos 1938, p. 207; Anderson, R. 1976 p. 10 note 9; Marin & Castro 
1993, p. 10.
213 Bentes op.cit., chapter 1.
214 Jomal The Brazilian Review (supplement). Extracts from The Message of the Governor of 
the State of Para H.E.Dr. Augusto Montenegro to the Legislative Assembly 1908, Rio de 
Janeiro, Tuesday, October 20th, 1908, n°42, p. 10.
215 Guedes, M.1920, pp. 91-92; Reis 1953, p. 80; MagalhSes 1977, pp. 15-16.
216 Fundas§o Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatfstica (IBGE). S6ries Estatlsticas -  vol. 2, 
Tomo 1 -  IntrodugSo -  Industria Extrativa, IBGE, EdigSo fac-similar, 1907, p. 2-3. On 
rubber fields and species of gum in Amazon valle see also Collins, J. 1869; Wright 1907.
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highest density occurred.217 However, the best quality gums could also be found in 
Acre State, in the regions not reached by flood, but characterised by high pluvial 
level, and the species caucho was typical of dry lands.218 Nevertheless, when the 
rubber trees were located some distance from the margin of the rivers, owners had 
to consider location in relation to waterways with good conditions of navigability, 
insofar as they were dependent on navigation to transport rubber to export ports.
Besides the location and geographical distribution of rubber trees, there were two 
other criteria defining the quality of land-forest. First of all, the species of gum, 
predominantly, as different species produced different kinds of rubber, which were 
variously priced as discussed in chapter four. Second, the level of density in the 
distribution of the best species of gum, as well as topography and quality of soil as 
these affect the productivity of the trees and the quality of rubber.
These divergent natural features greatly influenced the definition of the 
productivity of different rubber fields or land-forest. In 1908, this was expressed in 
monetary terms. For instance, the daily productivity of rubber fields situated along the 
Acre river was equivalent to £12.00, those in the low Purus River £ 5.50, those in 
the Madeira River £ 7.00 and those in the Javary River £ 4.00.219 Furthermore, the 
quality of raw material made from the same species could vary depending on the 
type of soil.220 For example, the latex of Hevea brasiliensis generated softer rubber in 
the island regions in Para State, in comparison with that from dry land in Acre.221 In 
general terms the different features and incidence of rubber trees represented 
different valuation of rubber fields as land-forest, and as such were sold or used to 
produce the commodity rubber of deferring types and values.
217 ACP, Diversas especies de seringueiras. Clima e terrenos apropriados. In: Revista da ACP,
9, e 10, Set.Out/1927, Anno XVII, p. 131; IBGE op.cit p. 3.
218 ACA, Editorial 'A Borracha do Amazonas na ExposigSo de Lodres'. In Revista da ACA,
Manaus, 5, November 1908, pp. 1-6.
219 Ibid.
220 IBGE op.cit. p. 3.
75
These conditions led to a geomercantile privatisation of rubber-fields in which
large estates were set up in the best land-forest - those with the highest density of
the best species of gum and situated along riverbanks near to, or with easy access,
to markets and export ports. The privatisation of rubber fields as land-forest and into
large estates situated mostly along the riverbanks can be seen in Appendix 3. The
List shows that only two out of 80 seringais in the densest rubber fields in Acre, in
1906-07, were located inland. Several authors222 have mentioned this characteristic.
The geomercantile privatisation of land-forest meant that the density and
geographic distribution of rubber trees defined the size and contours of a seringal.223
The non-gregarious distribution of trees224 was used as ideological justification for the
entrepreneurial privatisation of rubber fields into large estates. According to Bonfim:
“(...) an extractive property in order to be profitable has to be a large estate. Due to the 
heterogeneity of the tropical forest and the dispersal geographic distribution of rubber trees, 
a seringal with 30 rubber-tapers, for instance, which is considered a small estate, must 
have at least 9.000 rubber trees. This means that the extension of this seringal would be 
around 10.000 hectares".225 (our translation)
This very argument was used by Reis.226 Even in the area having the highest 
density of the best species of gums, around Acre River, in which it was possible to 
organise 16 paths in one league square, it was estimated that a middle size estate 
with 200 paths reached 15 leagues square.227
What has to be stressed is that instead of being a direct result of different features 
of nature, seringal as synonymous with large estates does express the 
entrepreneurial rationality of producing rubber for profit and capital accumulation,
221 Ibid.
222 See Euclides da Cunha, 1946; Bonfim, 1954 p. 15 and p. 18; Silva, L. 1962, p. 71; Silva, 
1982 p. 43; Duarte op.cit. pp. 25-26.
223 Reis 1953, p. 80; Magalh§es 1977, pp. 15-16.
224 Arkers, 1914; McHale op.cit.; Costa, J. 1913, pp. 9-10; Santos, 1980 pp. 82-83; Weinstein 
1983, p. 14 and footnote no. 19.
225 Bonfim op.cit, p. 18.
226 Reis op.cit.
227 Euclides da Cunha op.cit.
76
which requires certain level of productivity. It was this sort of rationality that turned 
rubber plants into land-forest. The non-gregarious distribution of trees constituted just 
the natural circumstance in which land-forest had to be privatised in large proportion 
by capitalists.
The notion of land-forest did not correspond to the Brazilian land legislation. In 
fact, seringal fits the Brazilian law only partially for being an entrepreneurial 
privatisation of terras devolutas, which was encouraged by the Lei de Terras (Law 
601/1850). However, seringal was not based on modern technology, neither in the 
sense of large-scale monocultural rubber, nor of the mechanical process of making 
raw material so that its infra-structure of extraction of latex and non-mechanical 
methods of transforming it into rubber could not be considered benfeitoria in the 
sense foresees by the law. The Brazilian law was based upon the Western notion of 
civilisation discussed in chapter one, according to which extractivism and non­
mechanical production of rubber would be interpreted as ‘primitive’, ‘pre-historical’, 
and ‘uncivilised’ forms of production. The Brazilian property right discouraged these 
methods of production by not considering them as benfeitoria. Consequently, the 
seringars infra-structure, which was composed not just of infra-structure of 
extractivism and manufacture of rubber but also of rubber tapers’ huts, commercial 
house, offices, warehouses and ports, characterised benfeitoria only partially.
This partial adjustment to the law brought about difficulties to a reasonable 
proportion of seringalistas whose enterprises produced rubber only in order to 
legalise their states before 1912-13. As was previously mentioned, 67% out of 105 
early seringais in the Acre River District and 41.5% of those in the nine most 
important municipality producers of rubber in Par£ produced rubber only.
Seringalistas questioned the criteria defining benfeitoria in the Brazilian right 
property and local governments tried to meet their demand directly. After 1891, when
227 Euclides da Cunha op.cit.
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the republican regime was inaugurated in the country, the governments of Par£ and 
Amazonas Provinces changed the definition of benfeitoria in their legislation. In Par£, 
soon after the administration of land affairs was transferred to the State in 1891, this 
definition was widened, incorporating also the conservation of extractive forest and 
natural grass since it was the object of effective and permanent occupation and 
economic exploitation.228 In 1903, the Amazonas Province did the same.229 In Par£, 
the modifications on the definition of benfeitoria were associated with the fixation of 
the maximum of 545 ha for a private property in extractive areas,230 which was 
turned into 1.098 ha in 1918.231 Thus, squats in rubber fields were legalised 
according to this legislation. Later, in 1920, the government created other forms of 
encouraging entrepreneurial privatisation of terras devolutas in Para State,232 
changed the system of pricing those lands233 and foresaw that the concession of 
pieces of land larger than two leagues squares would be done exclusively to 
industrial and agricultural entrepreneurs. Moreover, extractive areas with the status 
of terras devoiutas received special treatment due to the government’s aim at 
controlling the payment of tax by extractive undertakings more effectively. The State 
began to hire terras devoiutas with high density of exporting extractive products 
instead of selling them. The Art. 2° of that Law created the called aforamento title 
deed which meant the perpetuation of the State as owners of extractive areas in 
terras devoiutas. These lands were hired by the State and the rent value was the 
equivalent to 2% of the extractive production in 10.000 hectares and 1% of any
228 Decree 410/1891, article 6 th.
229 By the Decree 644 of 01/12/1903, art. 12. It was enforced by the Decree 79 of 31/12/1926, 
art. 7th and the Law 112 of 28/12/1926, art. 7th-C. See also Lando, A. O Seringal Nativo -  
Sfntese HistOrica e Jurldica. In: Jornal O Guapor6, 24/07/1977.
230 Ibid.
231 By the Law 1741/1918.
232 The Law 1.947, of 11th November 1920.
233 The Law 1.947 de 11th November 1920 changed the way land was priced according to the 
Law 82, of 15th September 1892 article 15 which was reinforced by the Law 1.741 of 18th 
of November 1918, art. 5.
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excess of it. This new legislation was the base of the privatisation of land in new 
areas of rubber production, and especially in areas of Brazil nut production.234
However, the question around the definition of benfeitoria assumed complexity in 
Acre since at first it was a Bolivian territory. Later it was incorporated to the Brazilian 
territory as a Federal Territory, therefore, regulated by the federal law and 
administrated by the central government as well as it was an area of frontier between 
Brazil and Bolivia so that it was object of special regulations.
The Question of Sovereignty and Domain in Acre
At first, Acre State was part of Bolivian territory, sharing a frontier with Amazonas 
State. From 1848 Brazilians started to exploit rubber fields in Acre. The Bolivian land 
law did not define non-privatised lands as terras devoiutas as expressed by Brazilian 
property right, which is a heritage of the Portuguese law. The Bolivian Civil Code, 
article 285, defines land other than private property as ‘vacant and free goods’ and 
foresee that occupants of such lands are entitled to have its occupation legalised.235
Since the 1850s-1860s the conjuncture was of increasing rubber prices, 
particularly after 1895 with the development of the car industry as is discussed in 
chapter five,236 and Acre was the region with the highest density of the best species 
of gums, so it became the most important producer of rubber in Brazil.237 As a result, 
the number of Brazilians investing in Acre increased. In 1887 rubber fields along and 
around the bank of Alto-Purus and Acre rivers already produced 500.000 kilograms 
of rubber with a population of 10.000 people238 without considering remaining 
nations. Analysing INCRA-Acre lawsuits I found out that 94 out of the 105 original
234 See Emmi 1988; Bentes 1992a.
235 MagalhSes, op.cit.
236 See also Furtado, 1959 pp. 130-131; Santos, R. 1980; Duarte 1987, p.16.
237 Prado Junior 1956, p. 236.
238 Labre, 1887; Tocantins 1961, p. 129.
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seringais in Acre River District239 have information on the date of the first acquisition, 
being 60% of them acquired in the period from 1848 to 1907, and 70% until 1913. 
Moreover, 52% were got in the period from 1895 to 1907.
Since the beginning Brazilian seringalistas had occupied and exploited this 
Bolivian territory but commercialised the raw material with traders from Bel6m and 
Manaus, paid taxes and tried to legalise their lands according to the Amazonas 
State’s law mostly. This behaviour represented a challenge to the sovereignty of the 
Bolivian government over the area. This had no support by the Brazilian 
governments. On the contrary. The Brazilian governments enforced the Bolivian 
sovereignty over the area at first by means of the Treat of Ayacucho in 1867, which 
last until 1903, and by means of a new Treat signed in 1895 between the Brazilian 
and the Bolivian governments, establishing new limits that even enlarged the Bolivian 
sovereignty. In 1896, the Bolivian government created a Syndicate of Rubber and in 
1899 it was installed a customs house in Acre.240 At the same time, seringalistas 
were called to legalise their squatters according to the Bolivian law.241 Seringalistas 
reacted to this by different ways, including armed struggles in 1899 and in the period 
from 6/8/1902 to 24/1/1903, supported by Amazonas State’s governments and by 
traders of Belem and Manaus.242
When the Bolivian Syndicate became a reality after 1901, neighbours such as 
Peru and Brazil reacted against it. The syndicate was a North American and English 
capitalist consortium, whose head office was situated in New York, having a contract 
with the Bolivian government, according to which the syndicate would be in charge of 
the land affairs and taxes over rubber production in the area. It was in this 
conjuncture that the Brazilian government assumed a position favouring the
239 The lawsuits of eleven among the 105 original seringais have missing information about the
date of first acquisition.
240 Duarte 1987, chapter 1.
241 Neves 1981, p. 17.
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integration of Acre to Brazil, which was the claim by seringalistas and traders 
commanding armed struggles with Bolivians in the area. Even so, it took long time 
until the final solution comes. In the meantime, until 1903, rubber estates in Acre was 
legalised according to the Bolivian Civil Code according to which Acre had the status 
of frontier.243
When the territory was at last incorporated into Brazil in November of 1903, by 
the Treaty of Petropolis,244 the Bolivian and the Brazilian governments agreed to 
respect land property of Brazilian and foreign investors in the area.245 Moreover, land 
other than private property assumed the status of terras devoiutas according to the 
Brazilian property right. The Lei de Terras of 1850 terminated the donation of terras 
devoiutas, but Acre was an area of frontier of Brazil with Bolivia, and the Brazilian 
property right treats terras devoiutas in such areas as an exception. This Law 
foresees that it is prohibited the acquisition of terras devoiutas by title other than 
sale. Except those land situated in the frontier of the Brazilian Empire with foreign 
countries in zone of ten leagues, which can be given freely. This law also foresees 
not only the free concession of land in zone of frontier but also even the possibility of 
donation of land having subsidy by the government to those entrepreneurs willing 
populate it. So, the government would finance both Brazilian and foreign settlers in 
this area.246 The Brazilian law even allowed the formation of large estates in terras 
devoiutas located in areas of frontier. The decree n° 1.318 of 30/1/1854 foresees the 
maximum of ten leagues square or its equivalent per colony of 1.600 people.
242 On the Acre Revolution see Calixto op.cit.
243 MagalhSes op.cit. pp. 47-48.
244 The treat of Petropolis was signed in 17/11/1903, when Acre became part of the Brazilian 
territory, and was approved by the Brazilian National Congress by means of the Decree 
5.161, of 10-3-1904.
245See art. 11 of the Treat of Petropolis.
246 ACP, “Zona de Fronteiras - Terrenos Ribeirinhos’. In: Revista da ACP, 6, set. 1919, pp. 
136-138; MagalhSes op.cit. pp. 31-32.
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Thus, it was easy to legalise large extensions of land in frontier areas. And Acre is 
an frontier area. The strict control over the size of land property as well as changes in 
the notion of frontier with other countries are recent features of the Brazilian law after 
the constitutions or Emendas Constitutional's of 1934, 1937, 1946 and particularly 
1964.247 Consequently, new notions and changes in the definition of frontier and in 
the way lands of frontier would be privatised are not useful for understanding the 
question of seringal as private property in Acre before 1930.
Acre was organised as a Brazilian Federal Territory only in 1904.248 Furthermore, 
only in 1906 Registry Offices were installed locally. In the period from 1903 to 1906, 
the registration of title deeds of land in Acre was done in Registry Offices situated in 
Manaus or in Rio de Janeiro. However, there were still conflicts around land affairs 
because Peru had areas around Alto-Purus and Acre rivers. Only in 1909 the 
Brazilian government signed a Treat with’ the government of Peru ending frontier 
questions in Acre. Then, the area of 152.000 kilometre square was incorporated to 
the Brazilian territory without any question by neighbour countries.
After that an internal question of jurisdiction between the Amazonas State and the 
Brazilian central government emerged. Acre was located in the zone of frontier 
between Bolivia and the Amazonas State, and seringalistas started to privatise 
rubber fields in the area as an expansion of the same process in Amazonas State, 
closely supported by the governments of this State since the beginning, as it was 
already mentioned in chapter one. Besides that the Federal Constitution of 1891, 
which established the Republican political system and transferred the administration 
of terras devoiutas to the States’ governments, provoked controversies about 
frontier zone. The controversy stem from the fact that this constitution did not specify 
if this zone would be considered as an area having different status from terras
247 MagalhSes op.cit. pp. 13-15.
248 See Decree 5.188/1904.
82
devoiutas in which case it would be administrated by the central government and not 
by the States’ governments. As a result, the States’ governments continued basing 
their actions on the Lei de Terras of 1850, which ^ a T z o r ^  of frontier as an 
exception of terras devoiutas. As such, it can not be said not being terras devoiutas, 
but only that it is a special case of it, and terras devoiutas are administrated by the 
States’ governments after the Constitution of 1891.
This was the interpretation of the Para and the Amazonas States’ governments.249 
In the meantime between 1867 and the final incorporation of Acre to Brazil, as a 
Federal Territory, the Amazonas State’s governments legalised squats in Acre. It 
was natural to them to do so since they gave political and institutional support to the 
privatisation of seringais there, and they claimed that Acre should be incorporated as 
part of the Amazonas State’s territory. They even went into Court claiming for this. 
When Acre was at last organised as a Federal Territory all those old title deeds were 
enforced by the Brazilian law. Seringais in Acre have different categories of title 
deeds such as Bolivian deeds, deeds supplied by provisory governments of Acre 
during the period of transition from a Bolivian to a Brazilian territory250 as well as 
Brazilian deeds originated in the legalisation of squats or private transfer of seringais 
by commercial transactions. As it can be seen in table 1, in the total of 66 title deeds 
out of 105 original seringais, which have information on the source of the deed, 42% 
was given by Amazonas State’s government and 40% by other sources. Other sorts 
of Brazilian deeds include title others than the original one, which stem from 
transmissions of Seringais or part of them by sale, permute, concession, heritage. 
These title deeds were given by Register Offices as part of the legal procedures 
regarding these transactions.
249 Revista da ACP, op.cit.
250 See on the governmental organisation and juridical system during these period in Calixto 
op.cit.
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Bolivian government 6 9%
Amazonas State Government 28 42%
Acre provisory Government 5 8%
Other Brazilian deeds 27 41%
Total 66 100%
Source: INCRA-Acre lawsuits
The point to be stressed is that the process of privatisation of rubber fields was 
enforced by the State so that the individual ownership of pieces of land was a right. 
The existence of different title deeds in no way denies that. On the contrary, this 
expresses two issues originated in the special situation of Acre as a frontier area. 
First of all, there was a dispute between Bolivia and Brazil concerning the 
sovereignty of the territory. Second, the incorporation of Acre as a Brazilian territory 
brought about a dispute between the Amazonas State and the Federal government 
around the jurisdiction of the area. However, neither the former nor the latter issue 
can be confused with domain. Domain concerns to individuals' right over pieces of 
land, while the two other are political matters in terms of the State' power over the 
population as well as the administration of public affairs. Thus, the existence of 
different kind of title deeds expresses two aspects. First, the landowner’s will of 
having their rights enforced by the State by means of a title deed. It was necessary 
for getting a loan since it implied in the offer of the property as mortgage. Second, 
the State (as a political institution of Bolivia or Brazil) enforced this right. The 
distinction between domain and sovereignty, and next between domain and
841
jurisdiction served as justification for the Brazilian Law to enforce old title deeds in 
Acre.251
Nevertheless, the juridical definition of benfeitoria in order to legitimate domain 
was not tackled by the Brazilian Federal Governments until 1912-13. In fact, the 
governments were contradictory in this matter since they tried to tackle specific 
issues without changing the definition of benfeitoria itself. In 1860, a Federal Law 
tackled the question of the size of seringais by fixing the maximum extension of a 
property in Yz league per Yz league.252 In 1874, a Decree253 intended to meet the 
specificity of extractive economy but ended up reproducing the same old perspective 
of trying to make people adopt modern technology, abandoning ‘primitive’ methods of 
production. In 1890, even not changing the definition of benfeitoria, another Decree 
foresaw that seringais could be registered and as such could be given as 
mortgage.254 Only in the Plan of Defence of Rubber255 in 1912 the Central 
Government foresaw modifications in the juridical definition of benfeitoria to 
incorporate specificity of economies in Amazonia. In 1913 it was done by means of 
Decree256 in which natural grass, when used to sustain cattle, and seringais and 
castanhais, when object of effective occupation and economic exploitation, are 
defined as benfeitoria.
Consequently, before 1913, the situation of seringais in Acre in regard to 
legalisation was different from Para and Amazonas where the re-definition of 
benfeitoria, which was done since 1891-03, allowed a relatively easy process.
In Acre, the problem of the definition of benfeitoria in the federal legislation, which 
persisted until 1913, created difficulties for transferring seringais. In the transfer of
251 MagalhSes op.cit. This author comments the Decree 4.657 of the 9/11/1939, called Law of 
the Public Registers.
252 Law 1.114 of 27/09/1860.
253 Decree 5.655 of 3/06/1874.
254 Decree 370 of 02/05/1890.
255 Law 2.543-A of 05/01/1912 , regulated by the Decree 9.521 of 17/04/1912.
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seringais by sale, heritage, dissolution of commercial partnership and so on, a rubber 
estate was evaluated and priced as land-forest. The deeds about theses transactions 
in Register Office Archives refers to the size of land-soils in kilometre or metre 
square, but most of them mentions only the land-forest or the number of rubber 
paths.257 In some cases the size in land-forest was not the same as the land-soil size 
so that an extension of terras devoiutas was incorporated to the seringal without 
being covered by the original title deeds (see chapter 1 footnote 150). It was not 
illegal, however, because the register in Registry Offices characterises a procedure 
of legalisation of private property. Seringais in Acre were registered in Register 
Offices since 1904, which means that they were legitimised by the juridical system.258 
Consequently, one could not question the legality of a registered rubber estate by 
means other than by trying to annul the registry of property, and the only way to do 
so is by taking the case into court, which results in a very slow and complex lawsuit. 
Moreover, seringalistas could argue that they were privatising terras devoiutas in a 
area of frontier, which was encouraged by the Brazilian law as was already 
mentioned.
Furthermore, seringais were recognised as estates by the Brazilian governments 
and governmental institutions, which bought rubber estates in Acre.259 Official banks 
such as Banco do Brasil and Banco da Amazonia always regarded seringais as 
legitimate properties, buying, sale and accepting them as mortgage.260
The analysis of INCRA-acre lawsuits confirm the status of seringal as private 
property since it indicates that 44% of the 105 original seringais in Acre River District
256 Decree 10.105/1913.
257 MagalhSes (op.cit. p. 16) says that seringais were sold by public deeds in which only the 
limits in terms of number of paths of rubber trees were mentioned. So, no-one had the 
exact idea about the size of the rubber estates in metres square or hectare.
258 See footnote no. 201. The Decree 4.657 of 9/22/1939, the called Law of public registries, 
art. 293 and 294 which was kept by the Law 6.015 of 30/6/1975 art. 250 and 252 enforced 
previous registers.
259 MagalhSes op.cit. pp. 50-51.
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was object of transfer once or very often by heritage, dissolution of entrepreneurial 
partnership and/or sale since the beginning of the 20th century. It also informs that 
16% of those seringais was transferred by sale once or many times since the last 
decades of the 19th century, while 18% was kept by heirs until around the 1960s and 
the 1970s and than started to be sold as a whole or partially. Thus, seringal was an 
individual right in the sense discussed by MacPherson,261 that is, the owner is not 
required to fulfil any social functions in order to have it and he/she could and can 
transfer the property freely.
The meaning of seringal as individual ownership reveals the weakness of both 
assumptions by the British Consul’s report in 1908, previously mentioned. Indeed, 
there was nomadic exploitation of the specie Castiloa. But this represented just 
around 20% of the Amazonia rubber production. Actually his statement was not 
supported by investigation on the Brazilian property right and on the formal 
procedures to legalise seringais. The Consul said: ‘I am not acquainted with the terms of 
Brazilian land legislation’.262 His letters defending himself from criticisms to his report by 
newspapers263 in Belem and by the Revista da ACA264 are quite contradictories. He 
argued that he was referring to questions around rubber fields in Acre State.265 But 
the question between Brazil and Bolivia concerned to those rubber fields had already 
been solved since 1903-04 as previously discussed. And the question of sovereignty 
over the area of Acre State is different from that of seringais as private property, 
which refer to domain. Moreover, the reports says that Very many of the so-called 
rubber estates are in the nature of claims set up by ‘pre-emption’ to a prescriptive right rather
260 Ibid.
261 MacPherson op.cit
262 F.O. and Board of Trade 1908, p. 21.
263 Jornal A Provlncia do Para, artigo ‘A Borracha -  O Para e seu Com6rcio, 25/20/1908 and 
artigo ‘A Nossa Borracha’, 02/11/1908.
264 Benoliel, R. ‘A Borracha do Amazonas na ExposigSo de Londres’. In: Revista da ACA, 5, 
Manaus, 5/11/1908, p. 3.
265 F.O.368/274 (1909), letter of November 1908.
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than by title deeds to a constitutional property’.266 This is true in part considering that 
many seringais had a provisory deed and were waiting the definitive one which could 
take years. However, since the moment one required a title deed the estate was 
legally recognised. Therefore, the owner could sell it as possession. The Consul also 
used Bates and Wallace’s quick reference to the temporary extraction of latex in the 
lower Tocantins river. But they wrote in 1848 when temporary arranchamentos were 
still being carried out in non-privatised rubber fields. In 1908, when the report was 
written, the situation was completely different as the most rubber fields were already 
private property. Finally, the report expresses the distorted interpretation of the 
difficulties estates producing rubber only had to be legalised due to the concept of 
benfeitoria in the Brazilian law.
The main point is that in fact, the British Consul expressed the stigmatisation of 
non-devastated nature originated on the Western notion of civilisation when he 
associates preserved Hevea forest with 'wildnessV’primitivisnrr and its supposed 
unfitness with the notion of land property. He says: ’(...) the term ’estate’ and the idea of 
settled occupation the world calls up is misplaced when applied to the immense areas of 
isolated swamp land and virgin forest (...).’267
The association between extractivism and absence of land property by recent 
literature left this biased description of seringal unquestioned as well as the biased 
view on preserved nature and non-modern technology intrinsic to the notion of 
benfeitoria in the Brazilian law. Like the British Consul, this literature also ignores the 
historical process of privatisation of rubber fields due to the lack of historical 
investigations. This allowed the surviving of the notions of temporary undertakings 
even when the historical context they referred to does not exist anymore. Temporary 
encampment can be expressing the surviving of the idea of feitoria and
266 F.O. and the Board of Trade, 1908, op.cit. pp. 21-22..
267 Ibid p. 21.
arranchamento. Feitorias were temporary extractive undertakings during the colonial 
period, being official or private expeditions to distant areas of valuable extractives 
products.268 Quintiliano269 refers to similar undertakings to rubber fields as 
arranchamentos around the1850s and the 1860s, registering the shift from this to 
seringais as estates. Other authors just mention the temporary entrepreneurial 
production of rubber during the harvest.270
A difference between feitorias and arranchamentos is that the former were based 
in slave labour, combined with forms of free labour, and arranchamentos were based 
on free labour only. However, this was not the only form of entrepreneurial 
production of rubber since agro-exporting farmers around the mouth of Amazon river 
also produced rubber by hiring rubber tree paths to rubber tapers.271 The 
arranchamentos disappear around 1850s and 1860s when it was initiated an 
expanding process of privatisation of rubber fields.272 Santos273 says that this process 
had already reached the distant Madeira and Purus rivers in the Amazonas Province 
in 1850-70. As was already mentioned the set up of rubber estates or the regionally 
called seringai started around 1848 even in Acre, whose rubber fields were the most 
distant from the mouth of Amazon river.
The historiography mentioned is more descriptive than analytical. Yet, this 
historiography indicates the process of privatisation of seringais clearly. Thus, 
absence of historical investigation and the neglect of the local historiography 
accounts for the sweep aside of this history.
268 Bentes op.cit.
269 Quintiliano op.cit.
270 See Cordeiro 1910, p. 17; Reis 1940; Bonfim op.cit. p. 16.
271 Bentes op.cit.
272 Quintiliano op.cit; Bonfim 1954; Reis 1953.
273 Santos, R. op. cit. p. 72.
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Seringal as Private Property of Entrepreneurs Mostly
The sense of seringal as rubber estate or private property in the modem sense is 
useless if not analysed from the broad perspective of historical social relations of 
land property.
As was mentioned, in my previous research it was found out that the best lands in 
Amazonia tended to be privatised by entrepreneurs. This is a tendency stressed in 
the process of privatisation of rubber fields. The possession of initial outlay was the 
fundamental condition for privatising pieces of rubber fields as long as the donation 
of terras devoiutas finished with the called Lei de Terras of 1850. In the delta of 
Amazon river, initial outlay was necessary for buying either a title deed or a squat 
from old holders. And the appropriation of seringais in terras devoiutas required 
payment to the state and expenditure at least with transport to the wished area. 
Furthermore, as was discussed in previous chapter, terras devoiutas were the most 
distant areas from local markets and ports.
Thus, the production of extractive rubber in these lands required initial expenses 
with foodstuffs necessary for surviving during the entire harvest that lasted for 6 or 7 
months, and the set up of a minimal physical infra-structure such as houses, 
warehouse, port. It required also initial investment in workforce skilled in initial tasks 
such as the recognition of the species of gum, their level of concentration and the 
first plan of the physical organisation of the enterprise. This work would last a 
minimum of two days in small seringais, having gregarious distribution of rubber 
trees, and if performed by one mateiro (labourer skilled on the task of localising and 
recognise the species of gum) and two toqueiros (the labourer with the attribution of 
tracing the contours of the future paths). It would be required much more than that 
time in large estates or in non-gregarious rubber fields. In 1913, one mateiro
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received around £66,00 per tree localised, and toqueiro was a salaried worker 
receiving from £100,00 to £120,00 per month. So, if this service lasted two days it 
would cost from £265,00 to £332,45 to the landowner.274
Such economic requirements qualified those people having initial outlay or credit 
to privatise the best rubber fields. Credit was offered by the local commercial- 
financial capital, represented by commercial houses, usually backed by foreign 
rubber dealers or by Brazilian private banks or credit associations as is discussed in 
chapter six. Exporting houses required easy accessible valuable properties as 
mortgage such as urban properties, imported boats or official financial titles. As a 
result, commercial houses became the intermediary in the flux of credit from 
exporting houses to seringalistas since they had the sort of properties accepted as 
mortgage by exporting houses. At the same time, commercial houses accepted 
seringal and rubber as mortgage, which constituted the seringalistas, main 
properties.
Seringalistas had initial capital and credit. They were immigrants ambulant- 
merchants and ex-farmers from North East or merchant and farmers from Para and 
Amazonas States. In Acre Territory there are evidences of a few salaried workers, 
performing administrative jobs in estates, who managed to become seringalistas. As 
is discussed in chapter five, salaried workers assuming important positions in the 
administration of seringais could make important savings. There are two published 
cases. Cabral’s brother, who, according to his description, was an accountant in a 
Seringal in Acre in 1890s, becoming a small scale seringalista in 1900,275 and the 
Seringal ITU's owner.276 In both cases, salary savings were added to savings brought 
from their homeland and, then, invested in ambulant trade in Acre, transforming it in 
expanding capital. After that they could buy small scale sen’ngais in less important
274 Chaves op.cit, p. 33.
275 Cabral 1949.
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rubber fields. In the case of the Seringal ITU's owner, he could buy a middle scale 
seringal in the stretch with the densest rubber fields in Acre. Yet, he had special 
conditions for that. He got married with the owner’s adopted daughter in 1896 and 
the previous owner was old and planning to go back to north-east. So he could buy 
the estate according to payment in parcels, getting the legal transmission of the 
property when he finished the payment in 1902. In this year he required the title deed 
of property transmission by sale, which was received only in 1906 when Acre was 
already a Brazilian Federal Territory.277
Moreover, commercial houses from Belem and Manaus as well as foreign 
companies increasingly bought seringais, particularly, in the 1910s. In 1903-04 several 
commercial houses from Belem requested the legalisation of seringais in Acre River 
District.278 As can be seen in Apendix 1, in 1906-07, seventeenth casas aviadoras 
owned seringais in the densest rubber fields in Acre, being eight of them from Belem. 
In 1913-15, during one of the deepest crises of rubber prices, casas aviadoras 
received several seringais as payment of debts by seringalistas.279 According to 
Dean280 European and North American investors increased their investment in 
Amazonia in 1903-13. Para’s Laws in 1909 and the increasing rubber prices in 1910 
encouraged several North American and European companies to buy seringais.29' In 
fact, although it was more frequent in the 1910s, since the last decades of the 19th 
centuries foreign companies and individual capitalists used to buy or rent seringais. In 
1899 a commercial house from Belem sold 35 of its seringais to a company from 
New York. The total area reached 800 million square metres, having 2.475 rubber
276 Neves, op.cit.
277 Ibid pp. 17-18. See also Di2rio Oficial ‘EL ACRE”, Ano II n° 42, 1902; and the Book n° 221 
of Registers of property in Register Office of the TabeliSo Manoel Antonio Lessa, fls 8 and 
verse, 02/03/1906, Manaus, in Amazon State. See also ACRE-INCRA lawsuit refering to 
Seringal ITU in Acre river District.
278 ANRJ, SDA, Cod. 988, vols. 3-5.
279 CC, Indice de Escritura?§o op.cit.
280 Dean op.cit. p. 81.
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tree paths, being all seringais situated along the bank of a river in Amazonas State.282 
At the beginning of the 1900s, English entrepreneurs rented rubber estates in 
Par£.283 In 1909, two commercial houses from Bel6m, having several rubber estates 
in Acre, constituted commercial partnership with English capitalists.284
As landowners of rubber fields and entrepreneurs of rubber, seringalistas 
emerged from 1848 onwards in Amazonia. They had access to credit and were 
encouraged to privatise rubber fields by local governments as was already discussed 
in chapter one. Besides that, the Lei de Terras of 1850 encouraged the 
entrepreneurial privatisation of terras devoiutas at the same time that it created 
obstacles to peasants to do so as is discussed in chapter four and the policy for 
rubber economy in the 1910s encouraged entrepreneurial investments. In such 
conditions, the most important rubber fields ended up being private property mainly 
of one class -  the capitalist class personalised by seringalistas, commercial-financial 
firms and companies.
Weinstein285 says that the figure of Amazonian patrao with his vast domains would 
be a product of the later boom years when the upriver districts had become the most 
productive rubber zones and the control of the best hevea fields had been divided 
between the major commercial houses and a small group of powerful seringalistas. 
Instead, she argues that in the more heavily settled rubber municipios such as 
Breves, Anajas, and Melgago in the oldest area of rubber production in Para State 
smallholders controlled rubber fields according to small size pieces of land and 
familial organisation of work.286
281 Ibid.
282 CC, Escritura Publics de 17/7/1899, Livro 66, fils. 102-104v.
283 TJE, Autos Civis op.cit.
284 JUCEPA, Registro do Commercio.
285 Weinstein 1983, p. 45.
286 Ibid.
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This is true in part. First of all, because seringais as synonymous with large 
estates emerged in Acre in 1848 and not only in the latter ‘boom’ years, even so the 
set up of seringais was more intense in the period from 1895 to 1913 as was already 
mentioned in chapter two. Moreover, the author’s findings such as members of one 
only family holding many plots, one person having even four plots287 in rubber fields 
in those municipalities as well as the existence of different sorts of owner were not 
valued as useful for defining who had the effective control over rubber fields.
As was mentioned in chapter one, the analysis of registers of squats in the nine 
most important municipalities producers of rubber in Para was carried out. Breves is 
not included because the questionnaires were damaged in the transport to London. 
As can be seen on Table 2, it was found 2927 properties producing rubber in these 
municipalities. The years of concentration of registers can be indicating the 
expansion of the process of geomercantile privatisation of seringais. In most of the 
six municipalities oldest producers of rubber, more than 80% of rubber estates were 
legalised in 1892-1898, while in Melgago 85% were legalised in 1895-1904, Anajas 
91% in 1900-11 and, finally, Altamira where 82% were legalised in 1914-15.
Reg i s t e r s  o f  Se r i ng  a is. Pa ra , 1891 - 1942
M  urt i e i p u  l i t  y
T o t a l  o f  
Registers
'
4 7 4
I t a  i t u  b a
A f u a
C h a v
2 9 7G u r u p a
C u r r a l i n h
C a in e t a
M  e l g  a co 2 2 3
A n a j  a s
A I t a  m i r  a
2 9 2 7
P e r i o d
1 8 9 1 - 1 9 1 1  
1 8 9 1 - 1 9  15 
1 8 9 1 - 1 9 0 5
1 8 9 1 - 1 9 0 3
1 8 9 2 - 1 9 0 3  
1 8 9 1 - 1 9 0 5  
1 8 9 1 - 1 9 0 4  
1 9 0 0 - 1 9 2 8  
1 9 1 3 - 1 9 4 2
T o t a l
C o n c e n n a t i o n  P e r i o d
7 1 %  i n 1 8 9 2 - 1  
6 2 %  i n 1 8 9 2 - 1  
7 %  i n 1 8 9 2 - 1  
9 7 %  i n 1 8 9 2 - 1  
4 %  i n 1 8 9 2 - 1  
9 2 %  i n 1 8 9 3  - 1  
5 %  i n 1 8 9 5  -1  
9 1 %  in 1 9 0 0 -  
8 2 %  i n 1 9 1 4 -
Source: Registers o f legalisation of seringais - ITERPA
287 Weinstein op.cit. p. 46.
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Table 3 shows that the number of properties does not coincide with the number of 
owners. There are 2383 owners for a total of 2927 properties since 316 owners in 
eight municipalities owned a total of 910 plots, each of them having between two and 
twelve plots. The number of people having two or more plots is even higher, 
considering that it was not possible to analyse this matter in Altamira. The data 
processing could not be finished in Belem and in the transport to London 
questionnaires of Altamira were partially damaged. Consequently, the definition of 
owners in Altamira does not include the analysis of those having two or more plots, 
who in fact were entrepreneurs as it was found out in the other municipalities. It 
means that the number of entrepreneurs in Altamira probably was less than the 
number illustrated in Table 3.
In the eight municipalities, the type of owner was defined by correlating three 
variables such as benfeitoria, type of owner if individual or companies and quantity 
of plots owned. In the analysis of benfeitoria, deeds mentioning only residential 
house, which in general was typical of those plots having just a few paths were 
considered probably peasant properties. Deeds containing residential house and 
abarracamentos or only abarracamentos were considered entrepreneurial properties 
as long as abarracamento was the denomination for seringueiro’ hut. Seringueiro 
was the labourer producing rubber as a subordinate form of labour as is discussed in 
chapter four.
The results indicate that in the rubber fields situated in the nine most important 
municipalities producers of rubber in Para, particularly in eight of them, 55% of owner 
were entrepreneurs and 45% peasants. However, in the total of 2927 properties 
producing rubber, 63% were enterprises and 37% peasant properties. In Itaituba 
85% were entrepreneurial property, in Gurupa 72%, in Cameta 70% and in Anajas 
62%. In the others municipalities 50% or more were entrepreneurial property, with
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exception of Altamira where the great majority seems to be peasant property and 
only 18% entrepreneurial property.
Itaituba 485 395 81% 90 19% 529 85%
Afua 428 215 50% 213 50% 261 55%
Chaves 188 79 42% 109 58% 122 53%
Gurupa 223 139 62% 84 38% 213 72%
Curralinho 160 47 29% 113 71% 111 50%
Cameta 405 268 66% 137 34% 322 70%
M elgaco 153 37 24% 116 76% 107 50%
Anajas 209 109 52% 100 48% 164 62%
Altam ira 132 20 15% 112 85% 24 18%
Total 2383 1309 55.00% 1074 45.00% 1853 63%
Source: Registers of legalisation of seringais - ITERPA
The entrepreneurial control of rubber fields is even more meaningful when the 
geomercantile feature of privatisation of land as land-forest already discussed is 
taken into account. As illustrated on chart 1, the results of the correlation between 
the variables ‘number of rubber tree paths’ and ‘benfeitoria’ shows that the Hevea- 
forest was massively owned by entrepreneurs rather than by peasants. There is 
missing information about the number of rubber paths in around 25% of peasant 
properties and around 19% of entrepreneurial properties. The valid cases illustrated 
that in the total of around 19.915 Hevea paths, only around 18% were located on 
peasant properties, while more than 82% lied on the entrepreneurial properties.
Besides that, while in entrepreneurial properties one path usually had between 
100 and 150 trees, rubber paths having just 40 to 80 trees were quite frequent in 
peasant properties. To sum up, although peasants owned a reasonable percentage
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of properties producing rubber, entrepreneurs owned the majority of property and 
more than 80% of the Hevea land-forest.
Source: Registers of Seringal legalisation - ITERPA
These results deny the notion that in Para smallholders controlled rubber fields 
according to small size pieces of land and familial organisation of work. In fact, 
rubber fields as land-forest in Par3 were owned by entrepreneurs mostly. When the 
variables ‘number of rubber paths’ and ‘benfeitoria’ are considered, there is a higher 
percentage of small scale entrepreneurial production of rubber in Para, around 75% 
of valid cases, when compared to Acre. Nevertheless, it has to be considered that 
316 or 24% of entrepreneurs owned between two and twelve properties. So, small 
scale rubber production in one property does not mean small scale entrepreneur. 
Furthermore, it has to be taken into account that only 41% of the total of 2927 
properties produced rubber only. That is, 59% produced rubber in association with 
other economic activities. Although in Gurupa, around 60% produced rubber only, in 
Itaituba 54% and in Melgaco 50%, in Altamira and in Cameta only properties 
producing rubber in association with cocoa reached 85 and 42% respectively. In the 
other municipalities the properties producing rubber only reached less than 50%. So, 
if most of entrepreneurial properties producing rubber in Para can be considered 
small scale producers of rubber it does not mean that they were small scale agro-
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extractivist familial producers because many entrepreneurial agro-extractivist 
properties had a few rubber paths, which were hired to rubber tapers during the 
harvests. In my previous research I found out that it was done even by State agro- 
extractivist farms in the 1860s,288 and Wallace mentions entrepreneurial farms 
cultivating cocoa in association with rubber production around Belem in 1848.289
In Acre River District in Acre Territory, the stretch of densest rubber fields, were 
privatised according to entrepreneurial property only. The INCRA-Acre’s lawsuits 
about the original seringais in this area shows the existence of just 105 original large 
rubber estates, comprising an extension of 1.592.676,5378 ha. This re-enforces 
information by Falcao,290 who mentions 80 seringais situated along and around Purus 
and Acre rivers, in 1907, which constituted the stretch with the most important rubber 
fields in Acre River District.291 As can be seen in Apendix 1, in 1906-07, this stretch 
was owned by 39 seringalistas and 17 commercial-financial firms, being 8 firms from 
Belem, which owned 15 estates, and 4 businessmen from Manaus and Bel6m. 
Among them, 74 produced around 4.540 tons of rubber, considering that 6 have 
missing information on this matter.
Thus, the most important rubber fields in Para were turned into private property of 
entrepreneurs mainly, while the stretch with the densest rubber fields in Acre River 
District, in Acre Territory, was privatised as large estate only. The census of 1920 
and 1940 shows land concentration in Acre. As Table no. 4 illustrates in 1920 the 
proportion of properties having more than 10.000 hectares was only 6% of the total. 
However, they represented almost 85% of the privatised lands in Acre Territory. In 
1940 land concentration was intensified. The properties having more than 10.000 
hectares represented 19% of the total number of properties, covering almost 92% of
288 Bentes op.cit., part II, chapter 1.
289 Wallace 1939, p. 92.
290 Falc§o, 1906-07.
291 Euclides da Cunha 1946.
the privatised lands. Regarding the person in charge of the property, in 1920, 74% 
was owner, 16% tenant and 10% administrator. Yet, in 1940, the number of 
properties under the responsibility of tenants reached 46%, while 28% remained in 
charge of the owner. This indicates the increasing hire of seringais by seringalistas 
after the deepest crisis of rubber in 1913-15. A new category in 1940 was the 
occupier, which is mentioned for the first time, representing almost 14% of the 
responsible for the property.
Table no. 4: Land Property in Acre - Census 1920 and 1940
Quantity o f Establishments Area (ha}
Owner/Area(ha) 1920 1940 1920 1940
Category of Owner
Individuals 1128 96,4% 460 43.9% 3.617.429 87,2% 4.089.692 59,2%
Other private property 42 3,6% 195 18,6% 530.154 12,8% 2.678.894 38,7%
Public Institution 377 36,0% 30.108 0,4%
Wthout Information 15 1,5% 116.015 1,7%
Responsable for the property
Owner 864 7,8% 294 28,0% 1.222.460 29,5% 2.599.033 37,6%
Tenant 185 15,8% 479 45,8% 1.753.433 42,3% 3.456.693 50,0%
Occupier 144 13,8% 14.702 0,2%
Administrator 121 10,4% 118 11,2% 1.171.690 28,2% 770.201 11,1%
Wthout Information 12 1,2% 74.08 1,1%
Property Area(ha)
Less than 100 647 55,3% 540 51,6% 11.402 0,3% 12.067 0,2%
100 to less than 1.000 303 25,9% 124 11,8% 116.420 2,8% 44.149 0,6%
1.000 to less than 10.000 150 12,8% 137 13,1% 508.189 12,2% 515.608 7,5%
10.000 or more 70 6,0% 197 18,8% 3.511.572 84,7% 6.342.885 91,7%
Wthout Information 49 4,7%
Total 1.170 100% 1.047 100% 4.147.583 100% 6.914.709 100%
Source: IBSGE,Censos Economicos 1975,Censo Agropecuario Acre,Serie Regional,Vol.I,Tomo 2, pp.2-3
Duarte op.cit.pp.28-29
Conclusion
Seringal emerged in 1848 and expanded intensively particularly in and after the 
1870s favoured by both a conjuncture of general tendency to increasing rubber
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prices, resulting from the increasing industrial demand for rubber, and the offer of 
easy credit and export services to large-scale production of raw material by foreign 
capitalists, and encouraged by local governments.
SeringaI means rubber estate or private property in the modem sense. The 
specific feature to be stressed is that the privatisation of rubber fields represented the 
continuation on time of the historical pattern of land property in Amazonia in which 
the best lands tended to be privatised by entrepreneurs. The stretch having the 
densest concentration of the best species of gums in Acre was privatised according 
to seringais as synonymous with large estate. Moreover, different from the idea of 
seringal as entrepreneurial property being a phenomenon of the later boom years in 
Acre State, it is a phenomenon which emerged from 1848 onwards all over 
Amazonia, including Acre. Furthermore, in Para State rubber fields in the nine most 
important rubber producing municipalities were privatised in great extent by 
entrepreneurs individually or under the form of companies. Although peasants owned 
a reasonable percentage of properties producing rubber, the best Hevea forest was 
greatly owned by entrepreneurs.
The material presented reveals that the association between extractivism and 
absence of private property represents the neglect of the geomercantile process of 
privatisation of rubber fields in Amazonia and biased view on non-devastated nature 
and non-modern methods of production intrinsic to the Western notion of civilisation. 
This view on nature was expressed in the definition of benfeitoria in the Brazilian law, 
imposing difficulties to the legalisation of those seringais producing rubber only. This 
definition was changed in the Brazilian law only after 1912 as part of the plan of 
defence of rubber. As a result, in 1908, these difficulties could be manipulated and 
distorted by the British Consul in Para in am attempt to mischaracterize seringais as 
private property, presenting rubber production as nomadic and lacking permanent 
and legal privatisation of land. Thus, thie revival of the association between
100
extractivism and absence of land property by recent literature results from the 
absence of historical investigation, ignoring the historical process of geomercantile 
privatisation of rubber fields. As a result, the definition of benfeitoria in the Brazilian 
law before 1912 and the biased view on seringais presented by the British Consul in 
1908 were left unquestioned so that they could survive somehow through the 
literature.
10)1
Chapter 3
THE AVAILABILITY OF LABOUR FOR SERINGAIS
The material presented thus far raises questions about the extent to which the 
existence of free land shaped rubber tapers as autonomous producers292 and gives 
ground to the discussion of our argument that rubber tappers were engaged in 
seringais as subordinate labour. The best Hevea forests constituted the private 
property of entrepreneurs rather than of peasants, suggesting that the peasantry’s 
rubber production was secondary to entrepreneurial production. Moreover, it has to 
be considered that peasant rubber production can be said to be non-capitalist but can 
never be said to be pre-capitalist. Familiar producers or peasants in Amazonia do not 
constitute a pre-capitalist phenomenon as feudal-peasants did in Western Europe 
since they emerged in and from the historical process of capitalist expansion, and 
even peasants or peasant-workers from different areas in Amazonia and the North 
East Region were attracted by, and engaged in, seringais not as autonomous 
producers but as subordinate labour.
A fundamental step in demonstrating the condition of the direct producer of rubber 
as subordinate labour is to discuss the availability of labour or the existence of a free 
labour market as a result of a long historical process of making labour, involving 
multiple social relations and processes in which the geomercantile patterns of social 
relations of land property plays an important role. As Malagodi293 argues, taking 
command of the process of production in capitalism, subduing the work of direct 
producers, requires as one of the first conditions the ownership or control over means 
of production. In the geomercantile pattern of privatising land, it is apparent that land 
property has the meaning posited by MacPherson, this is, it is an institution ‘(...)
292 Pacheco de Oliveira op.cit.; Weinstein 1983, chapter 1, and 1984.
293 Malagodi 1995 pp. 29-30.
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created or re-created and kept for the aim of meeting the wants of the class which 
command the process of production".294 In this sense, the social relation of land 
property is connected with the entire process of subduing direct producers or turning 
them into labour.
The argument is presented by dealing first with the historical formal and informal 
process of making labour in Amazonia to demonstrate the internal availability of 
labour to seringais. The rest of the chapter deals with the problem of shortage of 
labour for distant seringais in Acre, particularly from the 1870s to the 1910s when the 
conjuncture was of intense production and spreading rubber enterprises. The 
shortage of labour brought about recruitment as an intrinsic part of labour 
engagement. Seringais in Acre had a problem even anterior to that of controlling their 
labourers; they had to find and recruit them first. Therefore, the first main problem 
confronting employers was the recruitment of sufficient labour which involved tasks 
such as the attraction of labour with a willingness to learn the skills consonant with 
the methods of producing rubber, the promotion of the work pattern and the 
recruitment of labour in distant labour markets.
The Formal Historical Process of Turning Natives into Labour
In the geomercantile privatisation of land the best lands tended to be privatised by 
entrepreneurs. This tendency expresses social relations of land property in which direct 
producers were to a great extent excluded from the best lands. This condition had a 
major influence in the making of labour. The starting point in the history of labour in 
Amazonia is the freeing of land from The First Nations, initiated in 1615-16. This was 
followed by the geomercantile privatisation of land that was combined with the process 
of turning them into labour. The Portuguese and other Westerners depended upon The 
First Nation’s labour and skills in order to exploit local resources and produce 
commodities. Natives were the exclusive source of labour until 1680. When their
294 MacPherson op.cit. p. 1.
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enslavement was outlawed in 1755, followed by the increasing adoption of African 
slaves, they were still the predominant source of labour.295 Accordingly, apart from 
African slavery which was a phenomenon of the period from 1754 to 1888 (although 
African slaves had started to be adopted slowly and on a small scale since 1680) the 
history of labour, particularly until the first decades of the 19* century, was 
fundamentally a historical process of transforming natives into labour.
Early capitalism in Amazonia assumed the form of a colonial economy, employing 
different kind of labour, including slaves who were used as commodities. As such, 
native slaves were cheaper than African ones. This was one of the main reasons for 
the predominance of native slaves in poorer areas throughout the country.296 The 
higher prices of African slaves, in turn, transformed them into a characteristic of the 
richest economies and their possession into a sign of status and prosperity297 in which, 
according to Lobo,298 natives were replaced by African slaves as soon as an economy 
expanded.
The prohibition of the enslavement of natives in 1755 followed by the incentive to 
adopt African slaves in Amazonia, stemmed from a slight economic expansion 
represented by the central role Belem assumed as the only official port for the export of 
gold produced in Mato Grosso.299 However, the Pombalina policy aimed at rationalising 
the economy during the period 1751 to 1777,300 played a central role. This policy was 
part of the Portuguese crown’s policy of economic recuperation of Portugal initiated in 
1640.301 It involved the politico-administrative reorganisation of Brazil through the 
centralisation of administration to improve control over tax receives,302 and stronger 
imposition of Western economic rationality.
295 Bentes Feb./1992, chapter 3, p. 158.
296 Werneck Sodre 1979; Lobo 1952.
297 Gorender 1985
298 Lobo op.cit. p. 327.
299 Lapa 1973.
300 Alvara with power of Law of 07/06/1755, analysed in Bentes op.cit. p. 172.
301 See Dias, M. 1970; Lobo 1952; Arquivo Naciomal (Brasil) 1985 and analysis of this 
literature in Bentes Feb.1992 Part II, chapter 1.
302 Arquivo Nacional (Brasil) 1985, p. 55, Lobo opi.cit. p. 374.
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African slaves did not become the dominant kind of labour, though. In 1823, after 
the independence of Brazil from Portugal, the population of Para Province was 
128,127, of them 22% were slaves.303 Santos’304 data on the number of black slaves 
in Amazonia from 1800 to 1840 indicates an annual average of 30,841, reaching a 
peak in 1830 with 39,958 black slaves. In 1862, there were 30,847, but representing 
only 15.5% of the total population of Para province.305 In June 1884, there were 
20,849 slaves working in 9,872 sugar and rum mills, but by 1888, when black slavery 
was abolished this number had been reduced in around 50%.306
This reduction was the result of a number of factors including escapes to 
quilombos,307 death, and the sale of some of them to ‘owners’ in South East Brazil.308 
Regarding interregional trade, there are indications that Para won slaves.309 Yet, the 
sale of African slaves to the Southeast was an important feature of the last decades 
of slavery in Para, expressing their high cost to local investors. This relatively high 
cost resulted not only from the great distance from Africa and distance from re­
distributor ports in Brazil but also strong competition among slavers which put slavers 
from Para at a disadvantage to those from city-ports such as Recife, Salvador and 
Rio de Janeiro.310 Moreover, as Marin311 stresses, slavers in Para faced difficulties 
keeping African slaves, not only due to the end of trafficking in slaves in the middle of 
the 19th century and the direct political pressure of the internal abolitionist movement, 
but particularly due to slaves constantly escaping and organising quilombos. This 
demanded both government and private expenditure to organise means of capturing
303 Baena, A. 1839, pp. 282-371. See analysis of this book as source of historical research on 
Marin 1985, pp. 244-255.
304 Santos, R. op.cit., p. 59.
305 Para. Presidente da Provlncia, 1862 pp. 57-66.
306 Moraes 1984, pp. 39-40, quoted from Bentes Feb. 1992, chapter 3, p. 188
307 See on this subject Salles 1973 and Marin op.cit.
308 Bastos, A. 1938, p. 179; Viotti da Costa 1982; Marin op.cit.; Bentes Feb./1992, chapter 3,
p. 188.
309 Marin op.cit; Para. Presidente da Provlncia 1871 p. 39, quoted from Bentes op.cit.
310 Gorender 1985, pp. 189. On the difference of prices between ‘Indian’ and African slaves in 
Para see Lobo op.cit. p. 319 and D’Azevedo 19'00. On the high price of African slaves, 
particularly during the ascension of the mining economy in Minas Gerais, see Simonsen 
1957, p. 199.
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fugitives. In the last decades of slavery, the high cost of keeping African slaves was
used as a justification by local merchants opposed to the Dec. no. 6980 of 20/7/1878
and Law no. 2940 of 31/10/1879, under which both the hiring and selling of slaves
were taxed as a disincentive to the idea of merchandising human beings.312 They
opposed the Para custom, arguing that:
‘(...) the slave exists and that is bad, but the law allows it. Consequently, it can not prevent 
the owner from exerting his/her legitimate interest. One can not and may not prevent the 
owner from transferring slaves if he/she can not afford to keep them. Under these 
circumstances, the selling of slaves does not appear as the stigma of human traffic,313(our 
translation).
The declining number of African slaves was also a result of the progress, albeit 
slow, made in releasing different categories of them, particularly after Law no. 2040 
of September/1871 that set aside federal funds for this purpose. The President of 
Para Province reported that this grant led to the release of a total of around 472 
African slaves in 1882.314
The point to be stressed is that African slavery was a secondary form of labour used 
in conjunction with the important native labourers in Amazonia. Regarding labour, and 
particularly rural labour, it can be seen mainly as a historical phenomenon created by 
dispossessing The First Nations of land, thereby training-constraining the natives to 
work as subordinate labour. This was a process commanded and intentionally carried 
out by the Portuguese monarchy and Western capitalists, who imposed their roles and 
rationality on the organisation of work and life. This was a long historical process 
lasting from 1615-16 to at least the third decade of the 19th century, involving many 
secondary processes.
The geomercantile privatisation of land required the freeing of land from The First 
Nations, a process that was combined with making them labourers through a 
combination of the use of force and strategies of ideological subordination. The chief
311 Marin op.cit. pp. 308-314.
312 Decree 6980 of 20/7/1878 and Law 2940 of 31/10/1879.
313 Request to the ACP. In: ACP, Relatbrio Annual de 1881, p. 31.
314 Para. Presidente da Provlncia 1882a, pp. 84-87, quoted from Bentes op. cit. pp. 188-189.
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ideological strategy adopted by the Predatos constituted the absorption of the natives’ 
knowledge, followed by the dispossession by the latter of this knowledge. In the period 
1500 to 1615, representatives of the Portuguese Crown and traders were not just 
bartering with the natives. On the contrary, absorption of their accumulated knowledge 
and skills on nature and exploitation of natural resources, and on their economic, 
social, cultural and political organisations were being carried out concomitantly. This 
was done by manipulating the friendly way natives received the Portuguese and 
Westerners in general, as well as the way in which the society shared knowledge and 
skills - by oral processes, for free.315 That is as use value instead of as a commodity.
The natives’ dispossession of their lands was based on the use of this knowledge 
against them. At the same time, that they were classified as ‘savage’, ‘uncivilised’ and 
unable to produce knowledge. This intellectual exclusion assumed the form of scientific 
and institutionalised ideology. In the 17th and 18th centuries, Western intellectuals 
classified the inhabitants of The First Nations of the American continent as not human 
beings but half way between humans and animals.316 The evolutionary scientific 
discourse of the 19th century argued that they had imperfect development, so that they 
would degenerate without ever reaching maturity. For this reason, they were classified 
by science as remains of an old humanity, destined to extinction.317
Despite controversy over this view, which never reached the point of recognising 
them as normal human beings, and in spite of the Brazilian legislation not accepting 
this scientific explanation entirely, the classification of natives as under-developed 
human beings constituted the ideological justification for the set up of a system of 
tutelage and ‘civilisation’ that was, in fact, a process of making the natives into the 
labour required for the production of commodities for the international market.
‘ Civilisation’ was a policy carried out to meet the needs and demand of labour by 
the class commanding the production of colonial commodities. The removal of The
315 Bentes Feb. 1992, Part II, chapter 2.
316 Carneiro da Cunha 1992 and 1992a. See also Giddens 1993, chapter 2.
First Nations from their land and their subsequent transformation into labour involved 
two legal and institutionalised procedures, chiefly by official war expeditions. At first, 
catholic priests, who were salaried workers of the Portuguese Crown, tried to convince 
them to abandon their lands and move to catholic aldeias. Those refusing this ‘pacific’ 
form of recruitment were arrested as prisoners of war, and under such status were 
legally sold into slavery.318 Those who were recruited were turned into so-called Indio 
forros, who were salaried workers under the condition of wards of priests, by special 
training in aldeias.
Aldeia was the chief institutional structure under which these people were cleansed 
of their mother languages, cultural background, way of living and were taught- 
constrained to behave according to the Portuguese pattern of religion, culture and way 
of living, not as autonomous producers, but as labour. They were trained in 
professional skills and taught-constrained to acquire submissive and passive behaviour 
according to the hierarchical organisation of work and life in the society that was 
emerging in the region, which contrasted with their previous social organisation of work 
and life. Catholic priests administered their lives and allocated them to farmers and 
other businesses until the middle of the 18th century. Even so, in the first stage of the 
process of making labour, the First Nations’ cultural background survived partially. The 
priests organised a common language (the lingual geral), which originated from the mix 
of their different mother languages.
Nevertheless, in 1663, a slow process of secularisation of aldeias began, which was 
completed in 1751,319 when aldeias were given the institutional form of Diretdrios under 
secular administration. This was combined with the prohibition of their enslavement in 
1755 and encouragement for the Portuguese to intermarry with them. This policy
317 Carneiro da Cunha op.cit; Carneiro da Cunha e Farage, 1987.
318 They could be prisoners taken in official or private wars against them (Bentes February 
1992, chapter 3 pp. 160-161). See on legal forms and processes of turning people from The 
First Nations into either slaves or labour under the tutelage of catholic priests, Raiol 1900, p. 
122; D’Azevedo op.cit. p. 48, Malheiro 1867; Leite 1943, Lobo 1952; Quintiliano, 1963; Cruz 
1973.
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included the prohibition of the lingua geral and stronger constraints to speak 
Portuguese and adopt the pattern of behaviour established by the Portuguese. This 
policy was justified on the grounds of economic rationalisation and integration of 
natives into the colonial society.
Except for those who intermarried with the Portuguese, integration was achieved 
mainly through the use of native as labour under different forms of tutelage, such as 
ex-Indio forros who received plots around villages and Diretdrios who became peasant 
wards of the secular administration of Diretdrios, a situation that lasted until December 
1831.“ °
In fact, most of the ex-indio forros were kept as salaried workers under tutelage. 
What changed was the form in which the tutelage was exerted. They were made wards 
of the administration of the Diretdrios321 instead of priests as before. In 1761, in the 
Capitania of Par£, half of the 2,520 ex-Indio forros were distributed to farms. The other 
half who remained in villages or Diretdrios was distributed as labour to different official 
and private businesses. In the Capitania of Rio Negro in 1774-5, there was a similar 
situation. Among 3,243 ex-indio forros, just 15% were working on their own land, while 
85% were labouring on private farmland or in businesses situated in the villages.322 
Moreover, farmers could now keep those with the status of ex-slave, who had became 
wards of judge, provided application was made to the judge who was known as the 
‘judge of orphans’ for permission to keep the ex-slaves as serfs.
Apart from tutelage, ex-indio forros and ex-slaves were already free in the sense 
that they were acculturated workers, not owners of the means of production and were 
dependent on the owners for performing their job. Most of them seem to have 
continued under this condition even when they became free of any form of tutelage in 
the first half of the 19th century.
319 Bentes op.cit., pp. 168-175; D’Azevedo op.cit. p. 108.
320 Bentes op.cit p. 179.
321 Ibid, chapter 3, pp.173-178.
322 Ibid.
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After the middle of the 18th century, native ex-indio forros and ex-slaves constituted 
one of the main historical sources of free labour.323 They increasingly blended with 
European peasants brought about both by spontaneous and official immigration from 
the middle of the 18th century onwards. The mixed population expanded even more as 
African slaves or ex-slaves were blended in.
This process coincides with the appearance of temporary or unemployed labourers. 
Seasonal or temporary labourers living in Bel£m are estimated to have reached 13% of 
the population in 1793. According to the racist classification of the official statistics, the 
black, ‘Indian’ and mixed population reached a total of 1,099 people. In 1822, this 
population constituted 9% of the Belem population.324 According to Marin,325 the 
owners’ difficulty in imposing their own rules on this labour was expressed in the 
national law that treated those without permanent jobs as indolent and nomads, 
naming them vagabond, which was the ideological justification for treating them as 
cases for the police. According to this author, it was from this perspective that the 
President of Par£ province said that the problem of Par£ was not the lack of labour but 
the fact that labourers were not keen on working in plantations.326 One issue not 
mentioned by Marin is that this population was the heir to the social stigma that had 
originated in the ethnic-cultural discrimination against The First Nations or against 
African slaves who were expected to be nothing more than subordinated labour, which 
made them susceptible to that sort of classification, and to official recruitment even if 
they were free.
These reasons together brought about the idea of creating the so-called corpo dos 
trabaihadores in 1838, which was an organisation of labour combining the use of force
323 Free labourers are, in both senses as non-slave and non-possessors of the means of 
production.
324 Salles 1973, p. 154.
325 See analysis on the national law and discourse by Brazilian and Para Province 
governments about those they considered as having an indolent and nomadic style of life, in 
Marin, 1985 pp. 245-151.
326 Marin op. cit. p. 244.
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with contracts of location of service. Marin327 argues that this organisation represented 
the persistence of the official conception of creating labour by means of official 
institutions combining tutelage and hierarchical internal organisation until the middle of 
the 19th century. The corpo dos trabalhadores recruited, trained and distributed labour 
to farmers and factories and other private and public businesses in villages, towns and 
in Belem when there was a shortage of labour in the period post-cabanagem. The 
author shows how similar this conception was to that of Diretdrios (the secular 
institutional form assumed by the previous catholic aldeias) insofar as labourers were 
under the central hierarchical administration being trained, as the type of labour 
demanded by manufacturing, commercial and country enterprises. In 1848, the corpo 
dos trabalhadores was composed of 5,562 labourers, 62 officials and 56 subalterns; in 
1853-1854 it had 2,544 labourers, 41 officials and 299 subalterns, and in 1855, 4,064 
labourers, 47 officials and 280 subalterns.328 However, this organisation did not absorb 
all of the unemployed and temporary labourers. In 1849, the President of Para 
Province stated that there were around 60,000 male individuals available without a 
permanent job, which would represent Va of the Province’s population.329
The Informal Historical Process of Turning Direct Producers into Labour
Besides the official policy of creating labour by means of institutions such as 
aldeias, diretdrios and corpo dos trabalhadores, there was an informal economic and 
political process of achieving this by narrowing the conditions whereby the landless 
could become autonomous producers, or reducing the number of remaining nations. 
Deep forests and lands far away from the main riverbanks and ports that had the 
status of terras devolutas constituted the space where remaining nations managed to 
survive and fugitive black slaves ran away and organised quilombos as well as where
327 Marin op.cit.
328 Marin op.cit. p. 252.
329 Para. Presidente da Provlncia Fala 1849, p. 22.
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the poor landless could appropriate pieces of land. Life on those lands was hard, 
though.
First of all, this population already depended on the market for products that they 
could not produce themselves. Usually, they traded with nearby landowners who had 
a commercial house in their properties or with mobile traders, the regatoes, who 
came irregularly. In both cases it meant buying over-priced goods and selling their 
products according to the price offered by these merchants, as they had no options. 
According to Salles,330 people leaving in quilombos around Alenquer and 6bidos 
came to 6bidos in secret in the evenings to commercialise their products with 
regatoes. There are also plenty of references to remaining nations trading with 
regatoes (or mobile merchants,) as well.331
Second, they were confined to a poor and difficult life far away from health care, 
education etc. The autonomous occupation of those lands involved risks of disease 
or death owing to unhealthy living conditions. Even official settlements sometimes 
failed as a result of improper sanitary services in swamp areas.332 Official Reports 
mentioning the availability of terras devolutas far away from consuming centres date 
back to 1705. They say that the poor landless had access only to those distant lands 
in contrast to the powerful people with large estates in fertile varzeas near waterways 
and consuming centres.333 When some of them got land of good quality they were 
vulnerable to expulsion depending on the valorisation of different layers of land 
provoked by changing markets as well as the legal complexities of the matter. In 
1848, Bates mentioned that all land around the riverbanks was divided into large 
estates.334 In my previous research I found out evidences that the expulsion of the 
landless trying to occupy a piece of land was an immediate and commonplace action
330 Salles op.cit. pp. 236-238.
331 Bentes op.cit. Part II, chapters 3 and 5.
332 For instance the private settlement colonial N.S. do O in 1858-59 in Para State (Bentes 
op.cit. Part II, chapter 5, p. 250)
^ S e e  Bentes op.cit., Part II, chapter 5, pp. 236-237.
^Bates 1979, p. 86.
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taken by landowners in order to prevent them from creating the legal condition 
foresee by the Brazilian law.
In this context, geomercantile land property served as a barrier to direct producers. 
The Brazilian land property rights after 1850 created obstacles to direct producers’ 
access to terras devolutas, insofar as it encouraged entrepreneurial privatisation and 
prohibited appropriation of those lands by any way other than by sale, so that the 
poor landless had no means of accessing them legally. Remaining nations and 
peasants were expelled or had their free access blocked in terras devolutas that 
become valuable as a result of changing markets. For instance, areas of free 
extraction of latex disappeared after the middle of the 19th century,335 as did areas of 
free picking of Brazil nuts in South East of Para State in the 1920s.336 Regarding the 
remaining nations, a policy of legalising and/or donating them land appeared after the 
middle of the 18th century. Even so, attached to this practice was a policy of turning 
them into Portuguese subjects and different forms of official tutelage, during the 18th 
and the 19th centuries.337 In this sense, they were in a similar condition to remaining 
nations all over Brazil.338
Carneiro da Cunha339 does not distinguish forms of tutelage over remaining 
nations from those over Indio Forros and slaves. She talks about ‘Indian Reservations' as 
if they were ex-catholic aldeias. Although there may have cases of it, catholic aldeias 
in Amazonia were turned into villages and towns from the middle of the 18th century 
onwards. Engracia de Oliveira mentions 42 towns that originated from catholic 
aldeias or the merger of two or more of them.340 Camara shows this same process in 
Bahia State,341 while the so-called ‘Indian’ Reservations emerged from another
335Reis 1953; Engracia de Oliveira 1983.
336Da Matta 1979; Emmi 1988; Bentes 1992a.
337See Malheiro 1867; D’Azevedo 1900; Leite 1943; Bentes op.cit, chapters 3 and 5.
338 Carneiro da Cunha op.cit.
339 Ibid.
340 Engracia de Oliveira 1983, pp. 189-191.
341 Camara s/d.
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historical process involving the secular struggles by remaining nations to keep their 
old territory or get new lands.
However, Carneiro da Cunha stresses that the official policy towards remaining 
nations’ lands was combined with the intent to make them labour. The tendency 
throughout the 19th century was to confine remaining nations into reduced areas until 
they could not perform their traditional organisation of work and life while at the same 
time they were offered manufactured instruments of work in order to get used to and 
dependent on them, until they started to buy these instruments. When they did so, 
farmers tried to take their lands arguing that they were not ‘Indian’ anymore.342 The 
legislation gave ground for the expulsion of some remaining nations from rubber 
fields, engaging some of their members as labour into seringais after the middle of 
the 19th century.343 At the conjuncture of the ascension of the rubber economy, 
English and North American companies constructing railways demanded and caused 
the physical elimination, removal or destruction of remaining nations.344 English 
engineers demanded a quicker removal of remaining nations, who, according to 
them, were ‘infesting’ the areas where they wanted to build railways.345
Despite this history, several remaining nations survived. For instance, in Acre 
alone there are 25 ‘Indian Reservations’, which occupy 11.5% of the total area of the 
State346 nowadays. This historical result stems from different processes such as, for 
example, the remaining nations’ struggles. Yet, the geomercantile pattern of social 
relations of land property played a great role. Remaining nations usually moved to 
distant central lands since it was almost impossible to keep or get tracts of the best 
lands that were the object of competition by investors. Regarding Brazilian direct
342 Carneiro da Cunha op.cit. pp. 141-149.
^Ferreira de Castro, 1955, pp. 78, 85, 87-88; Chaves op.cit. p. Ill and p. IV; Brockway op.cit. 
p. 148.
344 F .0 .13-492 (1872) and F.0.13-543 (1878); see also the romance ‘Mad-Maria’ by Marcio 
Souza.
345 F.O. op.cit.
346 SEPLAN-Secretaria de Estado de Planejamento (1993) Programa Estadual de 
Zoneamento Ecoldgico-Econfimico do Acre. Rio Branco, Acre: Governo do Estado do Acre, 
quoted from De Carlo,S. 1996.
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producers, the geomercantile land property created difficulties for them too in getting 
or keeping pieces of the best lands. This social relation of land property constitutes 
one of the main reasons why peasants, as autonomous producers and sellers of their 
products, emerged mainly from official settlements of familial producers aimed at 
supplying the internal market with foodstuffs.347 From the middle of the 18th century 
and in the 19th century there was a permanent policy of settlements.348
The point to be stressed, however, is that the geomercantile privatisation of land 
was linked to forms of turning direct producers into labour, as already discussed. 
Even the policy of immigration was also a policy of making labour. During Pombal's 
policy of immigration, from 1751 to 1777, natives were settled close to some of these 
settlements under the ideological justification of ‘civilising' them by their contact with 
Westerners. In fact, native settlements were aimed at offering labour to those 
immigrants wanting to ascend to entrepreneurial small production.349 Moreover, the 
Lei de Terras of 1850 authorised the immigration of labour by private enterprises. 
This enforced previous law that conceded layers of the empire’s lands to the 
organisation of free labour colonies.350 Private immigration usually aimed at the 
immigration of labour that was also encouraged by Brazilian legislation. However, 
Westerners usually wanted to become autonomous producers and the crash between 
those different interests led them to abandon private settlements as was the case of 
the colonia N.S. do 6  in 1858-59 that was abandoned by foreign immigrants, who 
were replaced by Brazilian immigrants.351 Furthermore, even considering difficulties 
and failures of some official Western settlements, they made an important 
contribution to the supply of labour. The fact that some immigrants abandoned their 
plots due to distance from consuming centres and ports, poor natural fertility of soil,
347 Bentes Feb. 1992, chapter 5.
348 See on this matter: Penteado 1967; Marin op.cit; De Lima op.cit.; Moraes op.cit.; Carneiro 
da Conceit&o op.cit.; Bentes op.cit.
349 Bentes op.cit., pp. 243-245. Marin (op.cit p. 339) also mentions native settlements.
350 Marin op.cit.
351 Bentes op.cit., chapter 5, pp. 250-255.
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diseases, or even insufficient initial support by governments is well recorded.352 They 
moved to towns or joined the population of the landless, which originated in the blend 
of Europeans with native and ex-African slaves.
The existence of free labourers in both senses of non-slaves and of non-owners of 
means of production did not mean a smooth and automatic passage to the condition 
of subordinate labour. On the contrary, it was marked by struggles. Even in the 
structural condition of being non-owners of the means of production, the landless’ 
reaction to staying in this condition or to becoming subordinate labourers was always 
manifested by means of attempts to get a piece of land individually or collectively. 
Land conflict marked the historical process of capitalism in Amazonia, involving 
remaining nations struggling to keep their land, the landless trying to keep their 
squats or getting a piece of good land.
There is plentiful historical information on this phenomenon, the most dramatic 
event being the Cabanagem. During the time that the leaders of this movement 
assumed power in Bel£m, the landless occupied large estates of sugar production 
and destroyed mills, occupied cattle and agricultural farms or estates not exploited by 
owners.353 This happened not only in Para State but all over Amazonia.354 Although 
the solution to this conflict came by military intervention enforced by British warships, 
it also involved the concession of land and title deeds to many of them.355
As Marin356 evaluates cabanagem from the perspective of the transition from black 
slavery to free labour, she does not distinguish the claims by the landless and rural 
workers from those against slavery. However, she criticises the historiography that 
analysed this movement from the perspective of its leaders, saying that cabanagem 
was a political movement involving different claims and aspirations such as a 
nationalistic movement headed by layers of the upper class - which needed the
352 Moraes 1984; Carneiro da Conceicao 1990; Penteado 1967*
353 Bentes op.cit., chapter 4, p. 200. /
354 Bates op.cit. pp. 126-127.
355 Quintiliano op.cit. p. 141.
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political support of subordinated classes in order to challenge the still dominant 
position of the Portuguese despite the independence of Brazil from Portugal - and a 
social contest. Moreover, she enlarges on this view, saying that the transition from 
black slavery to free labour was very complex, involving different ‘factors’ such as the 
‘revolte des opprimes' (cabanagem, political movement against slavery, including 
passive reactions such as escape etc), demand for technical training of labour to 
work with machines, economic difficulties such as those concerned with market 
prices of African slaves, and political issues such as the treaties and the emergence 
of Brazilian state.357
I argue that because Marin centred her analysis on the transition from black 
slavery to free labour, she does not stress the complex historical process of making 
labour in Amazonia. During the time of African slavery, there was a contemporaneous 
process involving non-slaves, poor peasants and the landless reacting to becoming 
labour. The aspiration to be autonomous producers was expressed and persisted 
over time, as one of the motivations for political organisation in rural areas, which 
also inspired several technical proposals for agrarian reform in fertile varzeas359
Despite some landless peasants managing to become autonomous producers, the 
majority was already in the condition of labour. From the middle of the 18th century 
there are references to free labourers working as tenants on farms, and to forms of 
wage labour. The tenants’ work was characterised by high rotation. One of the 
reasons for this was the owners’ wish to prevent them questioning their right to a land 
property.359
356 Marin op.cit.
357 Marin op cit. p. 255.
358 Rocha, 1952; Departmento de Imprensa Nacional, 1954 pp. 55 e 160.
359 Cartas do governador Mendonpa Furtado de 14/02/1754 e 15/05/1754. In: Annaes da 
Biblioteca e Archivo Publico do Para, Tommo III.
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Lapa360 says that wage labour appeared first in the navigation business, in which it 
was already dominant in 1805, because it was easy for slaves to escape during 
journeys. Mills too employed wage labour to perform administrative tasks and the 
called indio forros received salaries. So, there were forms of wage labour from the 
very beginning. What is quite clear is that wage labour free of tutelage is a 
phenomenon more apparent in towns and in the navigation business.
However, it became increasingly apparent after the first decades of the 19th 
century in rural activities. Records from rural State factories in 1838 and 1839 show 
that they were run using daily wageworkers.361 Moreover, payment of wages in cash 
seems to have been less common than payment in kind in rural areas. Quintiliano362 
mentions the salaried receiving their payment in kind instead of cash soon after the 
Independence of Brazil in 1822. This is a form of remuneration that very often 
resulted in workers’ debt so further evidence of it is apparent in the revolt of 
cabanagem in which besides the claim for land, rural workers denied their debts.363 In 
the middle of the 19th century, the President of Para Province reported high levels of 
rural workers’ debts.364 In 1863, he reported that ex-members of remaining nations 
that were inserted in a few aldeias organised by governments in the first half of the 
19th century were working temporarily in rubber estates under the same form of 
remuneration.365 The predominant employment of free rural workers was quite clear 
in 1862 when the President of Para Province reported that there were 2,849 
agricultural establishments in Para Province, employing 6.856 free labourers and 
2,391 slaves, plus 556 pastoral establishments employing 875 free labourers and 554 
slaves. It means that 72% of the labour employed in rural enterprises was free labour
360 Lapa 1973 pp. 33-34, see analysis with other historical information in Bentes op.cit, p. 5, 
footnotes 10 and 11.
361 Cartas do Comandante Militar da ExpedigSo do Amazonas of 16/07/838 and 15/07/1839.
In: Governo do Amazonas, 1839. Correspondfencias com o Governo em 1838 e 1839.
Bel6m, C6dices da Biblioteca e Archivo Publico do Para (originais), volume 837.
362 Quintiliano, 1963 p. 97.
363 See Bentes op.cit. Part II, chapter 3, p. 200.
364 Parg. Presidente da Provlncia Falla 1849, p. 82.
365 Para. Presidente da Provlncia Relatdrio 1862a, p. 12.
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and just 28% slave. In artesian and industrial activities there were 1,905 
establishments, employing 9,708 free labourers.366 The total population is mentioned 
to have reached 167,909, being 84.5% free people and 15.5% slaves. Analysing this 
same data, Marin says that the predominance of free labour included a variety of 
categories of labour from smallholders to wage labour.367 In the middle of the 19th 
century, slavers or administrators of slavery farms used to advertise in newspapers 
available paths of rubber plants to be hired inside their farms and the final selection of 
the tenant was made by auction, suggesting a high availability of labour.368
Belem was the main local labour market in the region, having the highest number 
of artisan and industrial establishments in 1862, so that in this city could be found a 
higher proportion of free labour. According to the President of Par£ Province, in 1862 
there were 1,905 artisan and industrial establishments in Pard employing 9,708 free 
labourers. 67% of these businesses and 78% of those labourers were located in 
Belem.369 In 1897, the British Consul said that ‘Labour is fairly plentiful, and for most 
kinds of rough heavy work local labour is preferable to imported, the native population 
supporting life more cheerfully and resisting the two or three ‘standard' diseases far more 
vigorously than any imported element.'370 He also stated that ‘per head of its inhabitants the 
Amazon valley is far and away the most productive region of Brazil...while the productive 
capacity of the whole country was 34$011 reis per inhabitant in 1905-06, the Northern or 
Amazon states produced 559% more than that of any zone and 176% more than the coffee- 
bearing estates’.371 Although this statement provides no information as to the 
difference in prices between rubber and other products included in these values, it 
unquestionably indicates the internal availability of labour.
367 Marin op. cit. p. 420.
368 Para. President da Provlncia, 1863, Annex: Relatdrio do Administrador de Fazendas 
Rurais, p. 13-14.
369 Para. Presidente da Provincia Relatorio 1862, pp. 57-66.
370 F.O. and The Board of Trade, Report on Trade of the Consular District of Para, 1908, p. 
16.
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The Attraction of Labour to Seringais
Seringais increasingly attracted labour. The expanding geomercantile privatisation 
of rubber fields according to seringais meant that the only way rubber tappers could 
perform their jobs in the best rubber fields was under the entrepreneurs’ command. 
Rubber fields in terras devoiutas were far away. As was discussed in chapter two, 
the set-up of rubber estates in Acre started in 1848, which indicates that the 
privatisation of rubber yield from the mouth of the Amazon river inland was not a 
linear expansion as the idea of the frontier suggests, but a selective concomitant 
process. Under such circumstances, the unequal access to the best land is stressed. 
The slow and expensive system of navigation, particularly before the introduction of 
steam navigation in the middle of the 19th century, did not eliminate the social 
implications of the long distance of rubber fields with the status of terras devoiutas. 
For it took around 30 days to reach rubber yields in Acre from Belem. Furthermore, 
the travel tickets were dear, as discussed in chapter four, and the privatisation of 
those lands involved strong competition. This is mentioned by Reis372 and the 
analysis of lawsuits on Acre affairs for the period 1903 to 1904, kept in the Arquivo 
Nacional do Rio de Janeiro under code 988, confirms this. Among the total of around 
55 lawsuits, ten refer to land conflicts, and of these eight are concerned with conflicts 
in which the claimant’s allegation is that his neighbour invaded his rubber estate 
either when the engineer was demarcating a nearby estate or the defendant exploited 
paths of rubber tree inside the claimant’s property deliberately.
Apart from the competition, tapping required an initial outlay for subsistence 
products during harvesting from the middle of April to November when direct 
producers had to be far from local markets. Thus, the process of privatising rubber
371 Idem, pp. 10-11.
372 Reis op.cit. p. 79.
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fields required economic resources to reach these areas, creating the infrastructure 
required by law in order to legalize the property and for facing the high competition for 
those lands. Besides that, it occurred in a context in which the political-institutional 
apparatus such as local government policies and national and local legislation 
encouraged the entrepreneurial privatisation and exploitation of rubber yields, as has 
already been discussed in chapter two.
In this context, poor direct producers of rubber had none of the mentioned 
economic requirements for exploiting high density rubber fields. Moreover, even 
considering that the land legislation allowed them to privatise terras devolutas, since 
they paid the State for it, the politico-institutional apparatus considered them mainly 
from the perspective of colonisation in which they were supposed to be nothing but 
familiar agricultural producers or labour under entrepreneurial command.
What has to be stressed, however, is that the geomercantile privatisation of land
assumed the form of a barrier to direct producers accessing the best land, as
previously discussed. Bonfim stresses that with the privatisation of rubber fields:
“(...) all over the main waterways in spite of their huge extension and low demographic 
density, there is no free land, because all of those area have owners”373 (our translation)
As discussed in chapter two, despite autonomous familial producers owning 37% of 
properties producing rubber in the nine most important municipality producers of rubber 
in Para State, just 20% of the total of rubber paths that existed in those municipalities 
lay in their properties. They did not exist in the stretch having the densest rubber yields 
in Acre State, at least until the 1920s, as has already been mentioned.
Under such circumstance seringueiro, who was the direct producer of rubber, 
cannot be said to have owned or controlled the best rubber fields, which were the most 
important means of rubber production. In fact, the direct producers of rubber in 
seringais were subordinated labourers recruited or attracted from the available 
population of labourers, landless or peasant-workers. Most of the first rubber estates
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employed native labourers. However, the more the rubber price increased the more 
they attracted immigrant labour. Audrin374 refers to seasonal labourers coming from 
North East Brazil to work on rubber estates around the Araguaia and Tocantins rivers 
for 5 or 6 months who then went back home from the middle of the 19th century.
The flux of landless and peasant-workers to seringais was stressed or minimised 
according to different conjunctures in terms of peasant conditions in relation to the 
rubber economy. In 1871, the President of Para Province reported that one of the 
problems in peasant settlements in Bragantina micro-region was that many of them 
started to perform the role of temporary labour on rubber estates.375 The reasons 
were not just problems in the official policy of settlements but also the weakness of 
cereal prices when compared to rubber prices. This same issue was emphasised by 
the director of the Benevides colony in 1880.376 According to Bonfim,377 at the 
beginning of the 1870s in Bel6m, the mid-price of 1 kilo of rubber was around 1 or 2 
dollars, but with this amount one could buy around 30 kilos of rice, 45 kgs of sugar, 
10 kgs of coffee, 10 kg of animal fat, 1 hammock and 10 metres of rough cloth.
Thus, the existence of high rubber prices favoured not only the appearance of 
rubber estates after the middle of the 19th century, but also the labour required for it. 
Ferreira de Castro378 mentions that even employees in business in Belem who were 
getting low salaries often left their jobs, preferring to work on rubber estates instead.
The Recruitment of immigrant labour
Immigrant labourers or peasant-workers went hand-in-hand with the increasing 
shortage of labour which accompanied the spread of rubber estates, which was a
373 Bonfim 1954, pp. 15 and 18.
374 Audrin 1963, p. 93.
375 Para. Presidente da Provlncia Relatdrio 1871, quoted from Bentes op.cit, Part II chapter 5, 
pp. 261. See also Penteado 1967.
Para. Presidente da Provlncia Relatdrio 1880, p. 46, quoted from Bentes op.cit.
377 Bonfim, 1954 p. 17.
378 Ferreira de Castro op.cit. p. 31.
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feature much more apparent in the most important areas of rubber production in 
Acre. Here, the physical or geographic distance of rubber fields from local markets 
and ports of exportation emphasised the historical condition in which the only way 
rubber tappers could perform their labour in the most important rubber yields was 
under the owner’s command. It also stressed their dependence upon owners even to 
reach the area. At the same time, it transformed the engagement of labour into an 
internal-external administrative procedure. In 1910, Seringal ITU twice sent an 
associate to Belem to recruit labour at a cost of £14,624.84 as can be seen in Table 
5.
The expenses of recruitment illustrated in Table 5 was part of the financial capital 
outlay at the beginning of the harvest in April or in December, which assumed the form 
of a loan to the seringueiros who had to repay it with 20% interest. At the end, the 
enterprise would have a profit of around £ 2,924.97. This means that rubber tapers or 
seringueiros were free labour in charge of their own expenses with mobility from their 
homeland to the estate. The need to borrow money to cover this explains the 
seringueiros’ engagement as indebted labour and under the obligation to settle this 
before leaving the estate.
Table 5: S eringa l ITU Recruitment Expenditure, 1910
Period Expenses Items Total Value
Jan-M ar
Labourers' travel tickets, cash loan, food 
during the journey
Associate's expenses
£4 ,447 .99
£ 990.75
Decem ber
Travel tickets, cash loan and food for 25 
labourers £6 ,362 .65
Associate's expenses £ ..823 .45
Annual Expenditure £ 14 ,624 .45
Source: Seringal ITU, Diary of 1910.
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These features have being referred to as compulsory forms of labour,379 labour 
immobilisation380 or pre-capitalist relations of production.381 These conceptions followed 
the tendency among authors studying slavery as a mode of production382 or non­
capitalism383 to refer to experiments with different forms of labour as transition to 
capitalism or as forms of servitude.384 The interesting point in these studies is the 
explanation of the end of slavery as a result of multiple processes such as the 
conjuncture of constant decreasing sugar prices after the middle of the 18th century, 
technological changes and the abolitionist movement in Brazil, particularly the passive 
resistance of African slaves by means of the organisation of quilombos. The weakness 
in these studies is the conception of history as a succession of modes of production, as 
already discussed in chapter one.
These are conceptions permeating even studies on sharecropping contracts, which 
argued against the identification of indebted immigrant labourers in coffee plantations 
with debt peonage. 385 They stated that the primary aim planters pursued in charging 
immigrants with transport costs and food advances was to recover their initial 
investment. Lamounier386 considers this controversial since aspects of the 
sharecropping scheme that could reinforce its similarities with indentured labour have 
not yet been researched as for instance the role and expectations of the companies 
involved in the trade in colonos. However, she does not give evidences able to 
characterise the recruitment of colonos with ‘trade’ but mentions only planter attempt to 
establish this.
The subterraneous notion of history as a succession of modes of production, 
governing these studies, took special connotation in the term ‘transition’. The common
379 Silva, A. op.cit. p. 23; Paula, J. op.cit. p. 30.
380 Pinto de Oliveira, L. 1985.
381 Silva, A. op.cit.; Paula, J. op.cit.; Pinto de Oliveira op.cit.; Duarte, H. 1987.
^Gorender, 1985.
383 Dias, 1970.
384 Viotti da Costa 1982, pp. 104-105 refers to debt and peonage in coffee plantations as 
compulsory labour or servitude.
385 Stolcke, 1988 and Stolcke and Hall, 1983
386 Lamounier op.cit. p. 12-13 and footnote 23.
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element in this approach is the over-emphasis on the prohibition of traffic in slaves in 
1852, giving secondary importance to the multiple internal historical processes 
mentioned by previous studies. And the linear historical view has hidden important 
circumstances. Stolcke’s387 disagreement with Eisenberg’s388 explanation for the 
adoption of sharecropping contracts as a result of declining profitability, is based on the 
argument that planters introduced free labour because of their increasing awareness 
that slavery was doomed, and as a strategy for facing two main issues: how to find a 
new source of labour to replace the slaves, and how to organise and control free labour 
efficiently. However, she does not considers that declining profitability was an important 
matter in NorthEast (where Eisenberg’s study is concentrated) after the middle of the 
19th century. The North East’s declining sugar economy led to the sale of many slaves 
to the ascendant coffee plantations in S. Paulo,389 to a great extent due to sugar 
planters difficulties in keeping their slaves. Moreover, there being no shortage of 
labour390 because the declining economy as a whole was just liberating labour or 
generating unemployment. In S. Paulo, on the contrary, the expanding economy and 
the shortage of labour posited different issues for coffee planters.
Lamounier’s391 comparative study on different categories of contracted labour in 
coffee plantations and the ‘coolies system’ in Cuba considers different circumstances. 
However, the ‘transition’ historical perspective governs her study too. She distinguishes 
two senses of transition. In the language of the time it meant a ‘transition from slavery 
to free labour (non-slave labour)’, signifying a time in between two systems or possibly 
as a near permanent condition, given that the gradual abolition of slavery was expected 
to take a very long time in Brazil and in Cuba. In the academic debate ‘free labour1 has 
often been displaced by 'wage labour1 and ‘transition’ is viewed as representing the 
period in which the bases for a free labour market were set up. The author argument is
387 Stolcke op.cit. p. 2.
388 Eisenberg op.cit. p. 355.
389 Viotti da Costa op.cit.; Marin op.cit.
390 Eisenberg op.cit.
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that these early experiments influenced the process of gradual abolition and set the 
parameters for the ‘transition to free labour* as perceived by contemporaries. Actually, 
Lamounier392 refers to those contracts as ‘experiments’ and despite arguing that a ‘free 
labour market* might not have been the final end envisaged by 19th century planters, 
indeed, she does not face the theoretical issues on the table.
The idea that slavers started to experiment with new forms of labour only after the 
traffic prohibition is quite unsustainable when it is taken into account that those 
experiments constituted a constant practice in Amazonia for the very beginning. As 
already mentioned, slave labour was never the exclusive type of labour in Amazonia, 
and it was not even the predominant one.
Regarding seringais, although there are a few historical references to the use of 
slave labour in arranchamentos, that is expeditions to extractive areas situated in terras 
devolutas, before the middle of 19th century, no records have been found of such a 
practice on rubber estates. In contrast to sugar or coffee plantations, rubber estates 
were not a mix of slave/free labour enterprises, changing to a system of free labour 
later. From the beginning, rubber estates were based on free labour. Even slavers in 
Para exploiting paths of rubber trees inside their enterprises did not adopt slaves for 
this job. Indeed, they hired out paths to free rubber tapers, as previously mentioned.
The main reason for this was the specificity of rubber production in the face of the 
slow disappearance of slavery -  which, in fact, was initiated by the prohibition of native 
enslavement in the middle of the 18th century and the increasingly difficulty of keeping 
African slaves due to multiple processes which was also initiated around this time. The 
production of wild rubber was temporary, during the harvest from the middle of April to 
November, so during more than four months of the year there was no production. Since 
slaves were the sort of labour bought and maintained by owners who had to care for 
them like a property that had to be fit for sale at any time, the physical condition of
391 Lamounier op.cit. p. 16.
392 Ibid. p. 17.
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slaves interfered with their prices. The adoption of slave labourers in rubber production 
would mean that the owner was responsible for them even during the four months 
when they were not tapping. This would have been irrational from the entrepreneurial 
perspective of producing for profit and capital accumulation, particularly when slavery 
was slowly disappearing and it was already expensive to acquire and keep slaves, as 
previously mentioned. Seringueiros were responsible for their own keep from the time 
they left their homeland and even during the period between harvests when they were 
not producing rubber. Both native and immigrant seringueiros were labourers in charge 
of their own keep.
Immigrant labour in the second half of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th 
century was a sensitive issue because, like every capitalist, seringalistas wished for an 
abundance of cheap labour because the level of labour availability influences the 
degree to which labour can be exploited. According to McHale,393 the plentiful and 
cheap labour in West African and Malay rubber yields allowed capitalists to utilise 
higher physical labour inputs, implementing higher degrees of exploitation of labour. 
Barlow394 shows the high level of exploitation of immigrant labour in 'Peninsular 
Malaysia, particularly after 1909, by rubber planters. They were recruited by a foreman 
and employed without contract to prevent them from leaving the estate for other 
work,395 as is mentioned in the next chapter. Even contract categories of workers could 
come to estates already burdened with debts as a result of the expenses of transport 
and subsistence, together with a commission paid by the contractors.396
Although seringais in Acre shared such rubber plantations’ characteristics as the 
contract of immigrant labour involving debts and the settlement of debts as a condition 
for leaving the estate, as discussed in the next chapter, rubber planters managed to 
create plentiful cheap labour. In Amazonia, on the contrary, many authors frequently
393 McHale op.cit. p. 16.
394 Barlow, 1978.
395 Ibid p. 42.
396 Ibid p. 46.
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mention the lower level of labour offered.397 This circumstance gave a labour degree of 
bargaining power and required some form of commitment by capitalists, who had to 
face not just the problem of finding labourers but also of convincing them to work in 
distant seringais. There was a high death rate at the beginning, which persisted 
throughout the first half of the 19th century, owing to improper sanitary conditions in 
certain swamp areas. Memories of that time398 made people in seringais in Acre 
consider the health conditions in 1912 quite good even if Dr. Oswaldo Cruz was still 
concerned about the high level of diseases.399
Seringalistas’ strategies of recruitment changed over time according to the main 
issues they faced. Although there are indications of immigrant seringalistas in Acre 
bringing familial producers along with them, regional labour was the main source at the 
beginning. Calixto400 shows the engagement of families recruited in Manaus and the 
attraction of labour from Para is a problem constantly mentioned in reports by 
Presidents of ParS Province and already analysed by Santos401 as was mentioned in 
chapter two. There are no accurate serial statistics on the population of and 
immigration to Acre before 1920. The census included this area only in 1920, although 
historical literature and documents present estimates before this time, which are useful 
as an approximation. Calixto402 does a good analysis and systematisation of the 
quantitative information available on the immigration to Acre before the 1920s, and his 
results are going to be considered here in order to avoid repetition. Calixto shows that 
the migration from Para was an important feature. In the period 1872-1890, Para lost
397 MacHale op.cit; chapter one; Arkers op.cit.; Chaves op.cit.; Mendes op.cit.; Santos op.cit.; 
Weinstein op. cit.; Martinelo op.cit.
398 Neves, C. 1981.
399 Ministerio da Agricultura, Relatorio Oswaldo Cruz, op.cit.
400 Calixto op. cit. p. 83.
401 Santos op.cit.
402 Calixto 1993, pp. 83-92. He evaluated the following literature: BulcSo, S. (1973) 0  
Comendador JoSo Gabriel - A Origem do Nome Acre. In: Revista do Instituto Historico e 
Geografico do Cear£, Tomo XLV, s/d; Graham, R. (1973) GrS-Bretanha e o Infcio da 
Modernisacao no Brazil (1850-1914V ColegSo Estudos Brasileiros. S. Paulo, Editora 
Brasiliense; Benchimol, S. (1944) O Cearense na Amaz&nia. Rio de Janeiro, Conselho de 
lmigrag§oColoniza$So, p. 38; Hollanda, S.B. (1982) Da Magonaria ao Positivismo, in 
HGCB. O Brasil Mon£rquico. Vol. 3, Tomo HI. S. Paulo, Difel; Santos, 1983.
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around 32,000 inhabitants who migrated to Amazonas, Acre and Roraima.403 This 
migration from East to West Amazonia was confirmed by the census of 1920, which 
informs us that in 1872-1890 while the population of Manaus, the capital of Amazonas 
State, increased 32%, the population of Belem dropped 19% in the same period 404 The 
statistics on the whole population of Para and Amazonas show that while the 
population of Para Province kept growing in the period 1872 to 1920, its growth during 
this time was just 19% while the population in Amazonas Province increased 157% and 
until 1900 it had a population growth higher than Para, as can be seen in the Table 6.
The internal migration was not enough to meet the expanding demand of labour by 
seringais. Seringalistas gradually increased the recruitment of labour in the north-east, 
which, according to Calixto,405 was encouraged by the government of Amazonas. 
Information on immigration by Pinto de Oliveira,406 Calixto407 and Audrin408 confirms 
that the immigration from the North East to Amazonia started around the middle of the 
19th century. Since seringais in Acre started to be set up in 1848, as mentioned in 
chapter two, it confirms the immigrant labour from the NorthEast as a phenomenon 
characterising seringais in Acre from the start.
Table 6: Population Growth: Para, Amazonas - 1872-1920
State Quantity Percentage Growth
1872 1890 1900 1920 1872-1890 1890-1900 1900-1920
Amazonas 57,61 147,915 249,756 363,166 157% 69% 45%
Para 275,237 328,455 445,356 983,507 19% 36% 121%
Acre 92,379
Total_________ 332,847 476,37 695,112 1,439,052____________________________________
Source: Ministerio da Agricultura, Industria e Commercio, Censo populacional, op.cit. pp. IX  e X .
Calixto op.cit.
404 Ministerio da Agricultura Industria e Commercio - Diretoria Geral de Estatistica 
Resenciamento do Brazil (realizado em 1 de Setembro de 1920) - Vol IV (1a. Part) -  
Populac3o. Rio de Janeiro, Typ. da Estatistica 1926, pp. X e XII; see Table 6.
405 Ibid. p. 86.
406 Pinto de Oliveira, L. op.cit., pp. 9-12.
407 Calixto op.cit..
408 Audrin op.cit.
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The inter-regional immigration gradually increased, transforming labour from the 
NorthEast into the main source of labour in Acre. This is a phenomenon linked not 
just to labour shortage but also to seringalistas’ responses to changing 
circumstances. As mentioned previously, the first rubber estates in Acre engaged 
immigrant familial producers by means of the sharecropping form of remuneration to 
perform diversified activities.409 After the 1870s-1880s, seringalistas changed the way 
rubber tapers were engaged and performed their job in response to direct and 
indirect pressure to produce large-scale cheap raw material.
First, in this conjuncture, different standards of capital accumulation, involving 
diverse conceptions of time and rhythm of production by local and foreign capitalists, 
were materialised locally into an ongoing incompatibility between local rubber 
production and the foreign capital's requirements. Foreign industrialists, traders and 
financiers pursued higher levels of and faster capital accumulation in comparison with 
the local standard. Consequently, they sought higher level of productivity. This pursuit 
governed their evaluation of the population density in Amazonia from the perspective 
of labour availability, according to which low population means low offer of labour, 
which would be an obstacle to the production of the quantity of rubber required to 
lower the price to the level they wished.410 In the 1870s, the British government 
initiated a policy of heavy support for a systematic study aimed at agricultural 
production of rubber as part of its policy to control the production/commercialisation 
of this raw material.
Second, as this technology was not yet available, in the 1880s, foreign capitalists’ 
efforts were concentrated on finding new sources of extraction, whose non- 
gregarious distribution of trees could be compensated for the availability of plentiful
409 Letter anlysed by Bulc3o, Soares. O Comendador JoSo Gabriel - A Origem do Nome Acre.
Revista do Instituto Historico e Geografico do Cear£, Tomo XLV, s/d, p. 27, mentioned by
Calixto op.cit. pp. 83-4.
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cheap labour.411 They initiated the exploitation of the poor rubber yields in Africa and 
Asia, based on intense physical exploitation of low-cost labour412
Finally, they intensified their presence in the region, setting up exporting houses 
and banks, changing the system of credit and interfering in the local rubber market.
The seringalistas’ reaction to this conjuncture is many-sided as discussed in 
chapters five and six. Regarding labour, the level of exploitation was intensified as 
discussed in the next chapter and this also involved modifications to the way in which 
they were recruited. After the 1880s, labourers were recruited as individual and 
specialised producers of rubber and not as familial producers of diverse products as 
before. From this moment onwards, tapping and making rubber became a task 
performed by specialised producers and other activities became the task of wage 
labourers. The recruitment of individual and specialised producers of rubber was 
particularly strong in the 1890s-1910s.
Consequently, the recruitment of labour in distant labour markets became more 
selective and intense. In this context, Chaves413 says that patrdes in Acre (he was one 
of them) recruited labourers in the North East, Bel&m and Manaus. Chaves414 and 
Ferreira de Castro415 stress that patrdes preferred labourers from Ceara State. One 
reason for this was the availability of cheap labour. According to Pinto de Oliveira416 
the migration from the Northeast to Amazonia in this period was of labour recruited by 
seringalistas rather than the simple migration of familial producers leaving areas in the 
dry seasons. This is a phenomenon linked to the formation of ‘excess population’ or 
unemployed labourers in the NorthEast as a result of the decadence of the sugar 
economy since the last quarter of the 18th century and particularly after the middle of 
the 19th century, as well as of the crisis of the cotton economy at the beginning of the
410 This view can be seen in: Akers, C. 1914, p. 1; McHale op.cit. Chapter 1.
411 McHale op.cit. p. 16.
412 Ibid.
413 Chaves op.cit p. 66.
414 Ibid.
415 Ferreira de Castro op.cit.
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1870s. In this context, dry seasons only aggravated the process of the formation of 
plentiful cheap labour in particular areas such as the so-called sertSo (central lands 
where dry seasons usually occurred) in Ceara State.417 Peasants living in those areas 
in Ceara were impoverished and became vulnerable to recruitment by patrdes from 
seringais in Amazonia.418
One question mentioned in the historiography is why labourers from the North-east 
preferred rubber estates to coffee plantations in the south-east. Santos419 lists six 
reasons, as follows: (1) the repudiation of the slavery system of work on coffee 
plantations, (2) expectations of rapid enrichment during the rubber boom, (3) 
propaganda by seringaiistas and their representatives, (4) subsidies for their 
transportation by the governments of Para and Amazonas Provinces, (5) easy access 
to Belem and (6) reduced opposition to the migration of labour by landowners in the 
Northeast. Pinto de Oliveira420 stresses two of these reasons: the recruitment of labour 
by seringalistas and the absence of resistance by landowners in the Northeast.
Although all these reasons can be found in historical documents, the main debate in 
that epoch was about the seringalistas’ strategies to attract labour. Manipulating 
landless or poor peasant-workers’ resistance to subordinate forms of labour, 
seringalistas presented the work pattern in seringais as profit-sharing in which 
seringueiros would constitute a commercial partner rather than labour and in which the 
payment by results would mean the possibility of savings and social ascension.
The efficiency of this discourse is shown by different facts. First of all, the payment 
by results was mediated by commercial relations since seringueiros sold the rubber 
they produced to the owner (see the next chapter), given the appearance of autonomy 
in the process of production. Second, a few seringueiros and wage labourers managed 
to achieve social ascension. A memoir book written by a rubber tapper who worked in a
416 Pinto de Oliveira op.cit. Chapter 1.
417 Ibid.
418 Chaves op.cit, p. 81.
419 Santos, R. 1980.
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seringal in Acre in the period 1897 to 1907421 stresses his brother’s ascension from 
being a rubber estate’s accountant to manager and, then, seringalista in less valued 
rubber yields. In the Northeast, the author and poor local people were so impressed by 
his brother’s social ascension that some of them too decided to become rubber tapers. 
Honbrio Alves went on to become the Seringal ITU’s owner after working as a rubber 
taper and wage labourer as was already mentioned in chapter two. Moreover, 
considering the tendency towards increasing rubber prices until around 1912, labourers 
could make savings from their intense work since payment was by results. Actually, a 
reasonable proportion of seringueiros did so. In the seringueiro sample in Seringal ITU, 
17% had positive balance in December 1910 and 22% in December 1913. Moreover, 
taking into account the total number of seringueiros in 1910, 1913 and 1930, the 
percentage of those leaving the estate with a positive balance increased from 13% in 
1910, to 26% in 1913 and 35% in 1930, as discussed in the next chapter. Actually, 
rubber taper rotation was slightly higher than rotation of sharecroppers on coffee 
plantations. Analysing the current accounts of seringueiros who were in Seringal ITU in 
February 1910, I found out that the majority managed to settle debts and leave the 
estate within the period of 2-4 years. Of the total 202 seringueiros, around 55% worked 
for a period from three to four years, while 11% managed to leave the estate in just two 
years. Those staying for 5 or more years represented 20%. On coffee plantations, on 
the contrary, sharecroppers signed a contract for a minimum of five years, which was 
usually then prolonged indefinitely owing to unsettled debts.422
What has to be stressed is that the few cases of social ascension referred to people 
having initial savings as well as skills that allowed them to perform administrative jobs 
on rubber estates. Employees in the administrative organisation of seringais had high 
salaries and no food expenses, so that they could make savings (see chapter four).
420 Pinto de Oliveira op.cit. p. 13.
421 See Cabral, op.cit.
422 Gorender 1982 pp. 591-592; Viotti da Costa 1982 pp. 104-105; Sallum Junior op.cit. pp.
73-80; Stolcke op.cit.
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Furthermore, the cases mentioned above happened in the second half of the 19th 
century in a period when rubber had not reached the peak of high prices that occurred 
in the period from the 1890s to 1910-11 when the competition for rubber fields was 
higher. Yet, the positive effect of those few cases in Cear£ is apparent. The aspiration 
to continue as or become peasants or other sorts of autonomous producers is the other 
side of the fact that wage labour was not a chosen condition. In Amazonia there is 
strong evidence of the landless’ reaction to that, as previously mentioned. It also 
interfered in the immigrants’ decision to become rubber tapers in Acre. According to 
report by a Commission of Senators and Deputies in charge of making proposals about 
the rubber economy to the National Congress in 1912:
“The sertanejo (the inhabitant of central lands in the North East) sees the receipt of a salary 
not as the payment of a performed service, but as the alienation of the personality because 
of the obligation to do what is decided and determined by the boss. They identify this with 
the automation of an obedient beast”423 (our translation).
The report stresses the sharecropping contracts as being a stimulus for hard work in 
the Northeast and labourers’ repugnance of the condition of wage labour, which they 
referred to as “working as hired”. According to the report, the main cause of migration 
to rubber estates was the labourers’ expectation of working under forms of 
sharecropping contracts instead of wage labour, which became the main ideological 
support for the seringalista’s propaganda for recruiting labour.424
Ferreira de Castro425 argues that owners preferred not just the condition of being 
from Ceard State but particularly the combination of this with the status of single or 
married workers coming alone without their families. Under these conditions, immigrant 
labourers wished to go back home soon as autonomous producers and this wish 
encouraged them to intensify their efforts. Moreover, it was expensive to bring families, 
and married labourers with family would work less hard in rubber production, preferring
423 De Souza, E. A Crise da Industria da Borracha na amazdnia. In: Revista da ACA, Manaus, 
ano VI, 67, Janeiro/1914, p. Editorial (Parecer da CommissSo Mixta de Senadores e 
Deputados Federais, incumbida de estudar as causas da crise da borracha) p. 3
424 Ibid. p. 4.
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to perform other activities on the land. There is no statistics on this matter before 1920. 
But the IBGE census of 1920426 shows that Acre population presented the highest 
proportion of male in the country. In each 1,000 inhabitants in Acre in 1920, 63% were 
men. Calixto427 mentions the requirements of resistance to and familiarity with hard 
work and submissive behaviour in the process of recruitment. Resistance to diseases 
and ruggedness were important because rubber was made in an environment far away 
from medical services, sometimes in swamps, which presented improper sanitary 
conditions, as already mentioned. Submissiveness was required since the form in 
which labour was engaged and the circumstances under which they performed 
commercial relations in seringais involved debt and they had to accept the condition of 
leaving the estate only when they had settled that debt.
The gradual increase in immigration in Amazonia in the period 1872-1900 is 
confirmed by the quantitative data organised by Benchimol, as illustrated in chart 1. 
He gives a total of 160.125 immigrants in 1872-1900, which does not include the 
period 1879-1891, so that it is really an underestimation of the total. As we can see in 
Chart 2 immigration increased in 1878 in comparison to 1877, reflecting the effects of 
the dry season in 1877. Nevertheless, in the following period, the annual immigration 
dropped, persisting until 1897. It then rose steadily in 1898-1899 and sharply in 
1900, expressing the intensification of the recruitment of labour for the increasing 
production of rubber, which was enforced by the local government’s policy of 
immigration of labour and peasantry in the last decades of the 19th century and 
beginning of the 20th century which has been studied by several authors, as 
previously mentioned.
425 Ferreira de Castro op.cit. p. 103.
426 Ministerio da Agricultura, Indstria e Corrtercio -  Diretoria Geral de Estatistica -  
Recenseamento do Brasil em 1/9/1920, vol. IV ((1a. parte). Populac5o. Rio de Janeiro, 
tipografia da estatistica, 1926, p. XXII. See also Pinto de Oliveira op.cit. pp. 27-28.
427 Calixto op. cit.
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Source: Benchimol op.cit p.38
Calixto428 points out that in the period 1872-1900, approximately 78% of the 
immigrants in Amazonia went to Amazonas, Acre and Roraima. He estimates an 
average of 138,625 immigrants in Amazonia in that period, 67% being the percentage 
going to Amazonas, Acre and Roraima The increasing immigration post-1890s and the 
tendency towards West Amazonia re-affirms the intensification of recruitment of 
labourers by seringalistas as previously mentioned.
Apart from recruitment, immigrant labour also came to Belem spontaneously429 or 
under the already mentioned governmental policy of peasant and labour immigration in 
the last decades of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th century. Particularly 
after 1878 this policy offered many options of destiny to immigrants, who could opt for 
settlements, labouring in the building industry in Belem or working on rubber estates in 
Amazonas and Acre.430 In this case, they stayed in official accommodation around 
Belem awaiting recruitment by seringalistas. In 1877-78, British Consul accounts show 
that 16,000 cearenses were brought to Para Province, and 7,000 or 44% of them went 
to rubber districts while 56% was allocated to agricultural settlements in Benevides in
428 Calixto op.cit.
429 Ferreira de Castro op.cit.. pp. 124-126; Chaves 1913, p. 66.
430 Parci. Presidente da Provlncia Falla, 1878b, anexos, pp. 1-2, quoted from Bentes op.cit. 
chapter 5. See also Moraes op.cit.
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Bragantina microregion,431 Spontaneous, private and official immigration reinforced the 
position of Belem as the main labour market in the region, as already mentioned. 
According to Table 7, the population of Belem that in 1872-1890 had dropped by 19%, 
increased by 93% in the period 1890-1900, and 145% in the period 1900-1920. Belem 
became the main point in the region where owners from Acre Territory came to recruit 
native and immigrant labour. In 1910, one of the two associates in the Seringal ITU 
went to Belem twice to recruit employees, as previously mentioned.
Table 7 Population Growth: Belem, Manaus - 1872-1920
Capital Quantity Percentage Growth
Belem 61,997 50,064 96,560 236,402 -19% 93% 145%
Manaus 29,334 38,720 50,300 75,704 32% 30% 50.50%
Total 91,331 88,784 146,860 312,106
Source: Ministerio da Agricultura, Industria e Comercio, Censo Populacional,op.cit. pp.X e X II
The internal availability of labour in Acre
Accounting documents of Seringal ITU show that the recruitment of immigrant 
labour persisted until around the middle of the 1910s. The diary of 1913 does not refer 
to the initial outlay in the recruitment of labour in Belem or the North East as in 1910. 
The report by Oswaldo Cruz432 mentions villages in Acre already in 1912. As can be 
seen in Table 8, there were 8 villages which altogether accounted for a total population 
of much more than 4,200, insofar as the author does not estimate the population of 
Senna Madureira, seringal Cachoeira and Seabra. The report mentions villages as 
centres of rubber tapers or points were they stayed during the period between harvests
431 Report by Consul Green on the Trade and Commerce of Par£ for the years 1877 and 
1878, p. 49. In: F.O. Accounts and Papers, Par£, 1880, p. 29.
432 Ministerio da Agricultura Industria e Corrtimerciio, Relatorio Dr. Oswaldo Cruz, op.cit. p. 21.
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or when they were unemployed, or waiting boats to return home. Moreover, the city of 
Rio Branco had 2,000 inhabitants in 1912.
Pinto de Oliveira433 dicusses labour on the light of data by Costa,434 who estimates 
that when Acre was incorporated into Brazil in 1903, its population was around 100,000 
inhabitants, and by Santos,435 who estimates this population as only 75,000.
The questionable point in the author’s account is his presupposition of labour 
immobility on rubber estates, which contradicts his own discussion on the high level of 
male labour in seringais, as well as there being plentiful indications of labour mobility, 
as previously mentioned. The available data on population is meaningful when 
compared with Oswaldo Cruz’s report that clearly indicates the appearance of a labour 
population in Acre, which seems to be a result of a slow process initiated with the 
setting up of rubber estates. When the so-called crises of rubber happened in the 
period 1911-12 onwards, these processes were intensified. That is, the liberation of 
workers from rubber estates increased, and some of them went back to the NorthEast 
while others stayed in Acre. According to Oswaldo Cruz’s report, in November 1912, 
the population of Acre was around 35,000 to 40,000 inhabitants, 6,000 living in the four 
most important populated centres such of Empresa (a neighbourhood of Rio Branco, 
the capital of Acre), Xapury, Porto Acre and Brazileia, and the other part distributed on 
rubber estates and small villages. This can be considered the lowest level of 
population. According to the census, in September 1920, there were 5 municipalities 
and 5 districts in Acre, 3 municipalities of which had a population of between 10,001 
and 20,000 inhabitants and 2 municipalities which had a population of between 
20,0001 and 60.000.436 The total population, then, reached 92,379 inhabitants, which 
means an increase of 131% over November 1912. Another important aspect is that the 
immigration in Acre was not just of people from Para, Amazonas and the NorthEast,
433 Pinto de Oliveira 1985, pp. 5,15-16.
434 Costa, C. 1974, p. 128.
435 Santos,R. op.cit. p. 111.
436 Census of 1920 op.cit. pp. IX and X.
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but also from neighbouring countries, particularly Peru. In 1920, for every 1,000 
Peruvian in Brazil, 23% were in Acre.437 Moreover, Soares43® suggests that there was 
increasing immigration in 1924-25 as the Stevenson Plan restricting the production of 
rubber in British colonies seems to have improved the perspective of rubber production 
again. The statistic of 1936439 shows that Acre population increased from 92,379 
inhabitants in 1920 to 99,976 in 1925, 107,511 in 1930 and 115,451 inhabitants in 
1935. Increasing population meant increasing offer of labour, provoking changes in the 
way they were engaged in rubber estates. The diary of Seringal ITU in 1930 has no 
register of master travelling to Belem to recruit them and mentions male workers with 
families living in Rio Branco instead of in the NorthEast as before. They came to the 
estate on their own. Thus, shifts in the way seringueiros were engaged resulted from 
the increasing local population, which generated local labour available for work on 
rubber estates.
I
437 Ibid. p. LXII.
438 Soares, L. 1963, p. 122.
439 Instituto Nacional de Estatistica. Anu£rio Esta:tlstico do Brasil -1 9 36 , Rio de Janeiro, 
tipografia do Departamento de Estatistica e Piublicidade, 1936, pp. 61-62.
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Seabra M uru /Tarauaca the biggest centre of rubber tappers
C am utana Purus 400
close to reasonably im portant 
rubber estates
Labrea Purus 600 to 700 close to im portant rubber estates
C achoeira  R ubber 
Estate
Port and point w here people stayed  
awaiting boats or being engaged  in 
seringais
A ntim ary or Floriano  
Peixoto
Acre 500 close to im portant rubber estates
Porto Acre Acre 500 to 600
obligatory stopping for boats and 
navies because  the federa l custom  
house w as located there; close to 
im portant rubber estates
Xapury Acre 1.500 to 2 .0 0 0
the term inal point of A cre  river 
steam  navigation, and situated in the 
m ost im portant a rea of rubber 
production in A cre
S enna M adureira Yaco
this m unicipality had extensive  
agricultural production, particularly  
corn and m anioc, and the Y aco  river 
w as an im portant a rea of rubber 
production a lm ost com parab le  to 
that of Acre river
Source: Ministerio da Agricultura, Relatorio Oswaldo Cruz op.cit.
Conclusion
In opposition to the notion of free land shaping autonomous producers, I would 
argue that there was no free land but rather a process of freeing land from the First 
Nations in Amazonia as a pre-condition for the geomercantile privatisation of land, 
which was attached to the formal processes of turning natives into labour. The end of 
the enslavement of members of the First Nations in the middle of the 18th century and 
the gradual disapearance of African slaves after the middle of the 19th century mark 
the end of formal processes of making labour. Then, the link between geomercantile
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privatisation of land and turning direct producers into labour became informal. The 
non-slave population originated from the blend of natives with immigrant Europeans 
enlarged again as Africans was gradually released from slavery, which was enforced 
after the proihibition of slavery in 1888.
This is the population that constitutes the source of labour in the region. The 
possibility of getting tracts of land in distant terras devolutas and, particularly, the 
persistent official policy of immigration of familial producers of food after the middle of 
the 18th century favoured the emergence of peasants or peasant-workers. Yet, 
peasants or peasant-workers were made and made themselves into this as part of 
the historical process of capitalism in which a great deal of the free population was 
turned into labour instead. When seringalistas started to set up seringais there was 
already labour to be recruited.
Despite the internal offer of labour, it was not enough to respond to the increasing 
demand for labour, particularly after the 1870s, by distant seringais. This resulted in 
immigrant labour or peasant-workers being recruited. The particular condition of 
plentiful cheap labour in the NorthEast constituted the main source of immigrant labour. 
Although it is not possible to be precise statistically, there are strong indications that 
considerable proportions of immigrant labour to seringais were peasant-workers, 
working temporarily as a strategy to survive as peasants instead of becoming 
subordinate labour. At the same time, the constant immigration of labour which 
accompanied the setting up and expansion of seringais also led to a gradual increase 
in the population, leading to the emergence of a local labour market from which 
seringais could draw. This is particularly apparent after the 1910s.
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PART THREE: Work Relations in Seringais: Engagement and Forms of 
Controlling and Disciplining Labour
Chapter 4:
Forms of Controlling and Discipline Labour
A discussion of the relations of production is crucial in order to demonstrate that 
direct producers of rubber were subordinated to the owners’ direct or indirect 
command. Results of the investigation of partnership contracts and registers of firms 
in the ACA and JUCEPA have revealed that although seringalistas’ command of the 
process of production varied in many cases because some seringais were 
administered by managers, their rule as commanders of productive activities was 
deeper than the absenteeism supposed by the traditional historiography440 can 
suggest. The results show that casas aviadoras used to invest in rubber production 
by means of partnership with seringalistas or others who would run the rubber estate, 
although some of them contracted managers, particularly after the 1870s-1880s. 
Seringalistas did the same when they had more than one seringal. What has to be 
pointed out is that they did not need to be in direct command of production to be 
considered productive capitalists since even when they contracted managers at the 
apex, they still retained overall control.
Actually, most seringalistas in Acre River District lived on the estate or nearby in 
country towns. Particularly at the beginning, there were cases of seringalistas living 
alone on the estate without their families owing to an epidemic of malaria.441
Moreover, the existence of a commercial house within many estates does not 
implies that seringal was a mercantile undertaking. Until the 1910s seringalistas had 
to invest in an internal commercial-financial house to supply distantly located estate 
with foodstuffs. However, this was attached and subordinated to the process of
440 Reis, 1953; Quintiliano op.cit.; Bonfim op.cit; Santos, 1980.
441 Neves op.cit
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reproduction of productive capital, which can be visualised in the discussion of 
profitability and re-investments in chapter six, which was guarantied by surplus and 
profit produced by different categories of subordinated labourers. Interestingly, in 
Acre River District there existed seringais with no internal commercial house which 
were supplied by shops on nearby estates.
The results of the research clearly indicate the command of the process of 
production by capitalists and the labourers’ class condition of subordinate forms of 
labour. Because seringueiros constituted the main category of labourer in rubber 
production, this chapter discuss their condition of class as labourers paid by results 
by focusing on the way their work was subdued. In seringais, as in any other 
capitalist enterprise, the capitalist’s will and command over the process of production 
assumed the form of administrative rule and procedures of direct and indirect means 
of retaining, controlling and disciplining labourers. At the same time, the ways 
labourers were controlled and disciplined constituted the circumstances under which 
they identified issues and built responses, influencing the course of class relations 
within the estate. In other words, these were the circumstances under which 
labourers’ bargaining powers were defined.
In dealing with the forms of engaging, retaining, controlling and disciplining the 
direct producers of rubber, the following items will be discussed: (a) seringueiros’ 
engagement as Labourers Paid by Results; (b) the indirect and direct means of 
controlling and disciplining labourers in the process of rubber production; (c) the 
indirect means of controlling labour by controlling credit/debt; (d) seringueiros’ 
strategies to deal with debts: re-evaluating debt and abscondment; (e) Bonuses, 
Gratification or Discounts; (f) rotation of labourers and changes in work conditions.
1144
Seringueiros’ Engagement as Labour Paid by Results
Seringueiros had a distinct class condition. As previously discussed, seringalistas 
presented the work pattern in seringais as a profitable share by employers, which 
has been defined as the distinct feature of sharecropping contracts.442 Moreover, like 
sharecroppers on coffee plantations in S. Paulo, seringueiros were immigrant 
labourers whose engagement involved debt, originated in the expenses incurred 
when they moved to the estate.
However, seringueiros’ class condition was essentially different from 
sharecroppers. First of all, after the 1870s-1880s, work relations in seringais 
changed towards intensification in the engagement of individual exclusive producers 
of rubber, as previously discussed. In contrast, on coffee plantations, particularly 
after 1884, and especially in the period 1888-1930, the engagement of familial 
sharecroppers, non-exclusive producers of coffee, was intensified.443
Furthermore, the role of indebtedness as an instrument of labour subordination 
and retention in seringais was different from coffee plantations. According to 
Stolcke444 the distinctive incentive to hard work typical of sharecropping contracts - 
the idea of profitable share by capitalists - was frustrated on coffee plantations due to 
labourers’ difficulties in settling debts. The perpetuation of these contracts, as a 
result of indebtedness, was the centre of class struggles and changes in work 
relations. So, the elimination of initial debt after 1884, when the imperial and 
provincial governments started to subsidise labour immigration, seems to have 
minimised the role of debt on coffee plantations, although Sallum Junior445
442 See on this matter Eisenberg op.cit; Stolcke op.cit.
443 Sallum Junior op.cit.; Martins, 1979; Stolcke op.cit.
444 Stolcke op.cit.
445 Sallum Junior op.cit.
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demonstrates that debt and the utilisation of it as a form of constraint to hard work 
persisted for many more years.
In seringais in Acre initial debt was eliminated gradually according to the 
emergence of an internal labour market, instead, although the policy of immigration 
of labour played a role in it, as previously discussed. Yet, indebtedness persisted 
permeating work relations.
The point to be stressed, however, is that indebtedness did not define work 
relations in seringais. Actually, it was simply a consequence of singular 
circumstances under which labour was engaged and performed commercial 
relations. What defined work relations in senngais were the ways labourers were 
engaged, controlled and disciplined.
Rubber estates employed different categories of subordinate labour such as: (a) 
workers paid by work time, as for instance wage and salaried labour, and (b) 
labourers paid by results instead such as seringueiros. So, surplus, rent and freight 
were the basis of the process of accumulation. These different categories of labour 
were contracted to perform different tasks in an enterprise characterised by a clear 
internal division of labour in which even the internal supply of cereals and firewood 
constituted the exclusive tasks of particular labourers. As mentioned in chapter one, 
in seringal ITU seringueiros constituted the dominant form of labour (they were 202 
in 1910, 160 in 1913 and 215 in 1930), even considering that the number of wage 
labourers increased in the long term (from 27 in 1910 to 40 in 1913 and to 52 in 
1930).
Regarding seringueiros, after the 1870s-1880s they were engaged in two different 
ways, differing only in the level of their autonomy in the process of rubber production- 
commercialisation. According to Chaves,446 in the first form of contract rubber tapers 
had to do the following: (1) clean the rubber tree paths which in the case of first
14-6
exploitation would take 20 to 25 days for one man;; (2) be trained by a skilled rubber 
taper on the method of extracting latex and of transforming it into raw material, which 
usually took 15 days; (3) when they started to produce rubber regularly, they had to 
deliver it periodically according to the internal scheme of transport provided by the 
comboios whose service was planned administratively. The comboios would take 
the rubber and leave an IOU (I owe you) giving the gross weight of the rubber 
transported to the warehouse; (4) the balance was calculated twice a year (in June 
and in December). Usually when the final one was done at the end of the harvest, 
the seringueiro would come or send a representative to the commercial house to 
witness the calculation of their total rubber weight, and at this moment the lOUs 
would be replaced by a receipt specifying the total weight net, kind and value of 
rubber. This receipt would also contain the rubber taper’s authorisation for boarding 
this to Bel6m or Manaus and record his acceptance of full liability for expenses of 
transport. In this sort of contract, the rubber taper paid 10 to 15% of freight and 10 to 
15% over the net production for the rent of the paths.
In the second kind of engagement, rubber tapers were denominated aviado or 
freguez, signifying rubber tapers who, according to previous deals, worked on their 
own.447 That is, they had autonomy in the process of production. They neither paid 
rent nor freight expenses and they did not have to depend on nor did they have to 
match their rhythm of production to the internal system of transport. Any time they 
produced rubber they could deliver it to the owner and be paid immediately, at a rate 
about 50% of the prevailing rubber price at that time.448
However, aviado was a rare condition. In Seringal ITU in 1910 and 1913 there 
was just one case. Almost every rubber taper was engaged according to the former
446 Chaves, 1913 pp. 8-69.
447 See on the terminology aviado, seringueiro, patr&o: Guedes, M. 1920, p. 119; Santos, R.
op.cit. p. 160 footnote 8; Calixto 1993, chapter 3, footnote 3.
448 Chaves op.cit., p. 70.
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method of engagement under which they paid rent, freight and the owner had a great 
deal of control over the process of rubber production and commercialisation. The 
boss labelled them seringueiro, which meant a labourer dedicated exclusively to the 
production of rubber.
Seringueiros were not autonomous in the process of production. Rubber 
production was under the owner’s command. Appropriately, owners were called 
patrao, which means boss, characterising perfectly the class relations in seringais. 
This work relation does not fit with the recent classification of merchants as patrons 
in order to qualify commercial relations between them and familial or ‘indigenous’ 
producers as patronage or paternalism.449 The meanings of patronage (a) giving 
support such as charity or funds; (b) the power a person has to give contracts for 
work etc. bear only slight resemblance to work relations in seringais for in relation to 
(a) ‘support’ given by seringalistas to the transport of labourers to the estate was not 
really support at all but a loan to be paid back with 20% interest, as mentioned in the 
previous chapter. With regard to (b) this meaning is not sufficient to define the class 
relations of seringueiros/seringalistas which are disciplined by administrative 
procedures of direct and indirect control of labour in the process of production itself.
Actually, the regional terminology patrao was used in the second half of the 19th 
century and beginning of the 20th century to refer to the seringalista (which means 
rubber fields landowner) who was running the estates. The term seringalista 
emerged only in the 1960s in the context of land conflicts in Acre, when a reasonable 
proportion of seringalistas had become simply landowners, living in cities and hiring 
or selling their estates. Thus, the regional nomenclature patrao and seringueiro, 
expresses particular features of class relations in seringais whose appreciation
449 See, for instance, the anthropological debate otn patronage and paternalism in Meira, 1996; 
Guillaud, 1996; Geffray, 1996; Picard, 1996.
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requires a discussion on the way seringueiros' work was subdued by seringalistas. 
The term seringalista is largely used here to mean jointing landowner and boss.
The Indirect and Direct Ways of Controlling and Disciplining Labour in the 
Process of Making Rubber
The linking between technological issues, quality control and the search for 
suitable means of controlling and disciplining labour in order to maximise productivity 
shaped the process of setting up and running seringais. The industry required 
particular raw material and rubber dealers imposed a quality standard450 guaranteed 
by a local system of quality control, involving the classification of rubber according to 
different kinds, which was formally checked by institutional quality control in Bel&m 
and Manaus. Moreover, the making of wild rubber is quite a specific process 
involving tapping and manufacturing and it was made by adapting the First Nations' 
methods of making rubber to entrepreneurial production, which raised specific 
issues. Those methods had been developed according to a converging interaction 
with nature and to produce rubber on a small scale and as a non-commodity.
This became a problem since using these very methods entrepreneurs sought to 
produce rubber on such a scale as to generate profit to ensure capital accumulation. 
Therefore, the effects of the different rhythm and quality of nature on time and 
quantity production intrinsic to these methods had to be minimised to increase 
productivity. Rubber production was directly influenced by the cycle of harvest, by the 
non-gregarious distribution of trees and also by the incidence of different species of 
gum. The harvest epoch varied in different rubber fields depending on the eco­
system. In Acre, the harvest was initiated around the middle of April and lasted until
450 Rubber should reach Britain uniform in quality, containing a constant degree of moisture 
ranging from 15 to 20% (Coates op.cit. p.52).
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the end of November.451 Moreover, different species of gum generated different kinds 
of raw material which, in their turn, were priced differently. The Fina hard Para was 
made of the best species of gum, the entrefina of latex from inferior species of gum, 
sernamby of the latex not smoked or of latex residues produced during the process 
of smoking, clots left in the latex containers or formed around the cuts on the trees 
during extraction. Finally, caucho was made of latex from the Castilloa Ulei a 
species, which required a different method of latex extraction and of making rubber. 
In 1912, caucho represented 20% of the rubber production in Amazonia. It would 
have been priced about 50% below the price of fina depending on the level of its 
purity.452 In 1913, entrefina reached 84% of the Fina hard Para price, while sernamby 
reached only 54%.453 These percentages increased a bit in 1914 when they 
represented 85 and 65% of the fina price respectively.454 Besides the influence of the 
species of gum, productivity depended on the tree age. Trees were quite productive 
in the first month of extraction, with the second year showing the highest level of 
productivity overall after which productivity decreased gradually with the trees’ age 
and time of extraction. The overall time that paths could be exploited also varied. In 
1908, the Director of the Commercial Association of Amazon State estimated this at 
between 30 and 40 years.455 In 1913, however, local seringalistas and experts 
mentioned paths that had been in exploitation for 70 years.456
Seringalistas tried to minimise these natural influences on time and quantity of 
production by improving the technology of production, which is discussed in chapter
451 Chaves, 1913 p. 42.
452 Revista da ACA, Manaus, 10 de novembro de 1912, Anno V, 53, p. 3.
453 De Souza, E. A Crise da Industria da Borracha na AmazOnia. In: Revista da ACA, Manaus, 
67, Janeiro/1914, p. 4.
454 Chaves op.cit. pp. 58-59.
455 Benoliel, R. A Borracha do Amazonas na Expc&si?5o de Londres. In: Revista da ACA, 
Manaus, 5, Novembro/1908, p. 1.
456 Jornal Folha do Norte, Debate sobre o problema da borracha. Bel6m, Sabado, 16/04/1913,
p.1.
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six, and by rationalising space, building paths and colocagdes aimed at standardising 
and increasing productivity.
To build a path meant the organisation of rubber trees according to paths or 
sections, interlinking trees lying close to each other in circuits, irregularly and more or 
less elliptic and parallel to the rivers. When a few trees were distributed not 
according to closed circuits but nearby, one (or more) short paths would be built in 
order to join them to the circuit. These short paths were called mangas and one 
rubber path would contain many mangas. The whole, composed of one to three 
paths, a hut and a defumador (see appendixes 4 and 5 on methods of making 
rubber) was called colocagao (Map 4). Internal roads or paths were built for 
interlinking each colocagao to the administrative and commercial infra-structure -  
composed of the internal commercial house, warehouse and office -  which was 
usually located close to the estate port. However, this rationalisation of space and 
nature did not standardise productivity. In fact, it only minimised the different 
productivity of paths and colocagdes.
Map 4: Schematic Map of a Colocagao
Rubber Paths Plan: black points indicate the trees, B the seringueiro's hut and D the 
defumador (Chaves 1913)
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The rationalisation of space/nature defined the potential productivity of paths and 
colocagdes, setting conditions on the use of inspection, not just as a procedure of 
quality control, but also of direct labour control and discipline. Inspection was justified 
as necessary for quality control, grounded in the fact that making rubber required 
special skills of tapping and manufacturing pelles (which were oversized rugby 
footballs of rubber). Direct producers had to be trained under strict supervision to 
control the method of cutting rubber trees in order to prevent damage to them. 457 
Yet, this was combined with forms of controlling seringueiros' time and rhythm of 
working. According to Ferreira de Castro,458 inspection was done not only when 
newcomers were being trained. Inspectors used to come to colocagdes to examine 
the way labourers were making rubber and to find out if they were working according 
to the intensity required by the owner. If they were not, this was reported to the 
owner who could use this information as a justification for controlling their credit in 
the commercial house. The author mentions labourers’ difficulties in justifying 
incapacity to work for health reasons. Moreover, when rubber prices dropped 
sharply in 1913-15, and rubber tapers attempted to work less in tapping, owners 
reacted immediately by introducing daily inspection.459
In this way, rubber tapers were compelled to match their method, time and rhythm 
of working to the owner’s expectations. Reactions or resistance to this were treated 
in different ways including dismissing, expelling, legal action etc. In seringal ITU one 
seringuelro was expelled in 1910 due to ‘bad behaviour* and among the lawsuits on 
seringais in Acre in the Museu Nacional do Rio de Janeiro, Code 988, there are a 
few referring to seringalistas seeking the legal removal of seringueiros or aviados 
from their estates.
457 Chaves op.cit. p. 8.; Ferreira de Castro op, cit. p. 72.
458 Ferreira de Castro op.cit. pp. 95,108-110.
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The administrative control and discipline of labour in seringais are clearer when it 
is considered as a set of measures that changed over time. After the 1870s-1880s, 
and particularly in the 1910s, one of the strategies seringalistas adopted in the face 
of different conjunctures in the rubber economy was the intensification of labour 
exploitation within rubber estates, which was achieved in many ways.
First, the preference for individual instead of familial labourers goes hand in hand 
with the seringueiro’s condition of exclusive producers of rubber since it imposed the 
physical impossibility of individual labourers combining tapping and making rubber 
with different economic activities. According to Chaves,460 upstream of the Acre river, 
which was the most important area for rubber production in Acre State, the harvest 
endured around 140 days, and one seringueiro usually laboured on two paths, which 
were composed of around 200 trees, using 800 to 1000 small balls, getting an 
average of 6 to 8 litters of latex per path. Only the very exceptional among them got 
18 litres per path per day.461 His description suggests that more than 10 hours work 
a day was required to get around 6 to 8 litters of latex, producing around 45 to 50 
Kilos of rubber in 4 or 5 working days.432 Besides that, the literature463 suggests that 
subsidiary activities -  such as fishing and subsistence agriculture - were tolerated 
since they did not affect the work required in the making of rubber.
The seringueiros’ entire dedication to rubber production is confirmed by the results 
of the analysis of Sehngal ITU diaries. In 1910, their monetary income originated 
almost exclusively from rubber (Table 9). In the seringueiro sample, just one rubber 
taper sold firewood and wood to the commercial house. The only alternative means 
to get extra income was to sell belongings or work temporarily as wage labourers in
459 Ibid. p. 136.
460 Chaves 1913, p. 41.
461 Ibid.
462 Chaves op. cit pp. 41, 47-49.
463 Cabral op.cit.; Ministgrio da Agricultura, Industaia e Comgrcio, Relat6rio Oswaldo Cruz 
op.cit; Ferreira de Castro op.cit. pp. 99 and 108.
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other activities within the estate. Table 9 shows that in the seringueiro sample, only 
3% sold belongings, while 11% worked temporarily as daily wage labourers.
U
1 1 ■
1 £ 8 4 .8 3 10% 99%
6 £ 1 ,493.47 £ 1 ,4 9 3 .4 7 100%
9 firewood 
£ 6 3 .2 4 £ 5 8 .62 11% beans £102.00
14 plantation 
£ 497.20. 
work toots 
£ 124.30 46%
17 £ 602 .21 100%
20 £ 9 0 1 .7 4 100%
23 £ 15 8 .58 100%
25 1/4 m eet £ 77.73
28 £ 5 9 .2 4 8% £ 1 ,0 6 0 .5 9 69%
30
wife labour 
£149.16 £ 2 ,1 0 9 .5 2 61%
32 £ 8 4 2 .6 6 100%
40 £ 3 4 .0 3 5%
44
£ 123.76 8%
£2.321.10 (san); 
£ 2,065.96 
(father)
91%
45 £ 9 3 9 .6 4 51%
48 £ 1 5 7 .8 3 20%
51 £ 1 5 8 .6 8 r j? ,' •
■
100%
54 £ 2 3 1 .0 6 14%
57
work tools 
£ 49.75 2%
63 £ 568.18 26%
64 £ 9 4 .7 0 8%
Source: Diary of Seringal ITU  1910 and 1913
Notes: P .A .I.= Percentage o f Annual Income 
T.Labour =  Temporary Labour
The same list indicates that in 1913, when the rubber price was plummeting as 
can be seen in chapter five, a reasonable proportion tended to abandon or reduce 
rubber production in favour of wage labour since 22% of the sample got extra income 
by performing temporary or permanent wage labour. Among them, 42%  left the job of 
producing rubber to become wage labourers, as their wage income represented
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100% of their annual income in 1913. Moreover, while in 1910, 11% of the sample 
had part of their income originating from a daily wage or salaried work, in 1913, 17% 
did so. Finally, the percentage of a daily wage or salaried income in the total income 
of these cases increased. While in 1910 this percentage varied from 5 to 26%, in 
1913 the variation was from 51 to 100%. The exceptions were one case with 14% of 
wage income and three cases having the percent of wage income rising from 8 or 
10% in 1910 to 61, 69 and 99% in 1913. Thus, in seringal ITU, in 1910 and 1913, 
seringueiro persisted as subordinated labour and exclusive producers of rubber, who 
could perform temporary wage work or even become permanent wage labourers 
within the estate. The diversification of the estate’s economic activities at least until 
1913, discussed in chapter six, did not imply diversification in seringueiros’ economic 
activity, engagement of familial producers, or changes in class relations.
In the 1910s, besides the engagement of individual exclusive rubber producers, 
estates intensified labour exploitation in two other ways: (a) by increasing the 
number of rubber trees, compounding one path from 100 trees to 120, 150 and 
180464 and (b) by reducing the number of seringueiros on the estate. Seringal ITU 
had 400 rubber paths. The number of seringueiros was reduced from 202 in 1910 to 
160 in 1913 so that every seringueiro tapped a higher number of paths. This is even 
clearer when it is taken into account that in 1930, the number of seringueiros was 
increased to 215 - 26% more than in 1913. The higher level of work exploitation in 
this year is indicated by the fact that in 1913 the tendency towards diversification of 
rubber tapers’ economic activity, which appears clearly in 1930, was still quite slight. 
Table 9 illustrates that in 1913 just 3% got extra monetary income by selling cereal 
and small cereal plantations (and tools) to settle debt in order to leave the estate.
464 Chaves op.cit. p. 32.
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Indirect Means of Controlling Seringueiro by Controlling Credit/Debt
The seringueiros’ condition of being individual and exclusive producers of rubber 
is an important element in understanding the meaning of the strict control of 
debt/credit in the internal commercial house as an indirect means of retaining, 
controlling and disciplining labour. As individual exclusive producers of rubber, they 
depended on the market to get foodstuffs. Yet, the circumstances under which they 
performed commercial transactions favoured indebtedness.
First of all, because they worked and lived in enterprises situated far away from 
markets, they depended on the internal commercial house to buy foodstuffs. Table 9 
illustrates shopping frequency, estimate of monthly expenses and annual shopping of 
the seringueiro sample in 1910 and in 1913. The distribution of the sample is 
positively skewed so that dispersion is not readily achieved by the range, the mean 
of deviation or standard deviation. Searching for simplicity and a clear argument, it 
was verified that, in 1910, 32% of the sample shopped above and 28% according to 
the average (ten times a year). This means that 60% shopped according to or above 
the average frequency. Moreover, the percentage of those shopping eight or more 
times a year reached 89%. Thus, the great majority of seringueiros depended 
entirely or greatly on the internal commercial house for getting subsistence products.
Table 10 also shows that this dependency was slightly lower in 1913 with the 
annual shopping average (£815.14) being considerably lower than in 1910 
(£1,215.57) and the maximum annual shopping (£2,534.16) being around 16% lower 
than that in 1910 (£3,036.56). This is much clearer when the frequency distribution is 
considered. First of all, in 1913, the average shopping frequency was 9, which is 
lower than that in 1910. Moreover, there was no seringueiro shopping every month 
and the percentage of those shopping eighit or more times decreased from 89% in
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1910 to 64% in 1913. More importantly, 21% of the sample did not shop at all in 
1913. These results show a clear tendency to less dependency on the internal 
commercial house in Seringal ITU in 1913 in comparison to 1910. Yet, seringueiros 
still depended on the internal shop, considering that the average shopping frequency 
reached 9 times a year, 53% of the sample shopped above the average (10 or 11 
times a year), and average annual shopping reached £ 815,14. The tendency to 
decreasing dependency on the internal shop is clearly confirmed only from the long 
term perspective as is discussed later, while in and before 1913, seringueiros 
depended on the internal commercial house to buy foodstuff.
Table 10 Seringueiro Shopping -  Seringal ITU 1910,1913
Statistics Annual Shopping Monthly Expense Shopping Frequency
1910 1913 1910 1913 1910 1913
Average £ 1,215.57 £ 815.14 £ 110.98 £ 85.18 10 9
Median £ 1,125.81 £ 818.96 £ 101.91 £ 84.66 10 10
Max £ 3,036.56 £ 2,534.16 £ 253.05 £ 253.42 12 11
Min £ 123.66 £ 24.56 £ 39.47 £ 11.10 2 1
Stdev £ 554.59 £ 579.28 £ 45.82 £ 50.22 2 3
Avedev £ 426.18 £ 448.25 £ 35.39 £ 37.40 1 2
Source: Seringal ITU diaries of 1910 and 1913.
Foodstuffs were expensive in the internal commercial house due to historical 
circumstances, such as, for instance, the high cost of transport. Acre River District 
was supplied most by commercial houses from Belem. According to invoices 
referring to the sale and transportation of goods from the casa aviadora Alves Braga 
& Cia, in Belem, to the Seringal Guanabara in Acre River District, in March 1913, 
goods reached Acre River District 64% more expensive solely due to transport 
expenses from Belem, and 57% more expensive simply because of the payment for 
freight, as illustrated on Table 11.
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Table 11: G o o d s  Transport Expenses, 1913
Percentage 
of toe
Value
Value
Goods (£ 16,226,27)
Transportation to the navy plus official registers £ 1 3 2 ,5 9
Export Taxes 
Freight
Insurance and Other
£ 3 3 5 ,9 4
£ 9 ,3 2 3 ,4 2  5 7 %
£ 6 0 8 ,4 3
Total £ 1 0 ,4 0 0 ,3 7  6 4 %
Source: Chaves, 1913 pp. 71-2
Considering that the internal commercial house may have made a profit from the 
business, the final prices to seringueiros must have been dear compared to prices in 
Belem and Manaus. According to the law, if the owner’s profit from the sale of 
products in the internal commercial house was higher than 140% over the average 
prices of those products in Belem and Manaus, consumers could complain to the 
court.465 Yet, seringueiros could easily be out of date on prices in those markets 
owing to the distance and low frequency of shipment even considering that they had 
radio and many estates had a telegraph service.
However, the dependency on the internal commercial house and the high cost of 
goods do not explain debt in itself. So, it is necessary to discuss the circumstances 
under which seringueiros were engaged and remunerated.
Seringueiros were engaged as indebted labour. The owners financed their mobility 
from Belem or from the North East to the estate. This assumed the form of 
seringalistas’ capital outlay, as previously mentioned, and of seringueiros’ initial debt 
to be paid with 20% interest. In the seringueiro sample for 1910 and 1913, 36% were 
newcomers in 1910. As can be seen in Table 12, the average initial debt, including
465 This served as argument of defence in a Laws uit in 1904 in which the claimant won the 
case (Arquivo Nacional do Rio de Janeiro - Seccao Historica, doc. Codigo 988, vol. 3, docs.
17-18).
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20% interest reached £475.53. The initial debt included items such as travel ticket 
from Belem to Seringal ITU that in April was priced at £104.01 for third class and 
£412.14 for first class, cash and on-board expenses. The cash item together with the 
travel ticket represented the highest percentage of the initial debt. Considering the 
real expenses without interest, the price of travel tickets represented an average of 
around 45%  and cash represented 41% of the initial debt.
1
1 £1 0 4 . 01 £ 1 4 5 , 4 8 £ 2 , 2 6 £ 3 5 . 5 2 £ 5 7 . 4 5 £ 3 4 4 . 4 5
1 £ 1 0 4 . 0 1 £ 1 6 0 , 5 9 £ 2 9 , 3 9 £ 1 7 4 . 1 0 £ 9 3 . 6 2 £ 5 6 1 . 7 1
1 - - £ 2 2 3 . 4 1
1 £1 0 4 . 01 - £ 7 8 , 6 8 £ 2 0 9 . 0 4 £ 7 8 . 3 6 £ 4 7 0 . 0 9
1 £1 0 3 . 3 6 £ 2 9 , 9 1 £ 9 4 . 9 6 - £ 4 4 . 0 6 £ 2 4 0 . 3 1
1 £1 0 4 . 0 0 £ 1 5 0 , 0 0 £ 7 . 7 5 £ 5 2 . 3 3 £ 2 5 4 . 0 8
1 £ 1 0 . 0 1 £ 2 3 4 , 3 7 £ 1 6 , 8 0 £ 71 .06 £ 4 2 6 . 2 4
£ 1 0 4 . 0 1 £ 1 0 . 6 6 £ 5 4 . 2 0 £ 3 2 5 . 3 3
1 - £ 7 9 9 . 3 8
1 £ 4 1 2 . 1 4 £ 4 7 0 , 1 3 £1 1 . 95 IB M B iH B i i l £ 1 7 9 . 4 5 £ 1 , 9 7 3 . 7 2
£ 2 1 3 . 8 1 £ 2 7 8 , 5 5 £ 3 8 . 8 4 £ 7 3 . 7 1 £ 1 2 0 . 9 8 £ 7 2 5 . 8 9
1 £ 1 0 4 . 0 1 £ 1 1 7 , 7 0 £ 2 6 ,81 MM £ 4 9 . 7 0 £ 2 9 8 . 2 2
1 £1 0 5 . 5 5 £ 3 6 5 , 3 7 £ 5 8 . 5 3 - £ 1 0 5 . 8 9 £ 6 3 5 . 2 9
£ 3 6 4 . 3 4 - £ 1 2 8 . 5 5 - £ 9 8 . 5 8 £ 5 9 1 . 4 7
1 £ 1 0 4 . 0 0 - £3 0 1  .35 - £ 8 1 . 0 7 £ 4 0 6 . 4 2
1 £1 0 4 .01 £ 7 8 , 9 4 £ 2 5 . 7 8 £ 4 1 . 7 3 £ 2 5 0 . 4 6
£ 2 0 8 . 0 1 - £1 5 6 . 9 8 - £ 7 3 . 0 0 £ 4 3 7 . 9 8
1 £ 1 0 4 . 0 1 M M £ 1 5 9 . 5 6 - £ 5 2 . 7 1 £ 3 1 6 . 2 8
1 £ 1 0 . 0 1 £ 2 7 9 . 2 3 - £ 7 6 . 6 5 £ 4 5 9 . 8 9
1 £ 4 . 0 1 ■n £ 2 4 . 5 5 £ 2 5 . 7 1 £ 1 5 4 . 2 7
1 £ 8 0 . 7 5 £ 2 5 . 4 5 - £ 21 .25 £ 1 2 7 . 4 5
| 1 £ 1 1 5 . 1 0 £ 6 8 . 0 7 -  if jj i i j j i m hhm n £ 3 6 . 6 3 £ 2 1 9 . 8 0
Source: Seringal ITU Diary o f 1910
Notes: (1) The value £1,973.72 refer to December 1910 + £900.05 o f advance payment in Bel6m. 
Thus, the interest rate is on the total o f £ 894.22 only; (2) The information for 2 persons 
means a seringueiro and his wife.
The majority of newcomers, 61%, asked for cash in Belem, probably to buy 
foodstuffs and tools before coming to the estate. As already mentioned in chapter 1, 
Seringal ITU’s accounting documents do not give the price of single commodities, but 
considering that only 15% of newcomers did a first monthly shopping in the internal
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house in 1910, it is almost certain that most of them got tools in Belem where it was 
cheaper. In 1913, seringueiros’ expenses with tools could reach £506.49 on estates, 
as illustrated in Table 13. Although the prices in Bel£m were cheaper, they were still 
dear to seringueiros because they had to pay 20% interest over the cash borrowed. 
The official policy of encouragement to rubber production during the deepest crisis of 
rubber prices, initiated in 1911-12, considered the expenses with tools one of the 
main reasons for the high labour cost. The Plan of Defence of Rubber in 1912466 
foresaw that in the official accommodation for immigrant labourers there should be 
available tools to be sold at cost price. Chaves467 disagrees with this Plan saying that 
tools prices did not represent a high proportion of the seringueiros’ initial debt. 
However, this argument contradicts his own information illustrated in Table 13 in 
which tools prices are quite high. Actually, his disagreement shows the efforts 
owners went to, to go on selling tools in their commercial houses. Nevertheless, 
Chaves’ argument that the cost of transport constituted one of the most important 
items in the initial debt is confirmed insofar as it represented an average of 45% of 
the initial debt, as previously mentioned. He stated that:
“The men engaged in Cear& State or in any other place, leave the little they have to their 
families, so, they need everything from the owners in order to come to the Seringal. From Cear£ 
they go to Bel§m. The transport to this port, the accommodation in small hotels in this city and 
the travel ticket in steamboats cost 220$000 contos de reis. The travel ticket can be even more 
expensive because the commandants charge each passenger 5$000 to 10$000 per day when 
bad conditions of navigation force delays during the journey. So, people never know the extra 
amount they will pay at arrival. They reach rubber estates in Acre after 30 to 45 days in an 
uncomfortable and suffering journey’ (Our translation)
466 The Federal Law 2.534A of January 1912 and its respective regulation in May of the same 
year.
467 Chaves 1913 p. 80.
468 Ibid. p. 67.
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Table 13: Seringueiros' Tools - Prices in 1913 
T o o l Q u an tity  P rice
S m a l l  B o w l  
Zinc  bas in  (28 m)
S m a l l  axe
Big kni fe  Col ins  no. 128  
Big K ni fe  Col ins  s m al le r  
Zin c  b u c k e t  (6 l i tres)
Iron o r  c la y  j a r
100
1
1
£ 36.30 or £ 72.60
£326.00  
£ 54.45 to £ 72.60  
£ 9.07 to £ 18.15
£36.30
£27.22
£18.15
Total £ 506.49 or £ 571.02
Source: CHAVES, 1913 p.67
The engagement of seringueiros as indebted labour persisted until at least the 
1910s. In the Seringal ITU Diary of 1913 there is evidence of changes in that cases 
of engagement without debt as well as there being no register of masters travelling to 
Belem or to the North East of the country to recruit labour. In the Diary of 1930, there 
is no investment in recruitment of labour at all, no engagement of indebted labour 
and plenty of evidence of labourers having families living in Rio Branco or in nearby 
country towns instead of in the North East Region. This information confirms the 
emergence of an internal labour market in Acre, particularly after the 1910s as well 
as the existence of spontaneous immigration of labourers, as was discussed in the 
previous chapter.
These changes eliminated initial debts but not indebtedness in work relations 
because of the remuneration by results under particular circumstances. 
Remuneration by results meant uncertain income, depending not just on the work 
results such as quantity and quality of rubber produced. It also depended upon 
rubber prices to the direct producers and on the circumstances under which they sold 
rubber. Rubber prices in Belem and Manaus varied in the market daily and indeed 
many times a day, as seen in chapter five. Yet, rubber tapers could not benefit from 
these variations insofar as they sold their rubber within the estate according to
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internal prices and at a time defined by work conditions. In Seringal ITU, seringueiros 
delivered the rubber they produced according to the calendar followed by the internal 
system of transport, but it was weighed, conferred and priced when boats from 
Belem came to take the production. This happened four times in 1910, once on April 
30th and three times at the end of December. In 1913, it happened more than twice 
that year, at the end of January and on April 4th as well as there being references to 
the sale of rubber in Bolivia. Besides that, seringueiros sold their rubber on those 
occasions, not according to the prices in Belem, but according to the prices within the 
estate, which were around 40 to 50% cheaper than those.469 Finally, from the total 
amount achieved from the sale of rubber, was deducted rent and freight from each of 
them, representing 10 to 15%.
Moreover, seringueiros bought foodstuffs at expensive prices, as previously 
mentioned. Most importantly, they produced rubber for only about eight months a 
year, so that for four months, from the end of November to the end of March or the 
middle of April, they just consumed subsistence products but did not produce-sell 
rubber. This applied equally to those who went home during this time. Thus, the 
conditions under which seringueiros were remunerated and performed commercial 
relations tended to perpetuate indebtedness.
Such hash conditions made possible the use of the accountant’s strict control on 
their credit as an indirect way of retaining and constraining them to work. Rubber 
tappers bought goods on account to be paid with their future rubber production. 
However, in this commercial relationship rubber tappers were not autonomous buyers 
or sellers. They were obliged to sell the rubber they produced to the owner, who was 
in the position of owner-buyer and commander of the process of production, exerting 
direct control over their work, besides acting as creditor by means of the internal
469 This information on prices in Seringal ITU confirms estimates by Chaves (Chaves 1913, p.
70) and information by Ferreira de Castro (Ferreira de Castro op.cit. pp. 15, 74,112-114).
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commercial house, defining the level of loans and shopping on account. According to 
Ferreira de Castro,470 the rule in this matter was ‘He who does not produce does not 
consume’. He states that the manager always reduced the rubber tappers' demand 
for goods when they had high debt. They were not sold anything beyond their level of 
production.471
In Seringal ITU, however, even highly indebted rubber tappers had credit since 
they continued producing rubber because indebtedness also imposed difficulties for 
owners in controlling labour. Claims on non-payment of debt could be made 
according to the Commercial Code. The creditor could ask for aresto, which was the 
confiscation of belongings and proprieties under the mediation of authorities. 
Seringueiros had no valuable belongings or proprieties to be confiscated and their 
arrest would mean no payment anyway. Thus, the usual way to recover debt was to 
keep the debtor working on the estate.
The debtors, in turn, had to stay in the enterprise until the debt was settled. This 
could force seringueiros to stay on the estate for longer than they expected so that 
debt would also work as a means of retaining labour. However, the efficiency of it 
was limited. Seringueiros had an unequal level of productivity/consumption. 
Consequently, they had different levels of remuneration, defining different levels of 
income in relation to subsistence level. When they managed to pair their 
remuneration to their expenditure in the commercial house, they earned at the level 
of subsistence, which was expressed in their current accounts by the absence of 
debt or credit. Debt, in turn, would indicate earnings below the level of subsistence 
as a permanent or temporary condition. In Seringal ITU, in December 1910, 78% of 
the seringueiros sampled had debts. In December 1913, only 49 seringueiros or 76% 
of the sample in 1910 remained in the seringal, and 77% of them had a negative
470 Ferreira de Castro op.cit. p. 71 and p. 74.
471 Ibid.
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balance. This high percentage of indebtedness expresses the particularity of those 
making up the sample. They were selected among those staying in the seringal at 
the beginning of February 1910 and at the beginning of March 1913, when the 
accounting year started. After March 1913, 21% of the sample left the estate. 
Despite the existence of a considerable percentage of seringueiros staying there for 
years even having positive balances, most of those who stayed for long periods had 
negative balances. Finally, the percentage of the sample earning above the level of 
subsistence was not that low, considering that 17% had a positive balance in 
December 1910 and 22% in December 1913 (this percentage referred to those 
staying on the estate throughout the year, which means a total 21% lower than the 
sample in March 1913).
Moreover, as already mentioned, of the total of 202 seringueiros in seringal ITU in 
Feb-1910, around 55% worked for a period from three to four years, while 11% 
managed to leave the estate in just two years.
The results thus far raise questions about the extent to which work relations in 
seringais were characterised by labour immobilisation and abscondment, as 
suggested by the literature. The next step in this direction is the discussion on 
labour’s strategy of dealing with indebtedness as well as labour rotation.
Seringueiros’ Strategies of Dealing with Debt: Re-Thinking Debt and 
Abscondment
Seringueiros had different forms of resistance to the use or role of debt as a form 
of retention, control and discipline. In the accounting documents of Seringal ITU in 
1910, 1913 and 1930, there is plentiful evidence of seringueiros’ strategies for facing 
indebtedness. Most cases indicate collective forms of resistance and mutual aid. 
Those seringueiros and wage labourers having positive balances used to lend money
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to their indebted colleagues without charging interest. This saved them from getting 
loans in the commercial house at 20% interest, and they could buy goods with cash, 
which was crucial to those who were highly indebted and had their credit controlled 
by accountants, which in some cases included the stoppage of buying goods on 
account. In 1910, 25% of the seringueiro sample borrowed money from 27 lenders 
whose transactions reached the amount of £1,835.69. In 1913, 19% did the same, 
the number of lenders, being 27. Although the number of borrowers was lower in 
1913 than that in 1910, the total amount involved was higher at £2,493.98. 
Moreover, they used to lend them goods too. That is, they authorised the commercial 
house to sell them goods and register it in their current accounts. Authorising a 
deposit back to the lender’s accounts, usually at the end of the year when the annual 
balances were done made the payment back.
Especially when they wished to leave the estate, seringueiros used to sell 
belongings, including tools, in order to settle debt. List 1 illustrates that in 1910, 3% 
of the seringueiro sample sold belongings.
Finally, they performed jobs inside the rubber estates as daily wage labourers. 
The List shows that 11% worked temporarily as daily wage labour or salaried workers 
in 1910. In 1913, there was a reasonable proportion of seringueiros tending to even 
abandon or reduce the production of rubber in favour of wage labour, as 22% of the 
sample did this.
This tendency is also indicative of the seringueiros’ strategies to cope with the 
falling rubber prices in 1913, as discussed in chapter five. In this scenario, 
seringueiros were directly affected because not only did they sell rubber at lower 
prices than those prevailing in Bel6m and Manaus, but they bought expensive 
subsistence products too. Under such conditions, being a wage labour seemed a 
good strategy because wage labourers had clear advantages. They had fixed daily 
wages or salaries and most of them had free meals. Consequently, they tended to
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shop less. Considering a sample composed of 8 wage and salaried workers, earning 
salaries of £120.00, £150.00 and £200.00, it was found out that their annual average 
income was £1,077.40 in 1910. As such it was higher than the seringueiro’s annual 
average income in this year at £1,017.16. Most importantly, wage labourers 
expended less in the internal commercial house. Their annual shopping average was 
just £460.78 in 1910 and £327.10 in 1913, while the seringueiros' annual shopping 
average reached £1,215.57 in 1910 and £815.14 in 1913, as shown in Table 12. In 
the selection of a wage labour sample it was attempted to keep the criterion of 
permanence on the estate at the beginning of February 1910 and at the beginning of 
March 1913, but the rotation among wage labourers was higher in comparison to 
seringueiros. As a result, in 1910 the salaried sample refers to 7 salaried workers 
because the account of one of the eight considered had no movement in 1910 but 
had in 1913, and of the eight making up the sample, only two remained in the 
seringal throughout the year 1913 because one became a rubber taper in this year 
and five happened not to be there anymore.
Moreover, wage labourers tended to have positive balances. Analysing the wage 
labour sample from the point of view of the final situation, I came across with 75% 
leaving the seringal with a positive balance. It also has to be considered that workers 
at the top of the estate administration always had positive balances. The accountant 
received a salary of 700$000 contos de reis in 1910, and 1:000$000 contos de reis in 
1913, which was equivalent to that of the accountant in the Instituto Paulista da 
Defesa Permanente do Cafe.472 The accountant had a positive balance of £416.57 in 
December 1910, and £12,510.82 in December 1913, leaving the seringal in June 
1914 with high savings. Another administrative worker was contracted in 1910 with 
an annual salary of 10:000$000 contos de reis. He is recorded as having lent money 
to seringueiros a lot, without interest.
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Besides the reasonable tendency towards wage labour, seringueiros had to 
intensify their tapping and making of rubber since the owner reduced the number of 
seringueiros from 202 in 1910 to 160 in 1913, as previously mentioned.
Finally, seringueiros faced declining rubber prices in 1913 by augmenting the sale 
of rubber by consignation. In the sample just 2% sold part of the rubber they 
produced by consignation in 1910, while 44% did so in 1913. This could allow them 
to get better prices in comparison to what they could get at the end of the year when 
the final balance of their production was done, considering the tendency to 
permanently decreasing rubber prices. Nevertheless, because they were not aviado, 
they could not sell all the rubber they produced in this way.
The material presented raise questions to the prevailing accounts of work 
relations centred on indebtedness and abscondment. Calixto473 states that 
seringalistas must have been violent and arbitrary. His statement is based on 
Cabral’s description of the assassination of an indebted fugitive aviado by a 
seringalista in Acre.474 The author criticises Ferreira de Castro475 and Jose 
Potyguara,476 who, according to him, tended to see casas aviadoras or the 
commercial-financial capital as the cause of low remuneration and arbitrary work 
relations in seringais. Yet, Ferreira de Castro mentions it as the owner’s justification 
for the low remuneration of indebted seringueiros. Moreover, what this literature 
indicates is the existence of different attitudes to indebtedness and abscondment, 
even by the same seringalista. Ferreira de Castro describes two different attitudes of 
his boss in 1914. He forgave the debt of one seringueiro477 but had a violent reaction 
to an occurrence of abscondment in which three fugitive seringueiros were
472 See comments on the Law 2.004 of December 1924 in: Queiroz, P. 1927 p. 63.
473 Calixto op.cit. pp. 97-99.
474 Ibid. p. 98 (the author refers to a description by Cabral op.cit. p. 71).
475 Ferreira de Castro op. cit.
476 Potyguara, J. 1942.
477 Ferreira de Castro op.cit. p. 287.
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captured.478 In reaction to the capture, an old ex-slave who lived in the Seringal set 
fire to the owner’s residence, killing him.479
This is an important element in the novel by Ferreira de Castro because it 
expresses the repugnance of this, particularly of labourers and ex-slaves, in a post­
slavery conjuncture in which labour’s freedom was regarded as a precious principle. 
Actually, these situations constituted a dramatic expression of the seringueiros’ 
condition of subordinated labour in a historical circumstance of weak working 
legislation in Brazil, stressing the different existing standards of workers’ treatment by 
capitalists. The commercial transactions in seringais were regulated by the 
Commercial Code, which was the first legislation to be improved by Brazilians after 
independence from Portugal. Regarding work legislation, however, there were 
sparse laws on particular aspects in a conjuncture in which even urban strikers were 
treated as police cases. The Brazilian Work Legislation was promoted as a set of 
laws only in 1930.
At the beginning of the 20th century, Euclides da Cunha480 was one of the 
pioneers in questioning seringueiros’ living conditions. Stressing labour treatment as 
a matter of employers’ character and over-emphasizing cases of abuse of power by 
certain employers, he refers to seringais as ‘the most criminal of work organizations’. He 
also denounces the absence of official assistance in terms of health care and 
education, which were installed in the countryside only as part of the Plano de 
Defesa da Borracha after 1912.
However, Euclides da Cunha’s comments have been taken a-critically.481 Actually, 
the cases of interference of seringalistas’ subjectivity and individual character in work 
relations have been interpreted from the view of economic processes as non-social
478 Ferreira de Castro op.cit. pp. 199-211.
479 Ibid. pp. 215-18.
480 Euclides da Cunha 1946.
481 See for instance Calixto op.cit.
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phenomenon and from the perspective of the Western notion of civilization, idealizing 
capitalism as synonymous with 'rationality', ‘civilization’, well-being, progress and 
absence of violence in work relations in opposition to non- or pre-capitalist relations.
These views have shaped biased interpretations of work relations in seringais and 
posited obstacles to a more consistent debate on the matter. For instance, the fragile 
condition of seringueiros facing seringaiistas has been focused on as if it were a 
singular situation, ignoring that working class fragility facing capitalists constituted a 
general characteristic of capitalism in the period of this research,482 the situation of 
rubber tapers in rubber plantations in 'Peninsular Malaysia', particularly after 1909, 
was referred by Barlow as an ‘evil system’,483 which is a remark quite similar to that 
by Euclides da Cunha. According to Segatto,484 in Brazil, until 1930, the work time 
depended on the bosses’ will and need, the work journey in many urban industries 
reached 12, 14 and until 15 hours per day and workers had no right to remunerated
482 Russel (1991, pp.9-10; 17-18; 21, 27) shows that in British industry, on which Marx based 
his concept of capital, labour treatment was a matter of employers character. Incentives and 
rewards were selectively distributed; favour was bestowed upon those whose conduct and 
attitude were deemed to merit special privilege and this was intended to encourage 
emulation by the rest. Actually, for farm workers, any real progress began only from 1924, 
and in Scotland only after 1937. Moreover, it was not common practice for employers to 
continue to pay wages to manual workers during sickness absence and in many firms, 
retirement pensions for wage workers were at the discretion of the employer, and given 
selectively to 'deserving' individuals who qualified by length of service and good character.
483 Like seringueiros, rubber tappers in rubber plantations were immigrants whose contracts 
involved debts. According to Barlow, they were employed, without contract also, to prevent 
them from leaving the estate for other work. Moreover, 'Ears and other advances were 
recovered by making deductions from pay (...) Employees were not kept properly informed 
of the state of their accounts, extra sums were frequently debited, and interest was charged. 
They used to pay wages one or two months in arrears, as a means of discouraging 
abscondment. This made it difficult for workers to check on whether they were credited for 
the right number of days. In consequence of such practices many immigrants were 
permanently short of cash; they were often forced to procure food and other supplies on 
credit, and this inevitably led to a vicious circle of further poverty and debt’ (Barlow op.cit. p. 
42). Even contract categories of worker could come to states already with debts as a result 
of the expenses of transport and subsistence, together with a commission paid by the 
contractors. Moreover, the contractors'(...) did not permit the immigrants to leave them until 
all debts had been repaid; this often took a long time, for expenses were frequently 
exaggerated and swollen by interest charges. Debts were also enhanced by the practice of 
contractors in charging high prices for food, selling opium, and running gambling 
establishments’ (Ibid p. 46).
484 Segatto, 1987 p. 22.
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weekends off or any security for health purposes. Moreover, he says, many times 
urban proletariat were engaged and dismissed verbally, without formal contracts.485 
Finally, according to him urban proletariat were under rigorous system of coercion 
and discipline to guarantee maximum productivity, which could involve even physical 
constrains, threats and other kinds of coercion.488 Changes were not readily achieved 
or intrinsic to capitalism but were built in complex, difficult and violent class struggles 
as the vast literature on trade unions has revealed.
Finally, the a-critical reproduction of Euclides da Cunha’s accounts of work 
relations in seringais has ignored two important points. First, that seringueiros were 
not passive but had strategies to deal with different issues and that seringalistas 
were dealing with relatively low pool of labour. Such a condition required some 
commitments by employers, expressed not only in passive strategies to convince 
labourers to work in distant seringais, as discussed in the previous chapter, they also 
had to use different forms of incentives.
Bonuses, Gratification or Discounts
Seringueiros' labour was controlled and disciplined not just by inspection and by 
strict control of credit/debt. The seringal ITU diaries show that the seringalista also 
used different strategies of motivation and ways of retaining labour such as by 
offering schooling to those few who had children,487 by bringing priests to assist 
religious workers, by supplying loans to those requiring health treatment in cities or 
nearby country towns, by offering temporary wage labour to those who were highly 
indebted or their young sons or even to their wives who could perform house 
services in the owner’s residence or cleaning in the office. Moreover, seringueiros
485 Ibid.
486 Ibid. p. 23.
487 Neves op.cit.
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were also motivated by incentives and rewards in the form of bonuses, gratification 
or discounts.
These incentives and rewards were certainly given selectively to ‘deserving’ 
individuals who qualified by length of service, good character and expected 
behaviour. Table 14 illustrates that incentives were given to indebted and non- 
indebted labourers. In 1910, just a slight majority of receivers had a positive balance 
(56%) while most of the rest had low debt levels. However, in 1913, almost all 
receivers had debt instead of credit in the commercial house, and two out of the 
three cases among them who had a positive balance were ex-rubber tapers who 
became wage labourers. Moreover, rewards were often disproportionate to their 
balance. In 1913, just three seringueiros received discount of 50% or more of their 
balance and just four received gratification. Considering this and that in 1910 one 
seringueiro was dismissed due to 'bad behaviour1, there existed different standards 
of labour treatment by the boss.
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Sum £ 530.59 £_ 539.25 £ 2,206.71 _£_ 8,134.43 £ 288.11
Source: Diary o f Seringal ITU  for 1910 and 1913
Notes: P.A .D .= Percentage o f the Annual Debt.
P.P.B. = Percentage o f the Annual Positive Balance.
However, it should be noted that incentives were also given according to strictly 
profitable criterion. Table 14 illustrates that 10% of the seringueiro sample received 
incentives in 1910 and 31% in 1913. This was done twice a year, at the end of June 
and at the end of December. Apart from three cases in 1910 and four cases in 1913, 
incentives and rewards were given to those having high productivity and a relatively 
high level of consumption in the commercial house. Tables 15 and 16 show that in 
1910, the receivers average value of rubber production is almost double (£1,608.71) 
the value of non-receivers (£888.57). Data distribution in which, in 1910, 30% is far
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above the average of £1,608.71 and around 65% close below the average confirm 
the tendency to higher levels of rubber production among receivers. In contrast, the 
non-receivers’ data distribution express lower levels of rubber production with 41%  
below and far below the average value and just 20% above. In 1913, receivers and 
non-receivers present higher average values of rubber production in comparison to 
1910. However, the figures are quite similar. The receivers average value of rubber 
production is £1,736,28, with the distribution presenting 15% far above the average, 
65% close below the average and just 20% below. The non-receivers’ data present 
uneven distribution, tending to values far below the average in 1913, with 31% above 
the average and 86% below or far below.
Table 15; G ra t i f ica t ion  Receivers * P roduction  V a lue a n d  S hopp ing , 1910,19)3
Statistics
A v e r a g e
A n n u a l  S ho pp i ng  
1910 1913
M e d i a n
M a x
S t d e v
A v e d e v
£ 1 , 2 8 5 . 9 4
£ 1 , 1 3 3 . 6 6
£ 2 , 2 7 3 . 6 6
£ 4 7 3 . 6 1
£ 6 2 2 . 4 1
£ 5 3 1 . 1 8
£ 9 7 2 .7 3
£ 1 , 0 1 3 . 3 4
£ 2 , 5 3 4 . 1 6
£ 7 7 . 7 3
£ 6 3 0 . 8 3  
£ 4 5 7 .
R ubber Production
£ 1 , 6 0 8 . 7 1  £ 1 , 7 3 6 . 2 8
£ 1 , 4 0 8 . 0 4  £ 1 , 6 2 1 . 5 8
£ 3 , 0 4 5 . 1 0  £ 3 , 2 5 9 . 2 6
£ 4 8 1 . 9 0£ 4 5 8 . 5 5
Source: Seringal IT U  diaries of 1910 and 1913
A similar tendency was found with regard to annual shopping, though in a slighter 
proportion. Receivers’ annual shopping frequency was higher than that of non­
receivers. Receivers’ average shopping frequency was 10 in 1910 and 9 in 1913, 
while non-receivers’ average shopping frequency was 9 in 1910 and 6 in 1913. 
Moreover, the great majority shopped according to or above the annual shopping 
frequency average and the few exceptions shopped more than eight times a year. 
Furthermore, receivers tended to have higher levels of consumption in the internal 
commercial house. In 1910 receivers’ annual shopping was £1,285.94, while non­
receivers’ annual shopping reached £1,199,41. In 1913, the difference was higher.
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The average of receivers’ annual shopping reached £972.73 and non-receivers just £ 
696.95 as can be seen in Tables 15 and 16.
Table 16: Non-Receivers -Production and Shopping 1910,1913 
Statistics Annual Shoppoing Rubber Production
1910 1913 1910 191
Average
Median
Max
Min
£1,124.25
£1,099.28
£2,506.76
£123.66
£726.32
£625.71
£2,169.68
£24.56
£810.13
£669.16
£2,834.88
£70.56
£1,284.50
£1,018.13
£3,404.23
£14.93
Stdev
Avedev
£499.83
£362.22
£552.05
£429.47
£575.07
£425.32
£857.10
£711.24
Source: Seringal IT U  diaries o f 1910 and 1913
Another aspect to be considered is that seringalistas/seringueiros work relations 
also involved negotiation of debts and changes over time, as discussed below.
Labour Rotation and Changes
Since the last decades of the 19th century and particularly after the 1910s, 
seringalistas responded to the constant deep oscillations in rubber prices by 
diversifying economic activities on the estate, as discussed in chapter six. Together 
with agriculture and cattle, Brazil nuts increasingly became an important export 
commodity, particularly after the 1920s.488 On those rubber estates with castanhais, 
rubber production became an activity combined with the picking of Brazil nuts. As 
discussed in chapter six (see Table 20) until the 1920s around 6% of the early 
seringais in Acre River District produced Brazil nuts, yet those estates diversifying 
the production of commodities reached 33%. The 67% appearing as producer of 
rubber only signify that rubber was the only commodity product, while the 
diversification of economic activities occurred towards the production of cereals for
488 See on this matter Emmi, 1988.
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internal consumption. The general tendency to diversification of economic activities 
particularly after 1912-13 is well mentioned.489
This tendency affected the seringueiros’ work condition in a long-term perspective. 
In Seringal ITU, Table 17 illustrates that in the seringueiro sample of 1930, 
representing 3C% of 215 seringueiros working in the estate, 12% combined rubber 
production with the picking of Brazil nuts during the year, one case sold corn, and 5%  
worked temporarily as wage labour.
7 Brazil Nuts - 90 .42 8%
9
Brazil Nuts -1 6 1 .1 5 , pork skin 
corn - 9 .45
-5.32,
19 .51%
14 26.6 1.51%
15 1758.24 85%
17 Brazil Nuts - 74 .47 11%
M . 
21 Brazil Nuts -2 5 5 .3 2 12 .56%
30 Brazil Nuts - 250 .00 18%
45 Brazil Nuts -4 8 1 .4 8 us i l l  rs 7%
46 Brazil Nuts - 49 .45 82%
48 Brazil Nuts - 218.09 - 11 i l l l i B p  i  1 14 .50%
58 Brazil Nuts -2 9 .2 6 3%... I::'.:.-::-: : 7 ' \
62
--------------------------------------
. H . .' . 7 ■ ' :
“ ■ . - l  ■ v JT, ,» . .
611.38 39%
Source: Seringal ITU , Diary o f 1930.
Note: P.A.I.= Percentage o f Annual Income.
The diversification of seringueiros' economic activity allowed them to develop a 
degree of autonomy in relation to the internal commercial house, which is expressed 
in the tendency to a lower level of shopping in 1930 in comparison to 1910 and 1913.
489 See Reis, 1953 p. 107-108; Bastos, A. 1958, p. 38 and p. 43; Pinto de Oliveira op.cit. pp. 
25-26; Paula op.cit.
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In the seringueiro sample of 1930, 12% did not shop at all during the year and 53%  
shopped just three times. Moreover, 75% shopped less than 5 times during the year. 
Table 18 illustrates that the average value of annual shopping in 1930 dropped 
sharply. It represents 56% of the average of annual shopping in 1913 and 44% of 
that in 1910. Thus, in contrast to their colleagues in the other two years considered, 
in 1930 rubber tapers diversified their source of monetary income and means of 
subsistence, so that they could shop less in the internal house.
Average £ 548.78 £ 48.52 3
Median £ 383.18 £ 32.63 3
Max £ 2,477.80 £ 225.25 11
Min £ 74.82 £ 6.80 1
Stdev £ 502.47 £ 45.05 2
Avedev £ 370.66 £ 33.52 1
Source: Seringal ITU Diary o f 1930
Diversification of economic activities goes hand in hand with a higher level of 
labour rotation. The first point to be stressed in the discussion of rotation is that the 
idea of labour immobilisation characterising work relations is questioned by the 
results of this investigation. Many seringueiros with positive balances stayed on the 
estate for years contrary to the dogma that suggests only indebted labour did so. In 
December 1910, 17% of the seringueiro sample had positive balances and all of 
them stayed on the estate until 1914 or the middle of 1916. Moreover, just one out of 
the 20% having positive balances in December 1913, left in February-1914, while the 
majority stayed for many more years. In 1930, 5% of the total 215 seringueiros 
stayed on the estate with positive balances. Moreover, as previously mentioned, 
some seringueiros left the estate and came back the following year. Finally, many
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indebted seringueiros left via different forms of negotiations, as previously 
mentioned.
Furthermore, there was an increasing rotation of labour in Seringal ITU. Chart 3 
illustrates that the engagement of seringueiros increased from 24% in 1910 to 56% in 
1913. At the same time, the percentage of seringueiros leaving the estate was 10%  
higher in 1913.
Leaving
Source: Seringal ITU  Diaries o f 1910 and 1913
Chart 4 shows a firm tendency to an increasing percentage of seringueiros leaving 
the estate when the three years (1910, 1913 and 1930) are considered. Taking into 
account that in 1930 the total number of seringueiros on the estate reached 215, 26%  
more than the total in 1913 in addition to a higher percentage leaving, there was an 
intensification in the engagement of labour. In other words, there was increasing 
rotation of labour in Seringal ITU.
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Chart 4: Seringueiros Leaving the Estate, 
1910,1913,1930
Source: Seringal Diaries o f 1910, 1913 and 1930
Finally, changes in the way seringueiros left the estate were found. In 1910, two 
seringueiros died, one was dismissed owing to ‘bad behaviour’, and 30 left their jobs. 
Among those leaving the estate, only 13% had positive balance and 3% had their debt 
settled. The rest represented 53% who moved to a neighbouring estate, having their 
debts assumed by the new boss and 31% who were indebted seringueiros leaving by 
negotiation. Some of them had their debts assumed by other seringueiros while others 
had half of the debts assumed by other seringueiros and half by the owner. In 1910, 
the amount transferred from seringueiros' debt to the estate Lucros & Perdas account 
reached 4.982.680 contos de reis, including debts of the two seringueiros who died. In 
1930, 43%  left the estate at the end of the year and 81% of them had positive 
balances.
Conclusion
Seringalistas commanded the process of rubber production, contrary to what is 
popularly suggested by the literature. Moreover, work relations in seringais were not 
defined by indebtedness. Although seringueiros were engaged as indebted immigrant 
labour at least until 1912 and the circumstances under which they performed
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commercial relations within the estates favoured indebtedness or the perpetuation of 
initial debts, what defined work relations were the ways labour was subdued by the 
owner of the means of production and the commander of the process of production.
In seringais, as in any capitalist enterprise, the capitalist’s will assumed the form of 
administrative procedures of retaining, controlling and disciplining labour. The search 
for technological improvements, efficient systems of quality control and suitable forms 
of controlling and disciplining labour in order to maximize productivity shaped the 
process of setting up and running seringais. The organization and rationalization of 
space/nature in which rubber trees were organized according to paths and colocagoes, 
which where linked to the administration by internal paths, reduced production time 
and defined potential labour productivity. This was the basis for the use of inspection 
as a means of quality control and of direct control over seringueiros’ labour, which was 
part of a set of administrative procedures. Seringalistas controlled the level of labour 
exploitation by increasing or decreasing the number of seringueiros engaged, altering 
the number of rubber paths to be exploited by each of them and also by increasing the 
number of rubber plants compounding one path.
Besides that seringalistas used different forms of indirect control and discipline. 
First, as a result of circumstances such as the seringueiros' dependency on the 
internal shop to get foodstuffs insofar as they were exclusive producers of rubber in an 
enterprise situated far way from markets, the strict control over their credit was turned 
into a form of retention and control. Second, incentives were given such as bonuses, 
discounts and gratification, which were certainly given selectively to ‘deserving’ 
individuals who qualified not only by length of service, good character and expected 
behaviour but also according to profitable criterion such as high productivity combined 
with high level of consumption in the internal shop.
In these ways, seringueiros' labour was subdued to capitalists’ will and 
objective of producing rubber as a commodity to profit in order to ensure capital
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accumulation. They were not autonomous in the process of production but were 
labourers paid by results. Their subordination was manifested not just by means of the 
administrative measures of retention, control and discipline, they had an obligation to 
deliver the rubber they produced to the owner and they had to sell it according to 
internal work conditions. As a result, their remuneration was defined not just by the 
quantity and quality of rubber produced but also by the conditions that commercialised 
it - under pre-determined administrative rules and according to the frequency of 
shipments.
These forms of controlling and disciplining labour subdued seringueiros’ work by the 
seringaiista, indicating class relations in which the boss and labourers personalised 
distinct social conditions.
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PART FOUR: Profitability and Capital Accumulation: the seringalistas’
project of economic-political changes, re-investments and changes 
in seringais
Chapter 5:
The Double Movement English Rubber Dealers Versus Local Capitalists 
and The Seringalistasf Project of Economic and Political Changes
However fundamental, the previous discussion on seringueiros' class condition of 
subordinate labour is not sufficient to prove that seringal was a capitalist enterprise. It 
is, therefore, necessary to focus on profitability and capital accumulation, which 
demonstrate the ways seringalistas re-invested the profit they got from rubber and 
expanded capital, and why did they do so.
This has been neglected in previous literature for different reasons. On the one 
hand seringalistas have been classified as traders-usurers not keen on investing in 
production, as previously mentioned. On the other hand, the neo-classical technical- 
economic approaches focus solely on the non-adaptation by seringais of the pattern 
of civilisation and progress represented by the modern technology of large-scale 
monocultural rubber, which is interpreted as a ‘failure’. This is a distorted view of the 
matter which originated in the a-critical absorption of the Western notion of civilisation 
and progress, implying an automatic negative view of seringais. Moreover, this 
interpretation does not consider seringalistas as historical actors. Consequently, the 
literature does not consider the seringalistas’ own project of economic and political 
changes and gives no evidence about how seringalistas invested or re-invested the 
profit they got from rubber and why.
This chapter aims at understanding the local capitalists’ project of economic- 
political changes/re-investments in rubber production and the reasons for it. This is 
sought in their response to the obstacles to profitability imposed to a great extent by 
their complex relationships with foreign rubber dealers, particularly the English 
capitalists, which is focused in the us e of the term double movement.
l&2
The exposition of the argument is organised as follows: (a) the Brazilian counter 
movement to colonial inequalities and the English movement towards the rubber 
economy; (b) the foreign rubber dealers’ influence on rubber prices in Belem; (c) the 
seringalistas' counter movement to rubber dealers; (d) the demand for 
interventionism and the counter-reactions of foreign rubber dealers; (e) the demand 
for interventionism and the plan of defence of rubber; (f) the seringalistas’ project of 
economic-political changes and the central governments’ pattern of response
The Brazilian Counter Movement to Colonial Inequalities and the English 
Rubber Dealers and the British State’s Movements Towards the Rubber 
Economy
The English rubber dealers and the British State’s movements towards the rubber 
economy cannot be understood from the point of view of England’s economic- 
political expansionism alone. On the contrary. The crucial element is the way in 
which the Englishr gentlemanly capitalists’ search of markets for English goods and 
capital converged with the demands and dynamics of economic-political processes in 
Brazil. They were not autonomous newcomers. Rather, their investments entered the 
country under regulations - for instance, the opening of commerce to foreigners in 
1808 and the remission of the major barriers to foreign investment under the 
Constitution of 1824 - and by means of commercial treaties and strong restrictions in 
many sectors.490
The relaxation that led to foreign investments being permitted in Brazil was to a 
great extent, linked to internal struggles against colonial inequalities within which 
nationalism was born. In this process, liberalism assumed a particular meaning since
490 For instance, in the mining industry foreigners had to pay 5% higher taxes than nationals 
and offer one third of their company stock to Brazilian investors as well as to pay a deposit 
of 150,000 milreis to the Treasury as a guarantee against future payment of taxes and 
duties (Eakin 1986, p. 702).
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it was used to enforce claims in opposition to the close colonial economy in which 
exportation/importation could be performed only through the medium of Portuguese. 
This claim was an intrinsic part of the gradual internal process of ascension of 
Brazilian capitalists and the middle classes to the position of rulers in political- 
economic affairs, at first characterised by struggles to get rid of the Portuguese. In 
this slow and complex process, the Imperial government was, in fact, a temporary 
arrangement in which fundamental features of the colonial economy and policy were 
still alive,491 for example, the commercial treaties held by England, expressing the 
pattern of economic relations of Portugal with England since 1808 when the Crown 
moved to Brazil.
The 1830s-40s were marked by increasing criticisms of these treaties. The main 
point was England’s double standard regarding the principle of liberalism and the 
self-regulated market.492 On the one hand, the treaties gave privileges to British 
products and capital in Brazil while England had enacted protective legislation 
regarding its industries and the products imported from its colonies. On the other 
hand, Brazilian products and capital in England were denied any privilege, based on 
the principle of liberalism and the self-regulated market. Brazilian diplomacy 
questioned the double standard and denounced the unequal economic results. The 
treaties benefited English insurance companies, merchants, refineries and the 
government (by means of taxes), but imposed difficulties on the Brazilian 
economy.493 They also had indirect political effects. Furtado494 demonstrates that they 
prevented the Brazilian government from increasing import taxes so that the only 
alternative left was to tax exports which meant taxing the profits of agricultural 
capitalists who were in political ascension in the country, thereby reducing the central
of 150,000 milreis to the Treasury as a guarantee against future payment of taxes and
duties (Eakin 1986, p. 702).
491 Barman, R. 1981, p. 239.
492 AHI, Consulado de Liverpool -  Offcios 1842-1853, Oflcio reservado no. 56, mago 252/4/8;
Furtado 1961, p. 13.
493 Ibid.
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government’s authority at a time of increasing economic difficulties and political 
movement all over the country, particularly by rural workers and peasants.495
In 1841-5, during negotiations on the renewal of the 1827 Treaty Brazil attempted 
through diplomacy to eliminate such inequalities. England refused to accept their 
proposals, however, and it was this rather than the trafficking of slaves which 
Coates498 suggests that led to the non-renewal of the treaty.
In Amazonia, English investments started around 1808 and increased steadily 
until around the 1850s. They supplied the internal market with coal, machinery for 
sugar production, boats for internal navigation and other goods and were prominent 
in the shipment of export products to Western European markets. After the 1840s 
they increasingly offered credit and export services to the rubber economy. Then, in 
the 1860s they bought the main Brazilian company running internal navigation and 
began to receive a subsidy from the Brazilian government that composed more than 
50% of the total governmental subsidy to the sector.497 Coates498 shows that English 
traders increasingly became the main intermediaries in the exportation of rubber, 
favoured also by the prominent position of sterling. Only sterling letters of credit were 
accepted in external trade and in Brazil only through sterling could foreign earnings 
be converted into milreis.499
However, the crucial point regarding the English rubber dealers’ movement 
towards the rubber economy is that they did not want to just offer credit, to buy and to 
export rubber. They intended to do on their own terms. They constrained local 
producers to make rubber according to the quality (see footnote 450), quantity and
494 Furtado op.cit.
495 Ibid.
498 Coates op.cit. p. 46.
497 ACP, Relatdrio Annual de 1870; ACP, Relatdirio Annual de 1877; ACP, Relatdrio Annual de 
1879; ACP, Relatdrio Annual de 1881; ACP, Relatdrio Annual de 1885; ACP, Relatdrio 
Annual de 1909; ACP, Relatdrio Annual de 1911; ACP, Relatbrio Annual de 1913.
498 Coates op.cit., chapter 7.
499 Ibid. p. 47.
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prices required by the international capitalists’ pattern of accumulation, and wished to 
establish their political and ‘moral’ order in rubber commercialisation, thereby 
imposing their authority. These efforts were guided by the imperialistic mentality and 
ideological tools such as the western notion of civilisation and progress combined 
with the principle of liberalism and self-regulated markets and Spencer’s theory of 
the ‘survival of the fittest,’500 shaping a particular way of doing business. They 
attempted to impose these ideologies locally, trying to prevent the 
creation/implementation of regulations in the internal market. At the same time, they 
performed their business guided by a highly competitive pattern, attempting to sweep 
aside those they considered as competitors, which resulted in a certain tendency to 
dominate services in the rubber economy.
This pattern of doing business first of all clashed with the Brazilian struggle for 
autonomy in the face of European colonialist powers. Foreign capitalists invested in 
the region with formal permission and many times by means of economic deals or 
contracts with the Brazilian government. They were supposed to obey Brazilian 
institutions and laws. However, this matter constituted one of the greatest sources of 
clashes not just because of their pattern of doing business but also because they 
were closely supported by the international branches of their home states.
These relations changed over time, however in the period until around the 1870s 
or even the beginning of the 1880s, there was a direct connection between English 
merchants and the local branch of the British State, illustrating the prevailing strong 
character of class of the international branch of the British State. This is clear in 
many situations. In the selection of a new diplomat, the indication of or agreement by 
English firms constituted an important requirement. Moreover, when diplomats were 
absent, the consulate was left in charge of merchants.
500 See on this ideology Bowler 1992, p. 330.
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This same feature accounts for the military interference in the Cabanagem. As 
was mentioned in chapters 2 and 3, rural labourers contested the control of the best 
lands by entrepreneurs by occupying farm, including slavery sugar and rum mills 
owned by the English. Moreover, English merchants living in Bel6m feared that their 
private properties would be damaged somehow during the conflict. As a result, they 
were willing to meet the local government’s demand for military help. In a meeting 
with English capitalists, the British diplomat decided to meet this demand. British war 
ships bombarded Belem, after removing English capitalists. This was justified on the 
ground of defending ‘British’ interests, and was crucial for defeating this political 
movement. In fact, class interests were supposed to be threatened. British capitalists 
were also dissatisfied with the nationalist element of cabanagem, which was headed 
by nationalist factions of the native elite.
This does not mean that the British State was a sort of resonance box of their 
interests. Their demands to London involved more complex processes, some of 
which were not positively responded to. After the cabanagem and even until the 
1850s, English capitalists repeatedly demanded the foreign office interference to 
convince the Brazilian government to compensate those who had their farms 
damaged somehow during this conflict. This was always denied based on the 
international law.501
Finally, in 1882, it happened that the acting consul disobeyed Brazilian Customs 
regulations. He owned and ran the most important import-export house in Belem and 
in Manaus and one of his ships arriving from Liverpool did not stop at the port as 
required by customs’ regulations, thereby, preventing it from being inspected. He 
reported the immediate reaction by the inspector of the custom house as constituting
501 F .0 .13/327 -  Letters of 18th February 1848 amd 25th March 1854.
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disrespect for a British consul.502 However, a report by the Inspector of Customs 
accused the merchant of not distinguishing between his position as acting consul 
from that of businessman and reported similar behaviour by his firm on several past 
occasions,503 claiming that the firm did not want to respect and obey the Brazilian law 
and institutions.504
The English merchants practices and ideologies is clearer in the clashes which 
marked the debate on commercial-financial regulations at the AssociagSo 
Commercial do Par^.505 Local and foreign capitalists running businesses in Par£ 
were members of this association on the ground of common class interests. 
However, local landed capital, manufacturers, those investing in the service sector 
and running middle and small sized businesses in commercial-financial transactions 
wanted to establish protective regulations. Thus, clashes were commonplace in 
these meetings. The discussion of the Directory’s proposals for improving the 
regulations regarding commercial transactions in 1870 is particularly illustrative. 
English merchants were against them. They were not keen on respecting the 
adoption of the decimal metric system and they were against the directory’s proposal 
to regulate the legal procedures regarding receipts and bills. An English merchant 
argued that he was against them ‘because I do not like regulations. I do my job and the 
buyer has to defend himself.506 The President replied stating that ‘it is the seller’s obligation 
to sell any good according to legal and moral procedures’.507
502 APP, Carta do Consulado BritSnico assinada pelo Consul Substituto Arthur Sahuston em 
01/10/1882. In: APP, Oficios Diversos. Consulados do Para. 1880-1887. origem: Secretaria 
da PresidSncia da Provfncia, Caixa 374.
503 Idem, Relatdrio do Inspetor da Alfdndega de 13/10/1882 ao Inspetor da Thesouraria da 
Fazenda.
504 APP, Oficios Diversos. Consulados do Pare. 1880-87.oriqem: Secretaria da Presidfencia da 
Provfncia, Caixa 374.
505 See Minutes (Atas) of the ACP in the bibliography under manuscripts.
506 ACP, Livro de Atas de ReuniOes Ordinarias e Extraordinarias e Assembl£ias Gerais do 
perlodo de 13/02/1864 a 9/1/1877. Ata de ReuniSo Extraordin^ria em 10/02/1870, pp. 69 
and 71 (our translation).
507 Ibid. p. 71.
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The Spencerian subterranean conception governing the English merchants' 
behaviour was that they could act as aggressively and as harmfully as they wanted 
and the consequences of their acts were not their fault but the victim’s problem. 
When one had no condition to defend him/herself it was interpreted as weakness, 
and the principle ‘survival of the fittest’ conceives the exploitation of ‘weaker’ as 
‘normal’ and ‘acceptable’ as it is in the lion eating other animals. In Amazonia, 
English capitalists had favourable conditions to practice such a principle because 
most of them ran temporary businesses, investing in mobile or easily disposable 
capital, having no links with the land, the culture or the local society. Despite 
individual differences, the frequent fronting of Customs laws and attempts to prevent 
the creation of suitable protective regulations survived in the long term as a general 
pattern of doing business.
These practices were somehow benefited by national political context of the First 
Republic (1889-1930) which was marked by the political ascension of the so-called 
‘Group of oligarchy’, who assumed power throughout the period 1898 to 1920, 
representing successful groups investing in coffee plantations, who were well 
articulated with the international financial bourgeoisie,508 defending their ideology of 
progress and civilisation.509 This articulation was manifested soon after they assumed 
power when they dealt with the State's financial difficulties by getting an external 
loan. A funding loan was signed with English gentlemanly capitalists in June 1898 in 
a situation in which they already dominated the import economy,510 and acted as one 
of the most important lenders of money to the nascent Brazilian industries.511
508 This term is preferred here instead of'Haute Finance’, which was used by Polany (op.cit) in 
his ‘institutional’ approach, and instead of “financial oligarchy’ as Lenin (in: Imperialismo 
Fase Superior do Capitalism, S. Paulo, 1979, pp. 46-59) refers to them, which is linked to 
his view of capital in its monopolist stage, reproducing Marx’s notion of History.
509 Calixto op.cit p. 15.
510 Singer, P. O Brasil no Contexto do Capitalismo Intemacional, 1889-1930, in: H.G.C.B. III. 
O Brasil Republicano, Difel, S. Paulo, 1982, ip. 355, quoted from Calixto op.cit. p. 37.
511 Graham, R. 1973, pp. 140-142.
Topik512 raises important features of the role of the State in the Brazilian economy 
during the First Republic. However, he defines it as a mediator between strong 
foreign capitalists and a weak domestic bourgeoisie, resulting from a nation-state 
framework combined with a view on the principle of liberalism and the self-regulated 
market as a model to be adopted by Brazilians. As a result, Brazilian state 
interventionism is interpreted as an ‘abnormality’ or loss of purity resulting from (a) 
the dependency on the sen/ices and credit offered by foreign capitalists; and (b) the 
strength of foreign capitalists and weakness of native bourgeoisie, which demanded 
strong State action both to protect them and to provide the infrastructure necessary 
for their agricultural export economy.513
This nation-state interpretation shadows the specific features of demands for 
interventionism in Brazil and minimises the divergence and varying actions and 
ideologies internal to both native and foreign capitalists. The demands for 
interventionism in Brazil expresses both the landed capitalists’ principle of self­
protection in the face of deleterious actions of traders-financiers and the counter- 
movement to the foreign capitalists’ Spencerian way of doing business, which was 
marked by struggles against colonialist inequalities. Font514 shows that, in Santos in 
S. Paulo State, the planters-commissario' reactions against foreign commercial- 
financial capitalists goes back to 1909. Most importantly, he says that this assumed 
the form of demands for interventionism and involved varying and complex 
processes. So, the State’s policy of protection and valorisation of coffee, which was 
one of the most important policies during the First Republic, was a complex issue. 
This involved different interests and historical circumstances and oppositions by 
representatives of other Brazilian states.
512 Topik, 1979, 1980 and 1985.
513 Ibid. 1979, pp. 328-29.
514 Font, 1990 p. 45.
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Moreover, the First Republic (1899-1930) itself was marked by different internal 
pressures and oppositions.515 Calixto516 shows different groups of the upper class 
assuming power during the First Republic. The previously mentioned ‘group of 
oligarchy’ implemented a policy opposing the previous republican government (1889- 
1897) and important political factions. This is crucial to an understanding of the 
gradual set of political principles and practices that characterised their governments 
in 1898-1920 such as (a) detachment from regional interests; (b) treatment of 
financial affairs as the fundamental issue to be tackled by the government; leading to 
(c) the organisation of an administrative government, banishing the relative autonomy 
of the national Parliament and building a ‘Unitary Presidentialism’, consolidated in the 
elections of 1900, and attached to the so-called ‘politics of governors’.517 The federate 
government was characterised by the relative autonomy of States, which was in fact 
an autonomy integrated to the order imposed by the ‘Unitary Presidentialism’. This 
policy met the interests of national-international exporters and financiers and 
provoked reactions by national landed capitalists, the military, journalists, lawyers, 
bankers and industrialists.
The policy stemmed from the increasing complexity of internal economic-political 
affairs and from the double movement: foreign commercial-financial capitalists versus 
native landed capitalists. In the rubber economy, the First Republic’s policies 
welcomed both the foreign capitalists’ efforts to make Brazil produce rubber, and the 
intensification of their investments in other businesses. According to Weinstein,518 
followed by Calixto,519 the decade of the 1880s was marked by the increasing
515 See Calixto op.cit. 42-46; Tannuri, L. 1981 p. 73 and p. 85; Queiroz, S. 1984; Weffort, C. 
(org.), 1991 and Viotti da Costa, E. 1977; Carone, E. 1988; Singer, P. 1982; Souza, M. 
1973; Saes, D. 1985; Bello, J. 1972; Love, J. 1982; Queiroz, M. 1982; Levine, R. 1978; 
Topik op.cit.
516 Calixto op.cit. p. 21-41.
517 There are plenty of studies on this policy. See for instance: Viotti da Costa, E. 1977.; 
Carone, E. 1988; Singer, P. 1982; Souza, M. 1973; Saes, D. 1985; Bello, J. 1972; Love, J. 
1982; Queiroz, M. 1982; Levine, R. 1978; Topik op.cit.
518 Weinstein, 1983 p. 145.
519 Calixto op.cit. p. 71-74.
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submission of the local commercial-financial capitalists to Foreign export houses. 
However, an analysis of Public Deeds in the CC and reports by the ACP indicates 
that foreign capital invested in credit, commercialisation and the export of rubber from 
the very beginning. The privileges given by the commercial treaties of 1810 and 1827 
held by England allowed English capitalists to become prominent in the international 
transport of rubber to Europe and also sometimes as intermediates in the exportation 
of rubber to the USA. What changed after the 1880s was the kind of capitalists 
involved. Before the 1870s-1880s, most of them were small scale commercial-usury 
capitalists from Liverpool, Manchester and other English towns. Despite a few of 
them investing in the same business for decades, intermarrying with the Portuguese 
and living in Belem or Manaus, usually they invested in short term businesses, for 
two or three years, usually in the form partnerships.
After the 1880s, the English investors were mostly what Cain and Hopkins520 term 
gentlemanly capitalists (the association of aristocracy and financiers centred in 
London and offering services abroad). The gentlemanly capitalists were an intrinsic 
part of the international financial elite organised in trusts and cartels, defending State 
interventionism in its imperialist form as the tools to guarantee their expansionism, 
materialising changes in the initial form of liberalism as ideological tools of previous 
foreign commercial-usury capitalists.521
The gentlemanly capitalists were given incentives and contracts of service by the 
Brazilian central government or by the governments of Para and Manaus. They 
financed a wide range of businesses, carried out by English companies and 
engineers. After the 1870s, English companies increasingly invested in transport 
(navigation and railways), and urban infrastructure in Belem and Manaus by 
supplying services such as trams, gas, electricity and water. At the same time, the
520 Cain and Hopkins op.cit.
521 See reference to this in Calixo op.cit.
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gentlemanly capitalists offered credit or invested directly in the exportation and 
shipment of rubber, performed by export houses. The scope of these businesses was 
larger than the previous ones. In rubber economy, it was manifested in partnership 
with German or Portuguese capitalists.522 The English rubber dealers’ actions were 
characterised (a) by attempts to sweep aside the local commercial-financial 
capitalists, represented by Casas Aviadoras, trying to prevent them from expanding 
their businesses to export-import services; and (b) by making efforts to impose their 
principles.
This was happening in a conjuncture in which the British State was supporting 
imperialistic actions by English capitalists abroad at the same time as it was carrying 
on its own imperialist policy marked to a great extent by the efforts to control and use 
technology as political tools.523 This gives another dimension to the reasons 
governing the British State’s policy aimed at developing the technology of large-scale 
monocultural rubber in its colonies. According to Martinello524 this policy was a 
response to the automobile industry’s boom and to challenges posited by new nation­
states such as Brazil to the international capitalists’ imperialistic purposes. Actually, 
this policy started in the 1870s when the automobile industry had not yet developed. 
Demand at this time then resulted from the growth of the British and world industry of 
rubber by-products525 which was a historical condition for the British State’s main 
motivation: the search for the technology of large-scale monocultural rubber as a tool 
of the Spencerian intention to dominate rubber production, establishing control of the 
supply of this important raw material as well as establishing themselves as owner- 
sellers of this technology.
522 CC, Indice de EscrituragSo, 1812-1932 and JUCEPA, registros de firmas. See also Santos 
op.cit. p. 129 and Weinstein op.cit. 145.
523 Bowler op.cit.
524 Martinello, 1988 p. 154.
525 Hancok, T. 1857.
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In Amazonia, strategies aimed at defeating the local rubber economy, particularly 
in 1906-08, represent one of the main manifestations of the Spencerian principle, 
governing the movement of the British State towards the rubber economy. In 1906, 
tropical America was the most important producer of rubber (about 60%), tropical 
Africa the next (30 to 35%), and tropical Asia the least important, contributing just 
3%.528 Moreover, the highest quantity Fina Hard Para, constituted the greatest 
proportion of the rubber exported by Brazilian Amazonia,527 and this was the kind 
which usually commanded the best price and was most in demand.528
This contradicted the British empire’s wish to become the most important supplier 
of rubber. Rubber plantations emerged under heavy institutional, economic and 
political support by the British State529 facing difficulties which were sorted out only 
after 1909. The attempts to cultivate rubber failed in many areas. For example, the 
level of productivity in Ceylon was low at the beginning due to uncertain methods of 
extracting latex and young trees.530 Moreover, the cultivation of rubber was not 
viewed favourably and this started to change only after around 1907.531 
Entrepreneurs, in addition to facing plant pests, exhaustion of soils and other 
problems, which had frustrated the attempts to implement large-scale cultivation of 
coffee in Malaysia,532 were also afraid of over production.533 Entrepreneurs also 
thought that cultivation of rubber would be more an affair of the government than for
526 Wright, 1907 p. 615.
527 Ibid. pp. 619-620. See also the article Production of India-Rubber. Journal of the Royal 
Society of Arts, August 10,1906, p. 919 and Collins, J. 1869, p. 82.
528 Ibid. See also Coates op.cit. p. 52.
529 See article Rubber Planting. Journal of the Society of Arts Vol.LIV, January 26, 1906 pp. 
272-73; Barlow op.cit. pp. 27-30; Drabble, 1973 chapter 2; Santos, R. op.cit.; Dean op.cit.
530 Dean op.cit. p. 76.
531 Wright,1907 p. 631.
532 Barlow op.cit. p. 29.
533 See debate at the end of the article by Wright op.cit.
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private individuals due to the high cost involved.534 As a result, before 1909 there was 
shortage of finance in the Malay States.535
Under such circumstances, the British government not only had to invest heavily 
in research, infra-structure of transport and exportation, offers of credit etc, but also 
to convince entrepreneurs about the efficiency of the technology of large-scale 
monocultural rubber, trying to drive investments towards rubber plantations.
The Spencerian principle governing these efforts was manifested in the 
conception of the rubber economy in Amazonia as an enemy to be defeated. In spite 
of the ever-increasing demand for rubber by an expanding industry, they were 
apprehensive about potential expansion of rubber production in Amazonia. Actually, 
foreign investments in rubber production increased from 1900-10 as already 
mentioned in chapter two and there existed non-privatised rubber fields in central 
areas (distant from waterways). Most importantly, English scientists evaluated that 
the success of rubber plantations would depend, to a great extent, on the rubber 
production in Amazonia.536
These apprehensions were manifested in Spencerian attempts to sweep aside 
local rubber production. In 1906, the British diplomacy discussed the possibility of 
reducing or stopping credit or direct trading by British firms in Amazonia. However, 
such ideas were shelved because the vice-consul in Manaus warned that if British 
firms did so, the Germans would step in to offer these services to local capitalists.537 
At the same time high promotion of rubber plantations was combined with counter­
propaganda against the rubber economy in Amazonia. In publications and debate by
534 Ibid. p. 641.
535 Barlow op.cit. pp. 29-31
536 See comments on Wright’s paper published in the India Rubber Journal of September 21, 
1908 in Jornal ‘A provfncia do Pari, Coluna Assuntos Qportunos. A ExtracSo da Borracha 
e seu Futuro no Amazonas. 28/10/1908.
537 F.O. 368/172 -  Report for the year 1906 by the vice-consul to the Consul Casement.
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the Royal Society of Arts538 in that conjuncture, when the high cost of producing 
large-scale monocultural rubber was mentioned (the cost of opening 500 acres of 
land, and planting around 108 trees per hectare would reach £5,946 17s.6d. Sterling, 
with added interest on all money expended, and investors would have to wait 5-6 
years to begin obtaining profit),539 it was followed by a negative evaluation of rubber 
production in Amazonia. The main argument was that after seven years the profit in 
monocultural rubber would be considerable. In contrast, investments in extractive 
production would be expensive and would become even more so because of its 
presupposed nomadic and predatory production, which would require long journeys 
to reach new rubber-producing districts in the near future when the rubber trees on 
the coast would be exhausted.540
This version was over emphasised in the First International Exposition of Rubber 
in London in 1908 when the British Consul in Par^541 attempted to mischaracterize 
seringais as private property as was discussed in chapter two. His arguments were 
used to warn investors to be careful if thinking in investing of rubber in Amazonia.542
These attempts to sweep aside the rubber economy in Amazonia went hand in 
hand with the rubber dealers’ actions as brokers in the rubber market in Belem in a 
conjuncture of fragility of the local capitalists facing the First Republic policy.
The Foreign Rubber Dealers Influence on Rubber Prices in Belem
One of the greatest movements of English rubber dealers towards the rubber 
economy was the manipulation of rubber prices in Belem, which was hidden by the 
liberal explanation of prices as the impersonal results of the interplay of supply and
538 See articles in the Journal of the Royal Society of Arts vol. LI, June 5, p. 643; vol. LIV, dez. 
1,1905 pp.61-62 and vol. LIV, February 16, 1906, p. 382.
539 Ibid.
540 Ibid.
541 F.O. and The Board of Trade. Diplomatic and Consular Reports op.cit.
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demand as if it were a ‘law’ of nature. As illustrated in Table 19, Brazil was the only 
supplier of rubber until 1860. In the 1870s, Africa started to produce wild rubber and 
the production of monocultural rubber started only in 1900 so that in 1910, Brazil was 
still the main producer, accounting for 57% of world rubber production. The shortage 
of rubber had become more intense since the 1880s when the tyre industry emerged, 
initially for bicycle and carriages, and particularly when the pneumatic industry 
appeared after the 1890s, demand expanded quickly. Therefore, there was a clear 
tendency to steadily increasing demand and higher prices in the world market. The 
temporary fall of prices at the beginning of 1885, expressing the initial movement of 
large African supplies, lasted just a few years and by 1890, prices were establishing 
record highs in London and New York.543 Although experiments with monocultural 
rubber started in the 1870s, it was only in the 20th century that investments in rubber 
plantations were initiated and only by the end of the first decade of this century that 
monocultural rubber was demonstrated clearly to be more profitable than the 
traditional methods of production in Amazonia.544 The years 1900 to 1910 were 
marked by the tremendous demand for rubber by the automobile industry. This 
industry, which had used practically no rubber in the 1880’s and only a few tons in 
1900, consumed 100,000 tons by 1910, representing 70 to 80% of all rubber 
produced in the world at that time.545
542 Jornal A Provfncia do Para, A Borracha -  O Para e seu Comercio. Bel6m, 25/10/1908.
543 McHale 1967, p. 15.
544 Ibid. p. 17.
545 Ibid. p. 16.
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Tab le  19: B r az i l i an  R u b b e r P r o d u c t i o n ,  I 8 22-1 9 3 0
% o f  wo r l d
Y e a r _________ Q uan t i t y . ( t on )   p r o d u c t i o n
1 8 2 2  
1 8 3 0  
1 8 4 0  
1 8 5 0  
1 8 6 0  
1 8 7 0  
1 8 8 0  
1 8 9 0  
1 9 0 0  
1 9 1 0  
1 9 2 0  
1 9 3 0
31  
1 5 6  
3 8 8  
1 4 6 7  
2 6 7 3  
6 5 9 1  
8 6 7 9  
1 6 3 9 4  
2 7 6 5 0  
3 8 1 7 7  
2 3 5 8 7  
1 2 8 5 2
1 0 0 % 
1 0 0 % 
1 0 0 % 
1 0 0 % 
1 0 0 % 
9 3 %  
9 1 %  
8 4 %  
5 0 %  
5 7 %  
7 %  
2 %
Source: McHale 1967, p.28; Soares, 1930.
Moreover, before 1912, there was no over-production. Rubber production in 
Amazonia increased annually during the years 1896 to 1906, at an average of 6.5%, 
with the exception of two harvests in 1897-98 and 1902-03 when production dropped 
by 0.03%  and 0.25%  respectively.546 According to official statistics illustrated in Chart 
7, in chapter six, the highest level of production occurred in 1912, with 42,000 tons. 
In fact, before 1913, rubber production was never able to satisfy the ever-growing 
demand,547 and there was the technical impossibility of getting synthetic rubber to the 
market in a short time.
According to the liberal explanation of prices, this conjuncture of low supply and 
high demand would result in increasing prices. Indeed, prices did present the 
tendency to increase in the international market. According to Knorr548 rubber prices 
shot up from about 67 cents a pound in the 1890s to over $1.00 in 1903, and in 1910 
averaged $2.09 per pound. Nevertheless, prices in Belem were marked by profound 
oscillations. Records549 show daily profound oscillations in prices as being
546 Montenegro, Augusto(Governor of the State of Par£). Message to the Legislative Assembly 
in 1908. Journal The Brazilian Review, supplement, Rio de Janeiro, Tuesday, October 
20th, 1908, vol. XI, no. 42.
547 Knorr, K. 1945, p. 9.
549 Ata de SessSo Ordin£ria em 20/12/1872 e Parecer de Jos6 R. P.Junior sobre a Pauta 
Semanal de Pre^os da Borracha. Em 24/06/1872). In: ACP, Livro de Atas referente ao
548 Ibid.
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commonplace. This is expressed in the maximum and minimum annual average 
prices in Belem in the period 1890 to1930, illustrated in Chart 5.
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Source: Anu&rio Estatfstico do Ministdrio da Industria e Commdrcio, Janeiro
a Dezembro 1956, p.23
The causes of this phenomenon are of an economic, political and historical 
nature, revealing that prices are man-made instruments of social relations, rather 
than the mechanical results of the interplay between supply and demand. Before 
1912, the most important cause was the interference by foreign rubber dealers. As 
can be seen in Chart 5, the average prices of rubber in Belem increased sharply in 
the years 1890 to 1899, which may be seen in the light of the increasing demand 
provoked by the birth of the tyre industry. However, despite the higher demand 
resulting from the growth of the automobile industry in 1900-10, as previously 
mentioned, prices fell off violently in 1899 and were kept low until 1908. The sharp 
fall in prices in 1903-08 coincided with the attempt to sweep aside local rubber 
production, as previously mentioned. The Journal, the Brazilian Review,550 pointed
periodo 03/10/1870 a 17/06/1881; Ata da SessSo Ordinaria em 26/02/1880. In: Ibid. Livro 
de Atas de 03/10/1870 a 17/06/1881, p. 89; Ata de SessSo Ordinaria em 20/03/1883. In: 
Ibid. Livro de atas de 01/07/1881 a 23/03/1888, p. 28.; ACP, 1914, p. 40.
550 The Brazilian Review, article Rubber. March 9th, 1909.
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out a margin of manipulation and interference left to traders, supposedly by the ‘law’ 
of supply and demand, which could be eliminated by intervention in the market to 
try and keep supply and demand even.
Source: Anu&rio Estatistico do Ministerio da Industria e Commdrcio, 
Janeiro a Dezembro 1956, p.23
Confidential consular correspondence, however, informs us that foreign exporting 
houses were in the position of brokers, who, ‘by withholding supply and other 
manipulations, produce artificial prices and otherwise disturb the market’.551 
Moreover, local capitalists and the governor of Para went further, stressing 
manipulations by foreign rubber dealers as the main cause of oscillations in rubber 
prices, questioning the ‘law’ of supply and demand directly.552 They argued that (a) 
the increase of 9.09% in production in 1906-07 in comparison with the harvest of 
1905-06 was a result of entries belonging to the latter crop that were delayed or held 
by producers. And even if it constituted a real increase in production, it would never 
be considered over production in a market characterised by increasing demand; (b) 
in contrast to coffee whose price dropped as a result of over production, rubber was
551 F.O. 368/274, confidential letter by Milne Cheetham to the Foreign Office, Petropolis, March 
14th 1909.
552 Montenegro op. cit.
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a scarce commodity so that the fall in prices by 40% in the short space of four 
months from June to October 1908 could not be explained as being the result of 
increasing production; (c) this fall in prices could not be the result of the crisis in 
America either as economists or agronomists had argued,553 because this crisis 
caused a stock exchange movement and not an economic upheaval.554 Finally, they 
conclude that (d) the constant profound oscillation of rubber prices in Belem was the 
result of manipulations by exporting houses.
Manipulation of prices by foreign rubber dealers had been the object of 
discussion in Amazonia since 1884, when prices had fallen by 44%, expressing the 
impact of the international consumers’ reactions to the speculative high prices that 
exporting houses were trying to impose.555 As these houses were subsidiaries of 
head-offices in the main international consuming centres, these capitalists controlled 
the international rubber market, using many different strategies of holding prices 
down in Bel6m and pushing them up abroad.556
Particular circumstances were manipulated by rubber dealers. First, Brazilian 
producers depended on their international merchant fleet services. There were no 
Brazilian shipping companies that provided a service to international ports until 
August 1906, when a line was initiated to New York.557 The prominence of English 
Gentlemanly capitalists in the rubber export trade from Amazonia was apparent. In 
the 1910s, seven English companies and firms, the great majority from London, the 
two most important of them in partnership with German and Portuguese, controlled 
half the volume of the rubber exporting trade from Amazonia.558 Moreover, an English
553 See for instance Da Costa, J.S., 1913, pp. 25-26.
554 Ibid.
555 ACP, 1885, p. 10-11.
556 Jornal 'Folha do Norte’, artigo A crise..continuac5o. 30 de junho de 1913; Mendes, J. 1908, 
pp. 74 e 84; Santos, R. op.cit. p. 129.
557 F.O. 368/92 (1907) -  Dispach commercial no.20 of April 5th 1907.
558 F.O. 368/274 (1909), letter by solicitors of those companies and firms in London to the 
Foreign Office in 12/11/1908.
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navigation company controlled the transatlantic transport of rubber to Europe. To a 
certain extent, it dominated the exportation to Harvre and Hamburgo, re-packing the 
rubber from Amazonia in Liverpool and re-exporting it to those markets.559
Second, there was no well-developed banking system in Brazil.560 This is why the 
Brazilian and local States supported the offer of credit in the rubber production by 
foreign financiers. If in the coffee economy, commiss&rios lent money to planters 
representing the traditional reliance on commission merchants for loans,561 in the 
rubber economy, seringalistas borrowed money from casas aviadoras. The gradual 
increase in the offer of credit-banking services by Brazilian banks, insurance 
companies, popular credit houses and foreign export houses and banks after the 
1870s did not eliminate the problem of the absence of a proper financial system to 
seringalistas. Export houses and banks preferred easily accessible assets such as 
mortgages on boats, urban properties etc. Seringalistas, who had distant seringais 
and rubber as their main capital, could not meet such requirements. Accepting 
seringais and rubber for mortgage, casas aviadoras, whose main capital was usually 
manifested in boats, urban buildings and other investments, could perpetuate their 
commercial-usury businesses as intermediates, fulfilling the requirements of 
international financiers and bankers and meeting the seringalistas’ demand for credit 
for production.
The way these transactions were performed is more complex than the idea of a 
functional net (in which exporting houses-commercial houses-seri/7ga//sfas-extractors 
appear to have defined and complementary functions) suggested by the economic 
literature.562 First of all, ‘casas aviadoras’ did not accept the ‘complementary’ function
559 ACP, Correspondfencias - Letter by G.Maschke, who was the president of the Teuto- 
Brazilian Commercial Association, Berlin 22/01/1916; Telegram by the ACP to the Ministro 
das RelagOes Exteriores, Lauro Miller, in 05/05/1916, signed by A. Mendes.
560 See on this Font op.cit. pp. 43-45.
561 Font op.cit.
562 Santos, R. op.cit. p. 125; Martinelo op.cit.; Calixto op.cit. p. 82.
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of commercial-usury intermediates. On the contrary, they constantly implemented 
efforts to sell rubber directly to industrialists in order to break the monopoly by foreign 
merchants and financiers and many times headed the counter movement to foreign 
rubber dealers. Second, these houses also invested in rubber production. They not 
just received seringais as a mortgage from indebted seringalistas, which happened 
quite often, particularly in 1913-15 as mentioned in chapter two. These firms 
privatised rubber fields,563 investing in production or/and speculating with land. As 
mentioned in chapter two, only one casa aviadora from Bel§m sold 35 seringais in 
Amazonas State, keeping just a few for its own exploitation. Casas aviadoras 
represented the conjugation of commercial, productive and usury capital as 
previously mentioned. Moreover, two important casas aviadoras constituted 
commercial/productive partnerships with English capitalists from Liverpool in the 
1910s.564 One of these houses owned and ran four seringais on the left bank of the 
Acre river, in the main producing area in Acre.565 Actually, the results of the 
investigation raise questions over Santos’566 statement that transactions of importing 
trade and credit were transferred to Portuguese traders, while international capital 
ran the services of exporting trade. Indeed, capitalists from London, Germany and 
France concentrated their investments in such services. Yet, North American and 
small or middle scale English capitalists from Liverpool also invested in rubber 
production.567 As previously mentioned, these investments increased in the 1910s, 
encouraged by the governments, of the countries concerned.
563 ANRJ, SDA, Cod. 988, volume 5.
564 JUCEPA, InscrigSo Registro do Com6rcio no. 1550000 868-2.
565 According to Public deeds of CC and FalcSo, E. 1906-07.
566 Santos, R. op.cit. p. 123-29; Martinelo op.cit. p. 32.
567 TJ E, Autos Civeis, anos 1900-05, autos 194 (1904-Juizo do 2o.Distrito -  Autos Civeis de 
Carta Testemunhavel).
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In the local system of credit the cost of money was characterised by constant 
oscillations -  the highest interest rate was 15% in 1884 and 1889,568 but 12% in 1896 
and 1915s69 - and the export houses lent money according to the highest rate to be 
paid in three months. The Popular Credit Society and foreign and Brazilian banks 
acted in the market following the same procedures, despite insurance companies 
usually charging lower interest rates. In 1907, while exporting houses charged 12%, 
they charged 10%.57°
The practice of lending money attached to the future delivery of rubber at prices 
always below the actual quotations in the consuming market was quite common. This 
was pointed out by the governor571 as one of the main ways rubber dealers could 
impose low prices on local producers. Yet, casas aviadoras did get loans from 
exporting houses and particularly from Brazilian banks and insurance companies to 
be repaid in cash instead of rubber.572 In several cases, seringalistas carried out 
transactions directly with export houses or borrowed money from commercial houses 
without attaching it to the delivery of rubber. Moreover, there were a few insurance 
companies and small English companies from London which offered them loans at 
lower interest rates,573 despite being attached to repayment in rubber, meaning pre­
defined prices, usually lower than those prevailing in the market.
The point to be stressed is that seringalistas and casas aviadoras had a relatively 
varied range of credit options. The latter borrowed money from different lenders such 
as export houses, banks, credit societies or insurance companies. Although 
seringalistas in Acre usually got loans and goods from casas aviadoras attached to 
the future delivery of rubber, they also got loans to be repaid in cash and sold their
568 CC, Escritura de Divida e ObrigagSo. Livro 115, fls. 52 and Escritura de ConfissSo de 
Divida com Penhor in Livro 166, fls. 139.
569 Ibid Livro 184, fls. 39, and Livro 233, fls. 36v.
570 CC, Escritura de Empr6stimo com Garantia de Penhor em 20/3/1907, Livro no. 199, fls 12v.
571 Montenegro, op.cit p. 3.
572 CC, Indice de EscrituragSo 1812-1932.
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rubber to different buyers from Bel6m, Manaus or Bolivia. Finally, commercial- 
financial transactions were relatively flexible and changed over the time. In 1910, 
Seringal ITU performed financial and commercial transactions with nine casas 
aviadoras from Rio Branco or the surrounding neighbourhood, five from Manaus and 
ten from Belem. Throughout 1910-16 the greatest volume of transactions was 
performed with three firms from Belem. But, in fact, the estate performed 
transactions with different firms at different times. In 1913-1916, the transactions 
were performed with six companies from Rio Branco or the surrounding 
neighbourhood and eight from Belem. In 1930, however, the estate performed 
financial transactions with banks only, three of which had agencies in Rio Branco 
and the agency of Banco do Brasil in Manaus. This shift meant the transformation of 
casas aviadoras into commercial businesses as a result of the improvement of the 
Brazilian banking system in Amazonia and the elimination of the financial mediation 
of casas aviadoras or export houses, solving the problem of credit attached to the 
future delivery of rubber, thereby enlarging sale options.
However, despite the relative flexibility, throughout the second half of the 19th 
century and until the 1920s, the credit to and the exportation of rubber was controlled 
in the last instance by export houses, which gave them the power to manipulate 
prices.
Another circumstance favouring their manipulation was the long distance of the 
main areas of rubber production from the main export port and the poor transport 
facilities in important producing areas in Acre. During the dry season, distance and 
bad transport conditions, owing to the low water levels in the Acre river, forced 
seringalistas to hold the rubber for a while and deliver it all at once later. As rubber 
dealers controlled a great part of the credit system, they had a large margin for 
manipulating prices. Around May and June when they made their contracts for the
573 CC, Escritura de Quita?5o e Hipoteca, Livro 182, fls. 75.
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coming supply, either with or through commercial houses, they lowered their offer of 
prices. The rubber began to come in from the seringais around October and 
continued to do in great quantities until February. Whatever the quantities arriving at 
Belem and Manaus, it was all disposed of, only very little ever remaining in stock.574 
In these conditions, those who got credit attached to the future delivery of rubber had 
just to accept the price imposed by exporters and even those with sufficient ability to 
negotiate prices were weak when faced with buyers who could impose low prices 
since large stocks of rubber were arriving at the same time in Belem making supply 
plentiful.575
After 1913, the increasing supply led to a tendency for prices to decrease. In 
1913, agricultural rubber reached 48,000 tons, while Brazilian rubber reached 39,560 
tons, according to Santos,578 and 42,000 tons according to official statistics 
illustrated in Chart 7, in chapter six. Whittlesey577 deals with figures showing that the 
offer of monocultural rubber surpassed ‘wild’ rubber only in 1914. Even in this 
conjuncture, political actions or processes played a major role in the oscillation of 
prices. Regardless of increasing supply being a phenomenon of the conjuncture 
after 1913, the period 1911-1913 presented a scenario of deeply decreasing prices, 
as can be seen in Chart 6. From June-July of 1913, prices increased again and this 
tendency was maintained until 1916, while plantation rubber prices were falling.578 
This was explained by Whittlesey579 as a result of the manipulation of figures by the 
War Trade Board. However, he does not take into account some important factors. 
First, the strategy of rubber producers in Amazonia was to concentrate on the
574 Ibid. See also F.O. 368/172 (1908) -  article ‘Rubber1 in the Jornal do Commercio.
575 Ibid.
578 Santos, R. op.cit. p. 237.
577 Whittlesey op.cit. p. 12.
578 ACA, O Mercado da Borracha. In: Revista da ACA, 61, Manaus, julho de 1913.
579 Ibid. p. 12.
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production of the Fina Hard Para because of its good reputation,580 while 
monocultural rubber did not reach the same quality. Actually, England increased the 
importation of rubber from Amazonia from 19,000 tons in 1913 to 37,000 tons in 
1914, 37,500 tons in 1915, 36,500 tons in 1916 and 41.500 tons in 1917.581 Second, 
during the First World War, a few producers in Amazonia were secretly selling Fina 
Hard Para to Germany, exporting by submarine, which meant a reduction in the 
quantity offered in the formal market.
Moreover, the ACA demonstrated that as a result of the non- implementation of a 
policy of control of rubber prices by the Brazilian government, foreign rubber dealers 
intensified their practices of manipulating prices in 191 S.582 Finally, Whittlesey583 
shows prices being influenced by elements brought about by the First World War 
such as fears and deeper struggles to control sources of rubber, restrictions on 
imports imposed by the allied governments and the elimination of Germany and 
Russia from the formal rubber market.
In Belem, rubber prices fell heavily again in 1918-1922, as can be seen in Chart 6. 
Actually, the Revista da ACP584 considers the period throughout 1911-1924 as the 
first great crisis of the rubber economy in Amazonia. However, only the decline in 
prices of 1918-22 can be said to have been influenced by over production in the 
international market (resulting from an accumulation of rubber due to the scarcity of 
shipping during the war and the enormously increased yield from the newer 
plantations), and strengthened by the severe industrial and trade depression of
580 On the good reputation of Fina Hard Para and its usual position of leading prices see: AH I, 
volume 270/2/5 - Consulados Brasileiros, Adido Comercial em Londres, article by Wilson, 
P. The Rubber Problem in the USA. In: Newspaper The Sphere , March 17th 1928, attached 
to the Oficio 17 E.C. by J.A.B. Carneiro, London, April 10th 1928.
581 AH I, volume 253/4/7- Consulados Brasileiros -  Liverpool - Oficio no.49 em 25 de setembro 
de 1918.
582 ACA, Crise da Borracha na Amazonia. In: Revista da ACA, 65, Manaus, novembro de 
1913.
583 Ibid. pp. 11-12.
584 ACP, A Desvalorisa$ao da Borracha. In: Revista da ACP, 26, 2° semestre de 1928, p. 12.
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1920.585 This was the reason for the political interventionism of the British 
government after 1922 by means of different schemes and of the Stenvenson plan.586
In 1924-25, rubber production was restricted in British colonies by the Stenvenson 
plan which favoured Amazonian rubber,587 whose prices rose again in 1923-26, 
reaching their highest point in 1925, as illustrated in Chart 6. In the years 1929 to 
1934, without the interference of the Stenvenson plan, consumption was reduced, 
while the production of agricultural rubber increased heavily, provoking stockpiling 
and devaluation of the product.588
To sum up, rubber prices in Belem were characterised by deep oscillations 
throughout the period considered, for economic, political and historical reasons 
among which manipulations of prices by foreign rubber dealers, which played a major 
role in the conjuncture before 1912. Oscillations in ‘wild’ rubber prices stopped only in 
1942, not as a mechanical result of the ‘law’ of supply and demand, but owing to 
political measures -  the called deals of Washington -  which established a standard
_  589price.
The manipulation of prices meant that even before the increasing supply of rubber 
could really affect prices, rubber producers in Amazonia were already facing permanent 
economic uncertainty. Constant deep oscillations in prices meant that the rubber 
economy was characterised by crisis. In 1884, the 44% fall off in prices led to a reduction 
in government revenue of around 50%.590 The deep crisis in 1900 was also aggravated 
by a flexible exchange rate provoking a sudden rise in the value of the
585 Ibid. p. 13, Martinelo op.cit. p.142; Phelps, D. 1957, p. 7.
586 For more details on this matter see: Martinelo op.cit.; Whittlesey chapter II; Barlow op.cit. 
chapter 3; McHale op.cit. pp. 48-61; Knorr op.cit. pp. 90-101; Lawrence, J. 1931, pp. 38- 
39; McFadyeam, A. 1944; Soares, J. 1930, pp. 41-55; Gehlsen, C. 1940, chapter 1; Barlow 
etal. 1994, pp. 42-45.
587 Soares, L. op.cit. p. 122.
588 Ibid, p. 143.
589 Martinelo op.cit. p. 141.
590 Ata da SessSo ordinaria de 18/06/1884. In: ACP, Livro de Atas de 01/07/1881 a 
23/03/1888, pp. 61 e 63; ACP, 1885, pp. 10-11.
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currency.591 But the acute economic crisis during the period October 1907 to February 
1908 was provoked by the fail off in rubber prices and the shrinkage in the Par& crop 
amounting to 1,278 tons.592 At this time, bankruptcies represented 50.000:000$.593
The uncertainty resulting from the oscillation of prices was aggravated by the 
reduction or even stoppage in the offer of credit by export houses in 1913.594 
Consequently, the impact on the local rubber economy provoked by the deepest 
reduction of prices in 1913-15, which can be regarded as the result mainly of the 
higher supply of rubber in the international market, was much more harmful because 
local producers were already weak after having experienced constant difficulties in 
producing rubber in previous years. The bankruptcies in Belem reached 100,000,000 
francs or 59,524 contos de reis, around 20% of this amount being debts with the 
Banco do Brasil.595 But the main export house was characterised by a permanent 
boom. The English-German exporting house boasted an increase in capital from 
300:000$000 in 1884 to 2.400:000$000 in 1912 when the English share was 54% of 
profits, without considering the capital exported to the head-office in London.596
The Seringalistas’ Counter Movement to Rubber Dealers
The seringalistas' counter movement to the English Gentlemanly capitalists differed 
over time. Before the 1880s, seringalistas satisfied the international capitalists' efforts to 
make them produce raw material. They evaluated this as an opportunity to make profit in 
order to ensure capital accumulation.
591 F.O. and The Board of Trade, Report on the Trade of Para and District, 1901.
592 Montenegro, op.cit.; F.O.368/274,Letter by the Vice-Consul Fletcher to the Consul 
Casement, Manaus 20th June 1908.
593 Ibid.
594 ACP, 1914, p. 15.
595 Martinelo op.cit. pp. 237-238.
596 CC, Escritura de ContinuagSo de Sociedade. Livro 115, fls. 95v and Escritura de final de 
sociedade e criag§o de nove sociedade no Livro 218, fls. 132v.
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However, the agricultural and pastoral landed capitalists reacted to this. They feared 
an intensification of competition for labour in a local market already reduced from the 
perspective of the capitalists’ expectation of plentiful cheap labour. At the same time, 
they reacted to seringalistas as a new growing segment of capitalists that could alter the 
distribution of power among the regional elite. Most importantly, reactions and 
arguments by local landed capital, intellectuals and local governments, also expressed 
issues linked to struggles against colonial inequalities. They denounced the re- 
emergence of old features of the colonial economy, represented by the shift from 
production for the internal market to an economy of heavy export product dependency.597 
They also denounced the nomadic and destructive exploitation of natural resources that 
characterised the production of rubber by arranchamentos in some areas before the 
1850s and even in the 1860s,598 representing a renewed of colonial practices by the 
Portuguese who used to produce extractive commodities by destroying natural 
resources. These criticisms we.'e turned into encouragement for the entrepreneurial 
privatisation of rubber plant areas by the governments of Para and Amazonas States, as 
was discussed in chapter two.
Moreover, as in the rest of Brazil, local political affairs were permeated by the 
particular features the ideology of liberalism assumed, as a result of struggles against 
colonial inequalities. Before the 1870s, investors in the rubber economy and 
considerable parcels of small scale traders, particularly mobile traders, defended free 
trade by seeking the opening up of the Amazon river to free navigation, opposing the 
conservatives’ strategy of keeping national unity by exerting strict control over 
Amazonia, restricting navigation in the Amazon river to Brazilian capitalists,599 and
allowing exportation only from the port of Belem. When these liberals assumed power in
<
597 See for instance: Araujo Lima, J. 1943, p. 405; Santos, R. op.cit. p. 70; Martinelo op.cit. pp. 
29-30.
598 Para. Presidente da Provlncia, 1871; Para. Presidente da Provfncia, 1851; Euclides da
Cunha, 1946, p. 53.
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1862-67 they managed to liberate navigation. Santos’600 states that expressing the 
Smithian mentality, these liberals did not suspect the effects of this measure would be to 
transfer the Brazilian ship company, controlling internal navigation, to English capitalists 
which meant a reduction in the efficiency of ship services, increasing prices and a 
reduction in the level of hygiene aboard. Calixto601 shows, on the contrary, that their 
proposals did not represent a capitulation to foreign capital expansionism. Actually, they 
defended federalism, autonomy and progress combined with interventionism because 
they conceived the State as the force able to discipline the excesses and abnormality of 
laissez-faire. What old liberals such as Tavares Bastos could not predict was the 
subordination of local commercial-financial capital to the international financial
bourgeoisie after the 1870s-1880s. This was opposed and denounced by 
contemporaneous merchant-seringalistas such as Amando Mendes.602
In and after the 1880s, however, seringalistas and merchant- seringalistas, direct 
opposition to the gentlemanly capitalists was increasingly apparent. They were 
increasingly aware of the fact that in responding positively to their encouragement, 
they became dependent on the international market and on the services offered by 
foreign capitalists. At first, particularly merdnani-seringalistas, questioned the 
existence of exporting houses as monopolies, implementing efforts to break this by 
creating a competitor in the market. In 1883 they set up the Uniao Comercial, which 
endured for two years.603 In doing this, they faced two basic problems. First, the lack 
of sufficient capital to cope with the competition by exporting houses. Second, the 
barrier intentionally created by the international commercial-financial capitalists, 
enforcing old strategies and creating new ones in order to prevent them from 
establishing direct commercial relations abroad. In this process, patronage and
599 Calixto op.cit. p. 67.
600 Santos, R. 1980, pp. 55-6.
601 Calixto op.cit. p. 70-71.
602 Mendes, 1910; Santos, R. op.cit. p. 129.
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personal links characterised their action in the international market to guarantee 
social exclusion. The international firms or companies of rubber dealers formed a 
small group acting together against Brazilian attempts to break their barrier.
These experiments lasted for a few years. Seringalistas learned the subterranean 
problem of the rubber economy: this economy simply perpetuated the colonial pattern of 
producing commodities to satisfy foreign capitalists’ interests.
The Demand for Interventionism and the Counter-Reaction by Foreign Rubber 
Dealers
The constant clashes with foreign capitalists at the ACP led seringalistas to 
organise their own associations. In 1903-08, these associations used to bring their 
formal demands to the ACP, which acted as a formal mediator with local and federal 
governments.
In 1908, their counter movement to the foreign rubber dealers was manifested 
through the Governor of Par£ State’s proposal of interventionism to the central 
government. This proposal was a systematisation and slight reformulation of the 
proposal by the ACP, which expressed their main concern about market control and 
financing. They proposed two measures, one short-term measure that consisted of 
the establishment of a branch of the Bank of the Republic and one long term 
measure that was the establishment of a regulated market and, at the same time, a 
bulwark.604
603 ACP, Relatdrio Anual de 1883, pp. 19-10; ACP, Relatdrio Anual de 1885.
604 Montenegro op.cit. p. 2.
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The seringalistas demanded a Brazilian bank aiming at freeing trade from the 
credit attached to the future delivery of rubber. They also aimed to tackle the control 
of exchange operations and collections by foreign bankers or export houses.605
At the same time seringalistas expressed their concern over taxation by 
demanding incentives under the form of a reduction of the Export Duty from 22-24% 
to 18%, or around 4% in Para and 6% in Acre, to syndicates of producers of rubber, 
according to Federal Decree no. 979, of January 6,1903.
This last proposal was strongly combated by rubber dealers from England, the 
USA, Germany and France, who acted together, protesting through the British 
Minister in Rio, the Chamber of Commerce in London, and the Foreign Departments 
in London, Washington, Paris and Berlin.606 They argued that this law constituted a 
violation of a principle of the Brazilian Constitution, which guaranteed equal rights to 
all persons. Yet British rubber dealers reacted in a different way to the other foreign 
investors. The measure was not unconstitutional and foreign exports could form 
syndicates themselves on the condition of owning and investing in rubber fields.607 
After a while, North American capitalists accepted the idea of forming syndicates 
according to the Brazilian law.608 Some companies from the USA had already 
invested directly in rubber production as mentioned in chapter two. Yet, the English 
gentlemanly capitalists did not want to invest in production and they saw this law as a 
threat, not just to their principle of a self-regulated market, but to their authority and 
Spencerian sense of superiority. They argued that:
'(...) the unconstitutional proceedings in the Brazils, the threatened violation of rights of 
British subjects residing there, together with the resulting prejudice to British interests at 
home, combine to justify our Government in holding Brazil responsible for any injuries 
which may be caused, and we would respectfully suggest that action be taken on these 
lines’.609
605 Ibid. p. 3.
606 F.O. 368/274 (1909); 3230 (1909); F.O. 368/274-33521 (1909).
607 F.O. 368/274(1909): telegram by Mr. Cheetham of December 31st, 1908; F.O.368/274, 
Letter by the British Consul, Para, October 24th, 1908.
608 Ibid.
609 F.O. 368/274 (1909), letter by one English export house of November 20th, 1908.
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They considered their private interests as if they were the interests of British
industry and of British citizens in general, repeatedly trying to convince the Foreign
Office to bring the matter into the British Parliament as a means of putting pressure
on the Brazilian Federal Government. Frustrated because the proposal passed in the
Para and in the Brazilian National Congress, they became coercive and threatening,
concentrating their pressure on the President of Brazil. In November 1908 they sent
a letter to the Minister of Finance at Rio de Janeiro, stating that:
‘(...) unless steps are taken at once to restore the rubber trade to its old basis great 
difficulties might arise, strong protests having already been made from Washington, Paris 
and Berlin, and also by the British Foreign Office. We trust Your Excellency and the 
President of the Republic will recognise at once the necessity of remedying a state of 
affairs in Par£ which might create great difficulties for the Federal Government and would 
be of little advantage to Par£ itself.610
They also threatened that a non- positive response to their demands would lead to 
wild speculation in rubber trade, since they controlled half of the 38,000 tons of 
rubber exported from Amazonia.611 Finally, they initiated actions to exert pressure in 
Paris connection with the S. Paulo loan,612 which was an important factor in the policy 
of the valuation of coffee.
The Chamber of Commerce refused to consider the English rubber dealers’ 
protest on the ground that the matter it referred to had been already voted on and 
remitted to the senate, and that the measure was not unconstitutional.613 Soon after, 
rubber dealers gave up, expecting that Brazilians would not have enough capital to 
implement such a measure.
The incident illustrates the way the Gentlemanly capitalists interfered in internal 
political affairs: they acted on high level guidance with a range of manipulative 
strategies, from simple ideological manipulation to coercive threats, and with a
610 F.O. 368/274 (1909), letter by English rubber dealers of November 12th, 1908.
611 Ibid. letter of November 3rd, 1908.
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simplistic look at the internal political and economic processes in Brazil, imagining
that the President could simply manipulate or, as they said, ‘seduce’ the congress
and everybody else in order to get what they wanted. They asked the Foreign Office
for a personal and direct appeal to be made to the President of the United States of
Brazil himself, because
'(...) we feel sure that if he could be induced to order the immediate cancellation of the law 
at Pard, such an order would have great effect upon the politicians there, who, no doubt, 
fear the intervention of the president^..).’614
After 1912, Seringalistas and merchant-seringalistas expressed their counter 
reaction to the principle of liberalism and a self-regulated market and to Spencer’s 
theory directly. An article by the Revista da ACA in 1912615 criticised the 
stigmatisation of nature intrinsic to the Spencerian theory, stating that regarding 
animals and plants, both big animals and trees are reproduced together with little and 
apparently unimportant animals and plants.616 Moreover, they argued that this theory 
was history and had no support either in facts or in the development of agriculture 
and industry, concluding on the need for interventionism by the federal government.
The over production of rubber after 1918 brought about problems already faced by 
coffee planters. Yet, seringalistas and merchant-ser/V?ga//sfas were strongly against 
the policy of valuation of coffee for there was concern about the destruction of the 
product as a means of creating equilibrium pricing.617 Rubber economy had 
specificity. Monocultural rubber had affected the production of inferior species of 
gums directly, particularly in distant areas where the high cost of transport had a 
major effect on the cost of production. As a result, their strategy was to concentrate 
on the production of the Fina Hard Para, as previously mentioned. However, over
612 F.O. 368/173, letter by British Minister in Petropolis of November 24th, 1908.
613 F.O.368/274, Letter by Mr. Casement of October 28th, 1908.
614 F.O. 368/274 (1909), Letter by English rubber dealers of November 12th, 1908.
615 Revista da ACA, Pela Borracha I, Manaus, Setembro 1912, 51, p. 5.
616 Ibid.
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production pressed home the urgency of reducing the cost of production. 
Accordingly, although maintaining demands regarding financing and market, at this 
time they emphasised interventionism in taxation and in the sphere of production 
itself.
Their demands were justified on the grounds of the importance of rubber in the 
Brazilian economy as a whole. In the period 1889-1897, rubber represented 11.8% of 
the Brazilian exports, reaching 25.7% in 1898-1910, 20% in 1911-13 and 12% in 
1914-18.618 Accordingly, the rubber crisis affected not just the local States’ revenue 
but also that of the federal government. The Par£ State revenue dropped from 
20,255 contos de reis in 1910 to 8,887 in 1915. That of the Amazonas States fell 
from 18.068 contos de reis in 1910 to 5,888 in 1920 while that of the federal territory 
of Acre dropped from 19,868 in 1910 to 5,620 in 1915.619 That is, the federal revenue 
from the Acre territory alone dropped by 28%. Furthermore, there was a high level of 
bankruptcies. According to Santos, bankruptcies in Belem reached the amount of 
100,000,000 francs or 59,524 contos de reis, around 20% of this amount being debts 
with the Banco do Brasil.620
The Seringalistas’ Project of Economic-Political Changes and the Central 
Governments1 Pattern of Response
The material presented shows that seringalistas/merchani-seringalistas were 
concerned with problems such as the control of markets and financing, taxation, the 
offer of labour, poor transport conditions and the influence of high freight in the cost 
of rubber and of foodstuffs to seringais. These were the subjects of their demands for 
protection and interventionism.
617 Revista da ACA, Pela Borracha II, Manaus, Outubro 1912, 52, pp. 6-7.
618 Villela, V. e Suzigan.W.1975, p. 50 -  quoted from Martinello op.cit. p. 48-49.
619 Santos, R. op.cit. p. 388.
620 Ibid. pp. 237-238.
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These results raise questions on the stress placed on large-scale monocultural 
rubber as a model of civilisation and progress to be followed, as Dean821 suggests. In 
Amazonia, large-scale agricultural rubber was proposed by agronomists, economists 
or other scientists, and by a small clutch of seringalistas/merchant seringalistas. 
However, it was conceived of as a practice restricted to areas with special ecological 
features622 and not as a model of development. The majority of 
seringalistas/merchant-seringalistas, however, had strong criticisms of the modem 
technology of large-scale monocultural rubber as is discussed more fully in chapter 
six.
The seringalistas and merchant-seringalistas' project of economic-political 
changes was frustrated due to the central government’s indifference or partial 
response to their demands.
First, their nationalism was frustrated on the Acre question. From 1867 to 1903-04, 
Acre State was a litigious area, as mentioned in chapter two. Seringalistas and 
merchant-seringalistas claimed the integration of Acre in the Brazilian territory as a 
federate State in which they would share power with the central government. The 
central government’s attitude to this was characterised by indifference or a partial 
response which, according to Calixto,623 resulted both from (a) poor knowledge on the 
area by both the Bolivian and the Brazilian governments; and (b) the Brazilian 
government’s attempts to get the support, or at least the indifference, of the Bolivian 
government in the face of the Paraguay war. This attitude changed only as control of 
the area by an English-North American consortium became imminent as discussed in 
chapter two. However, the local capitalists and provisory governments had no voice 
in the decisions. Acre was integrated into Brazil neither as part of the Amazonas 
State, as this State wished, nor as a Federation, as the seringalistas proposed.
621 Dean op.cit
622 Costa, J. 1913.
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Rather, it became a Federal territory administrated by the federal government 
located in Rio de Janeiro.
Partial response constituted the pattern of action by the ‘group of oligarchy1 in 
power in 1898-1920, whose reasoning, according to Calixto,624 was Brazilian internal 
political affairs. The government strategy was to leave regional affairs to regional 
politicians, who should respond to local demands so as not to challenge or disturb 
the priority given to national policy, aimed at moulding the national economy to the 
model of civilisation and progress defended by their allies - the international financial 
bourgeoisie.
This explains, in part, the clash of this policy with the economic-financial measures 
demanded by the Amazonian agrarian-extractivist bourgeoisie. In 1889-1902, when 
local capitalists were trying to counteract the manipulation of prices by foreign rubber 
dealers, measures adopted by the central government affected the rubber economy 
directly. Elevation of the exchange rate led to a great number of bankruptcies.625 In 
this context, two Brazilian banks went bankrupt (the Banco de Belem do Par£ and 
the Banco do Norte do Brasil), and the three others suffered reduced capital due to 
losses (Banco de Credito Popular’s capital was reduced from 4,123 contos to just 
1,000 contos while Banco Comercial do Park’s capital was reduced from 19,000 
contos to 4,000 and the Banco do Park’s was reduced from 19,500 to 5,000 contos). 
At the same time, four insurance companies and casas aviadoras went bankrupt. 
The numbers of bankruptcies reached 240 and the economic-financial losses in 
Belem reached between 70,000 and 140,000 contos. In the period 1890 to 1910, the 
governments of Par£ and Amazonas States had an income of 84,965 contos to cover 
expenditure of 104,413 contos. Yet, the interplay between the Federal government’s 
receipt of taxes and expenditure in Amazonia presented gains. They collected
623 Calixto op.cit, p. 157.
624 Ibid.
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124,107 contos and expended just 21,955 contos in the region. That is, the central 
government gained a net 102,292 contos from Amazonia.626
The devaluation of the Brazilian currency meant that imports cost more while 
exports cost less, therefore adversely affecting rubber production. As can be seen 
from Chart 6, rubber prices fell sharply in 1901, which coincided with the shortage of 
money resulting from the burning of paper money by the central government. As a 
result, investment in the rubber harvest of 1902 was reduced, manifesting in a 
decrease in production of around 2,085,476 kilos in 1902. This, in turn, resulted in a 
reduction in the level of local government taxes collected.627
However, developments around the Plan of Defence of Rubber of 1912 (the Law 
2.543A of 05.01.1912, which was regularised by the Decree 9.521 of 17.04.1912),628 
reveal the subterraneous issue governing the central government pattern of 
response: the view of the rubber economy permeated by the Western notion of 
civilisation and progress,629 which clashed with the seringalistas and merchant- 
seringalistas’ geomercantile way of appropriating and using natural resources.
The plan of the defence of rubber resulted from negotiations between the 
governments of Para and Amazonas, Acre Territory and the Federal government. As 
a result, it expresses not just seringalistas' and local governments’ demands and 
views on the matter, but also the central government’s own conception of the rubber 
economy and its singular way of responding to the issues it considered central to the 
matter.
625 Cordeiro op.cit.; Santos, R. op.cit. pp. 210-11, quoted from Calixto op.cit.
626 Calixto op.cit. pp. 159-160.
627 Goncalves, L. 1904, p. 9, quoted from Calixto op.cit. p. 159-160.
628 ACA, A Crise da Borracha na Amazonia. In: Revista da ACA, Manaus, 65, novembro de 
1913; ACP, Relatdrios Anuais do perlodo 1910-1914.
629 This is clear in articles on the matter such as ACA, artigo ‘O Desenvolvimento do Valle do 
Amazonas’. In: Revista da ACA, 63, Manaus, setembro de 1913, and in Dean’s (op.cit.) 
reference to ‘Brasilian efforts’, which is an expression of the view on the matter by the 
central government and political figures in Rio de Janeiro, some of them exerting political 
influence in the Amazonas State.
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This plan contains measures to reduce the cost of producing rubber and to 
encourage the diversification of economic activities and production for the internal 
market, by reducing taxation on rubber export duty and freight in national navigation, 
enlarging banking operations and reducing taxes on subsistence products.630
However, this policy encouraged the adoption of the modern technology of large- 
scale monocultural rubber and of methods of manufacturing the latex, which were 
strongly criticised by seringalistas and merchant-seringalistas for ecological reasons 
which originated in their geomercantile way of viewing and using natural resources 
as discussed in the next chapter.
This policy clashed with their view on nature in other aspects too. Seringalistas 
from Acre and Manaus criticised the construction of a stretch of railway, linking the 
Rio Branco region to the Madeira Mamore railway. They argued that the original 
proposal, which considered the physical and ecological conditions of the areas 
affected, was completely modified. These modifications resulted from the technical- 
bureaucratic staffs own perspective rather than from considerations of local physical 
and ecological conditions.631
The plan was also criticised regionally for other reasons. Merchants of Belem 
protested against the way the plan of defence of rubber was implemented by the 
commission working in Rio de Janeiro and in Amazonia.632 They argued that, as had 
happened with the local branch of the Bank of Brazil years before, public money was 
being spent without due care, and that the way decisions were being made and tasks 
were implemented was strongly influenced by practices of patronage and personal 
links, distorting the purpose of the policy.
630 ACP, Relatdrio Annual de 1913, pp. 22-27; ACA, Defesa e Amparo da Borracha. In: Revista 
da ACA, Manaus, 49, Julho de 1912, pp. 4-5.
631 Revista da ACA, Manaus, Julho 1912,49, pp. 2-3.
632 ACP, Relatdrio Annual de 1913, p. 132.
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Finally, a few merchant -seringalistas and agronomists criticised this policy 
because they evaluated that the priority at this time, as previously, should be the 
regulation of the rubber market, stabilising prices, combined with encouragement of 
agricultural rubber in areas around the Bragantina railway, which combined proper 
soils and climate with good location and transport conditions. They defended a policy 
of attraction of international investments in a plan of stabilisation of rubber prices in 
the local market.
From this point of view they expressed the complexity of the relationship between 
seringalistaslmerchant-seringalistas and international capitalists, involving 
convergence of class interests and clashes which originated in the double movement 
of the liberalism/Spencerism/imperialistic mentality versus social protection/struggles 
against colonial inequalities/nationalism. These merchant-seringalistas had formed 
commercial partnerships with capitalists from Liverpool or from the USA around 
1909, lasting for some years.633 Moreover, they made efforts to attract international 
capital investments, which involved negotiations in industrial and financial centres in 
England, the USA and Canada. This resulted in the offer of partnerships in a 
regulator market. However, this was conditional on the charge of 400 r&s over every 
kilo of rubber exported by the Brazilian government, which should be destined to 
support this investment. Seringalistas were dealing with capitalists who were used to 
receiving heavy support from their home governments in the form of infrastructure of 
transport, protective tariffs, land and labour policies as well as propaganda in the 
case of policies regarding rubber plantations in British colonies. On the other hand, it 
was this same capital that was threatening and putting pressure on the Brazilian 
government, as previously mentioned.
633 See Comments by one of these merchant-seringalistas. In: Jomal Folha do Norte, A Crise 
by J.S. da Costa, Bel£m, 2a. feira, 16 de junho de 1913.
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However, they were not unaware of the international rubber dealers’ strategies 
against the local rubber economy, including manipulation of prices and the creation 
of legal obstacles for the commercialisation of Amazonian rubber in their home 
market. On the contrary, they criticised international capital's dubious standards on 
the matter. As soon as capitalists of Canada and the USA heard about the federal 
government’s policy of encouraging the adoption of mechanical processes of 
coagulating latex as was done on rubber plantations(this is discussed in the next 
chapter) they started to discuss the payment of import taxes on this product, arguing 
that it would be a manufactured product while rubber from plantations was not 
classified in this way.
They pursued direct relations with industrialists, trying to solve the problem of the 
absence of a proper commercial-banking system, eliminating the margin of 
manipulation of prices by rubber dealers.
Their attempts expressed the contradictions posited by the character of the 
Brazilian export economy, contrasting with their principle of social protection and their 
struggles against colonial inequalities. This also indicate that the Brazilian 
governments’ apparent indifference to the rubber economy involved more complex 
elements. The Brazilian economy was exposed to the dangers of export products’ 
heavy dependency such as sugar, cotton, coffee and rubber. Sugar and cotton 
economies were the most heavily affected by the general crisis of the export 
economy from 1909-191 Os.634 the Coffee economy had been facing a long-term crisis 
but was strongly supported by the federal government by means of the policy of 
valuation of coffee.
The reasons for the priority given to the coffee economy are complex. Besides the 
strong economic-political position of coffee planters in the national context, the 
support required by the local agricultural-extractivist bourgeoisie contrasted with
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central government policy, as already mentioned. Moreover, even the central 
government project of economic-political changes to the rubber economy required 
heavy public investment in infrastructure, in financing, technical support to the 
process of production and labour policy. Could the Brazilian State afford this in 
Amazonia at the same time as it was done in S. Paulo?
Furthermore, aspects linked to international competition have to be considered. 
First, the English State and capitalists were unsuccessful in their attempts to invest in 
coffee plantations in Malaysia, as previously mentioned, but they were successful in 
doing so with rubber. This means that from the perspective of the Western notion of 
civilisation and progress, Brazilians had a relative advantage in international 
competition in the coffee economy. Second, coffee was produced for both 
international markets and the national market, while rubber had no internal market. It 
depended entirely on international markets until 1936, when the pneumatic industry 
was inaugurated in the country. Third, the policy of valuation of coffee included an 
experimental policy of improving the Brazilian currency, which could benefit the 
whole of the Brazilian economy.635
Despite the alliance with the international financial elite, the 'group of oligarchy’ 
had their own nationalism. They increasingly assumed the so-called 'Pan- 
americanismo*36 strengthening of relations with the USA at the same time as 
diversifying commercial relations by establishing relations with different countries and 
by strengthening relations with others, for instance, Germany.637 These were 
strategies aimed at getting rid of the Spencerian way of doing business by the 
English gentlemanly capitalists, who diverted their attention to Argentina.638
634 Teixeira, C. op.cit.
635 Montenegro op.cit.
636 Calixto op.cit. p. 38.
637 See record of F.O. in the Bibliography, manuscripts and reports and journals of the ACP 
and ACA.
638 Ibid.
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All these elements explain the relative indifference or inconsistent attitude of the 
central government towards the local rubber economy. One of the fundamental 
proposals of interventionism in 1908 was met partially. Branches of the Banco do 
Brasil were established in Belem and in Manaus but a regulator market and a 
bulwark was not established under the shelter of which national trade could find 
protection and defence at times of crisis. Moreover, the Banco do Brasil was 
established as a normal bank, while they had demanded it be a business formed by 
sharing capital among Par£ and Amazonas State and the Federal State, which 
should offer alternative means of credit to those offered by exporting houses, and 
foreign and Brazilian private banks, freeing seringalistas from the credit attached to 
the future delivery of rubber. However, the reduction of export duties to syndicates of 
seringalistas was approved by Para State though, the same demand by seringalistas 
from Acre, in spite of being approved by the federal congress, was not implemented 
as intended. One of the reasons for this was that these syndicates depended on 
heavy economic and institutional support by the federal government in order to be 
effective, which was never offered.639 The wisdom of seringalistas' demands could 
be visualised after 1922, when the British State implemented a policy for rubber 
characterised by heavy intervention in the market by means of market regulation 
policies. Moreover, the establishment of a regulator market was one of the central 
measures of North American policy towards natural rubber during the Second World 
War.
Finally, the plan of defence of rubber disappeared one year later, in December 
1913, when the national budget did not include the resources necessary for the 
continuation of services which had just started to be implemented,640 confirming the 
pattern of partial response to the seringalistas’ demands.
639 This was mentioned by Knorr op.cit. pp. 88-89.
640 Martinelo p. 57.
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The material presented raises questions over Martinelo’s statement that the 
seringalistas ignoring that the prices were manipulated by the English, intended to 
valorise the production of rubber in Amazonia by holding the product, trying to force increasing 
prices’ (our translation).641 Indeed many seringalistas did so in 1913-14. However, this 
does not indicate lack of knowledge or of the right political proposals. The problem 
was that they were capitalists and capitalist interests were successful, from the 
capitalistas' point of view, when under the heavy economic, institutional and political 
support of States, like for instance, the coffee economy supported by the Brazilian 
State and the rubber plantations supported by the British State. Seringalistas had no 
such level of politico-institutional uphold.
However, this does not mean that governments did not support the rubber 
economy at all with public services or that this economy did not contribute to 
improvements in social conditions. As was discussed in chapter two, local 
governments in Par& and in Amazonas State did have a policy of encouraging the 
privatisation of rubber fields, not solely with the aim of receiving taxes but also with 
the aim of preserving the Hevea rubber forest through a land law which included a 
conservation legislation. Moreover, transport in the region was greatly improved, 
even to the most distant seringais, while Bel6m and Manaus were served by export 
ports, similar to those in the most important ports of Brazil, meeting claims by local 
capitalists.642 Furthermore, a postal service was implemented throughout the city- 
ports, and telegraphic communications were installed linking Amazonia to the main 
commercial centres in Brazil and abroad. Questions of frontier were solved, including 
the Acre question with Bolivia, adding 214,000 square Kilometres to the Brazilian 
territory. The economic improvements of the Amazonas State, having its own port 
and means of national and international communications, led to its separation from
641 Ibid. pp. 55-56.
642 Reports and Journals of the ACP.
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Par£, improving the conditions of administration in the region. Finally, the rubber 
economy engendered the creation of new towns, some of them of continuous 
development, as well as giving rise to urban reforms in Bel£m and Manaus. The 
rubber economy also engendered an increase in the local population in the long term, 
despite the conjunctural decrease in population during the deepest crisis of rubber in 
1913-15 and 1918-22, when many rubber tappers returned to their homes.
Conclusion
The results presented indicate that large-scale monocultural rubber was never 
defended in Amazonia as a project of civilisation and progress. Agricultural rubber as 
an agro-ecology was an old practice and the few agronomists, economists and 
seringalistaslmerchani-seringalistas who proposed agricultural rubber wanted it as an 
activity restricted to an area presenting proper ecological and transport conditions.
Most importantly, large-scale monocultural rubber was not part of the project of 
economic and political changes by the majority of seringalistas/merchant- 
seringalistas. They were concerned with issues affecting the local rubber economy 
directly and with eliminating circumstances that gave margin to the foreign rubber 
dealers’ manipulations of rubber prices. As a result, after frustrated attempts to break 
the monopoly of export services by foreign rubber dealers, after the 1900s-10s 
seringalistas demanded interventionism by the central government. Their demands 
reveal their concerns over (a) the control of the market and financing; (b) taxation; (c) 
availability of labour; (c) poor transport conditions and the influence of high freight 
cost in the overall cost of rubber and of foodstuffs in seringais.
The central government’s policy (a) gave priority to national policy, aimed at 
moulding the national economy to the model of civilisation and progress defended by 
its allies -  the international financial bourgeoisie; (b) centred on the policy of
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valuation of the coffee economy, giving secondary importance to the rubber 
economy; (c) its view of the rubber economy accorded with the Western notion of 
civilisation and progress in which modern technology played the central role clashed 
with the seringalistas’ demand for interventionism and the implementation of their 
project of economic-political changes. This resulted in partial and, to a certain extent, 
opposing political interference by the central government in the rubber economy. 
This left the seringalistas carrying on the rubber economy practically on their own, 
although it cannot be said that governments did not support the rubber economy at 
all or that this economy did not contribute to improvements in previous social 
conditions.
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Chapter 6:
Nature, Technology, Re-investments and Changes in Rubber States
The material presented contributes important points to the discussion about 
profitability and the way seringalistas re-invested their profit, implementing changes in 
senngais. Firstly, the seringalistas’ project of economic and political changes was 
concerned with the control of market and banking, improvements in transport 
facilities, taxation, labour cost etc. and not with large-scale monocultural rubber. 
Secondly, their demands regarding these issues were frustrated by the central 
government’s partial response and intervention guided by the Western notion of 
civilisation and progress, trying to adapt rubber production to the plantation 
technology, clashing with their geomercantile view on the use of natural resources.
Once left practically to themselves the seringalistas’ response to deep oscillations 
in prices and other obstacles to profitable rubber production, was guided by their own 
evaluation of the rubber economy and views on technology. Actually, in the sphere of 
production, they had to make decisions in the light not only of how to increase 
productivity having a relatively reduced labour offer and non-industrial technology of 
production but also considering the geomercantile way of using natural resources 
and how to re-invest profits in the historical circumstances they were dealing with. 
These concerns moulded the main changes in senngais such as: (a) changes in the 
way labourers were engaged and performed their job in order to increase productivity 
and face the instability of prices; (b) improvements in the technology of production 
and diversification of economic activities, shifting to production for the expanding 
internal market, particularly in the 1900s-1910s. These changes guaranteed 
profitability and capital expansion.
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While (a) was discussed in chapter 4, (b) will be discussed in this chapter as 
follows: (a) Nature and Technological Changes in Seringais; (b) the way 
seringalistas re-invested the profit they got in rubber production.
The Geomercantile View on Nature and Technological Changes in Seringais
As previously discussed, the adaptation of the First Nations' methods of making 
rubber to entrepreneurial commodity production challenged the capitalist logic. These 
methods involved a special interaction between man and nature, and were invented 
in a society in which production did not pursue profit but auto-consumption, so that 
they did not aim at more than small-scale production. The adaptation of these 
methods to entrepreneurial commodity production for profit posited difficulties and 
challenges such as: how to achieve a level of productivity sufficient to cover costs of 
production and generate profit in a context of non-gregarious distribution of trees and 
relatively rudimentary methods of extracting and manufacturing latex.
The British State dealt with this by promoting large-scale monocultural rubber 
production which could permit a higher level of profitability per hectare. Yet, it was 
governed by an opposing interaction with nature. Preservation did not play a great 
role in the scientific debate and in entrepreneurial decisions regarding rubber 
plantations. As a result, a vast expanse of native forest was cleared to plant Hevea 
Brasiliensis in British colonies. McHale643 states that from 1905-15, approximately 3 
million acres in South and Southeast Asia were cleared of native forest or other 
crops. According to Barlow,644 in the late 19th century and beginning of the 20th 
century much of what is today the cultivated area of Peninsular Malaysia was 
untouched forest. Large-scale monocultural rubber production brought about a sense 
of easy replacement of trees and of destruction of vast native forest as a necessary 
pre-condition to progress, or as a simple technical-scientific matter. At the same
643 McHale, T. op.cit. p. 20.
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time, the development of the tyre industry to supply the automobile industry, which is 
strictly connected to scientific improvements in the First Nations’ methods of 
manufacturing latex, brought about the massive daily and permanent destruction of 
nature, in the form of air, as the intrinsic characteristic of industrial cities. Therefore, 
the scientific and industrial improvements in the original methods of producing rubber 
and manufacturing became powerful instruments of destruction of nature in the 
forms of forest and of air. At the same time, the scientific notion that human beings 
could control nature and everything else by means of science, shaped a simplistic 
view of the consequences of the massive destruction of nature.
In these circumstances, plant pests, which were the result of large-scale 
monoculture, were conceived as a technical matter to be solved by science rather 
than as an ecological issue. Wright645 emphasised that native trees were more 
resistant to pests and according to agronomists from the Brazilian Ministry of 
Agriculture,646 the percentage of loss of trees owing to pests in British colonies 
reached 12 trees per hectare around 1912, which meant a loss of 40% of the 
plantation. Dean647 attributes no importance to this report, arguing that it was semi­
official. However, he can not deny that plant pests did exist in rubber plantations, 
although not at such a level to prevent this activity as happened with the attempts to 
plant coffee in Malaysia, as previously mentioned. In native seringais there were no 
plant pests. This is a phenomenon brought about by large scale monocultural 
production.
What matters, however, is the way plant pests were conceived. Planters did not 
stop implementing large-scale monocultural rubber since plant pests did not prevent 
them from profit, they received economic, scientific, political and institutional support 
by the British State and, most importantly, they interacted nature guided by the
644 Barlow 1978, p. 22.
645 Wright 1907.
646 Revista da ACA, Borracha do Brasil. Manaus, 10, novembro 1912, no.53, pp. 3-5.
647 Dean op.cit.
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Western notion of civilisation and the Spencerian perspective. So, the notion that
dominated nature would be a necessary pre-condition of progress and the idea that
plant pests were a simple technical matter to be solved by science was crucial.
However, seringalistas had a different conception of the matter. In the previously
mentioned report by agronomists from the Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture,
information on plant pests in British colonies was used to warn investors in rubber in
Brazil to develop their own clones in order to prevent the importation of plant pests.
This report was commented on by the Revista da ACA, well known among rubber
producers in Amazonia. Moreover, Neves,648 who was an agronomist and the
entrepreneur of the Seringal ITU after the death of his father, had since 1938
contested the idea that plant pests prevented local producers from adopting large-
scale agricultural rubber, which is Dean’s main argument.649 He became particularly
vocal on the matter in the 1980s when he said:
The supposition that cultivated seringueira in Amazonia is not productive is a serious 
mistake. It is enough to mention just the example of the Henry Ford Company in 
Fordlandia and Belterra, in Para, to demonstrate that. In this project, rubber trees are 
productive even after 60 years. The loss of trees resulted from the process of putting down 
the forest to plant grass in Fordlandia, and in Belterra part of the area was abandoned or 
some trees were damaged by fire. The surviving trees are producing latex profitably so far, 
being exploited by the Estabelecimento Rural do Tapajbs -ERT'.650
What is clear in the publications by Das Neves is that in his professional and
entrepreneurial experience, there was no expansion of monocultural rubber before
the 1950s. The reasons for this were (a) the lack of sufficient systematic investigation
to develop native resistant clones because imported clones were unsuitable for the
local environment, (b) insufficient capital and (c) the lack of a proper credit system.
He does not argue that there was no scientific investigation, but that the investments
648 See for instance: Neves, C. A Cultura da Seringueira nos Seringais Nativos. Rio Branco, 
Federag§o das Associates Rurais do Territbrio do Acre, 1958; Neves, Vamos Plantar 
Seringueira. In: Jornal O Acre of 12/01/1958; Ibid. O Desenvolvimento Cultural da 
Seringueira no Estado da Bahia. In: Jornal 0  Acre of 4/4/1959; Ibid Borracha: Programa 
Principal do Novo Titular do Departamento de Produg3o. In: Jornal O Acre of 12/6/1958, 
Ibid. A Seringueira. In: Jornal O Acre of 19/07/ and 29/12/1958.
649 Dean, 1989.
650 Neves, C. A Amazbnia e a Hevea. In: Jornal O Rio Branco, segundo caderno, Rio Branco, 
14/12/1985.
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were not sufficient, considering that the British State invested around 90 million 
pounds in scientific investigations for solving the problem of pests in its colonies, and 
it took around 50 years of systematic experiments for the simple minimisation of it.851 
At the same time, he uses the history of his plantation of rubber in an area of around 
200 hectares in the 1950s as an example of the problem of lack of capital and a 
proper credit system.652
Most importantly, the non-adoption of large-scale monocultural rubber does not 
result from these problems. The author emphasises that seringalistas did not invest 
in this activity because they were not keen to do so. Indeed, seringalistas were not 
very keen on large-scale monocultural rubber.
This is the fact interpreted by Martinelo653 as a lack of entrepreneurial vision. 
However, this interpretation ignores the role of the seringalistas’ geomecantile view 
on natural resources. They did not propose large-scale monocultural rubber as 
previously mentioned, and the reasons for that were neither plant pests nor lack of 
entrepreneurial vision, but their conception of the use of natural resources. 
Seringalistas absorbed the original methods of extracting and manufacturing latex 
without neglecting the converging interaction of man and nature. On the contrary, this 
element was preserved and re-dimensioned in their geomercantile notion of nature 
and technology, which shaped the ways they privatised rubber fields (chapter 2), 
organised space within rubber estates (chapter 4) and improved the methods for 
making rubber.
The best known alterations in the methods of extracting latex and transforming it 
into raw material are those by Coutinho and Amandio Mendes,654 described in 
appendixes 5. Coutinho had several patents granted by USA, Germany, England, 
Belgium and Brazil. The advantage of the Amandio Mendes system over that of
651 Neves, C. A Amazdnia e a Hevea. In: Jornal O Rio Branco, Segundo Cademo, Rio Branco, 
14/12/1985.
652 Neves, C. A Borracha Brasileira. In: Jornal O Rio Branco, Rio Branco, 20/04/1975
653 Martinelo op.cit. pp. 52-53.
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Coutinho was that it resulted in drier rubber, making it more elastic and waterproof, 
with no conservation problems. In addition, the method not only allowed for greater 
control over the weight of the raw material but the latex could be extracted and 
transformed into rubber on the same day, without any residues. The presence of 
residues was one of the main justifications by the quality control services in Belem 
and in Manaus for the classification of the type Hard Fina Para as entrefina. Besides 
the two mechanical methods mentioned, there was also the Cerqueira Pinto method 
which was a chemical process to improve the production of rubber.655
Thus, seringalistas in Amazonia absorbed and made technical alterations to the 
First Nations’ original method, aiming to increase productivity as researchers in 
British colonies had done. Nevertheless, seringalistas’ pursuit was to maximise 
productivity without destroying nature. As discussed in chapter two, agriculture had 
been practised in Amazonia since very old times. The First Nations were the first to 
do so followed by the Portuguese after 1616 and, then, Brazilians. The cultivation of 
rubber in association with other crops had been practised since the first half of the 
19th century by means of agro-ecologicai methods.656 Thus, seringalistasAnerchant- 
seringalistas were not reacting to agriculture but to the method of large-scale 
monocultural rubber.
The question that needs to be addressed is why they reacted to this and the 
answer were in their geomercantile notion of nature and their criticisms of modern 
technology of producing rubber. The most explicit evidence of this can be found in the 
report by the representative of the Associagao Commercial do Amazonas on the first 
international exposition of rubber in London in 1908 in which he stated that the
654 Chaves pp. 50-1.
655 Ibid. p. 53.
656 The term agro-ecological methods has been used to express the idea of agriculture based 
on the association of different cultures (such as various types of cereals with different 
types of fruits etc) and preserving the native forest as much as possible, which is a 
traditional way of practising agriculture in Amazonia, in opposition to large-scale 
monocultural rubber. Rubber was usually associated with cocoa and other cultures (Bentes 
Feb/1992, Appendix 1). See brief reference to this in Wallace op.cit. p. 92; Bates op.cit. 
See also Dean 1989 pp. 77-78.
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method used on rubber plantations required land to be cleared up completely. This 
was justified as a measure for increasing profitability. Scientists found out that young 
plants grew very slowly in the virgin forest and so native forest was destroyed simply 
to reduce production time. In reporting this, the author re-inforced the old agro- 
ecological method, advising the cultivation of rubber in Amazonia close to the forest, 
without destroying it.657
Moreover, in the 1910s, seringalistas and merchant-sehngalistas increasingly 
discussed the need to implement agriculture on rubber estates and this was stressed 
particularly during the meeting they had in Manaus in 1910.658 Yet, they were talking 
about agro-ecological methods, rather than large-scale monocultural methods. In this 
meeting they decided to recommend experiments with agricultural rubber by clearing 
up small plots of the forest but only at the early stage of planting. In doing so, they 
aimed to increase productivity, without destroying the forest, believing that clearing 
up the forest entirely was completely unnecessary.659
When their arguments are analysed, it is apparent that preserving the forest had 
an economic-ecological meaning. The large-scale monocultural method in use on 
rubber plantations presupposed clearance of the forest. Yet, the Hevea forest in 
Amazonia meant land or the means of production in itself. Native trees had survived 
exploitation for 70 years,660 while cultivated trees at that moment could be exploited 
by modern methods for only around 25 years.661 Furthermore, while the latex from 
Hevea Brasiliensis, when coagulated using the smoking method, produced the best 
rubber, these trees developed only if kept altogether, with the forest surrounding the 
trees, as mentioned by Dean.662 Furthermore, according to Das Neves663 large-scale
657 Revista da ACA, A borracha do Amazonas na Exposic5o de Londres. Manaus, novembro 
1908, 5, p. 2.
658 Miranda, B. (Org), 1990.
659 Ibid. p. 104.
660 Jornal Folha do Norte, Debate sobre of Problema da Borracha. Bel£m, Sabado,
16/04/1913, p. 1.
661 Dean op.cit.
662 Dean op.cit.
663 See bibliography mentioned in footnote 374.
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monocultural rubber production required high level of capital investment in technical
measures to prevent pests and other hazards that could hinder the development of
the trees. Yet even with this care, pests not yet completely controlled by agronomists
could still thrive in the trees.
This reveals that the view that it was the seringalistas' lack of entrepreneurial
vision that prevented the adoption of large-scale monocultural rubber in their
seringais does not stand up. On the contrary, it was a conscious entrepreneurial
decision on their part. To destroy native productive trees in order to achieve large-
scale monocultural rubber was too risky.
Moreover, seringalistas were unanimous in criticising the way the trees were cut
on rubber plantations, stating that ‘the cut is too ‘long and the trees suffer with it,
particularly in the higher parts of the trunk in which there is no too high humidity’.664
The accounts on the First International Exposition of Rubber in London, already
mentioned, report that:
'(...) by the half herring-bore system adopted on rubber plantations the tree cut reached 60 
inches. By the system used in Amazonia the cut reached the maximum of 2 inches. Even 
so, there is no skilled rubber taper in Amazonia who would disagree that even the trees 
most carefully cut have their production reduced over time (...).1665 (our translation)
The aim of preserving nature is apparent as an important element of the process 
of production itself. Chaves,666 who was a seringalista in Acre, justified his preference 
for the so-called ‘simple method’ of cutting trees in Amazonia because it was more 
productive and less harmful to the trees. The quality of being less harmful was 
stressed as an advantage over the highly profitable rubber plantation’s technology. 
Da Costa,667 who had proposed large-scale agricultural rubber production along the 
Bragantina railways in Para, argued in a speech to the Club of Engineers in Rio de 
Janeiro in 1912, that the modern method of cutting the trees was not suitable for
664 Revista da ACA, 5, op.cit.
665 Ibid. p. 3.
666 Chaves op.cit pg. 37-40.
667 Costa, J. 1913, p. 22.
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native trees. Preserving rubber trees had a profound economic meaning since it 
would take many years to replace them. Seringalistas did not subscribe to the notion 
that trees could easily be replaced and that the destruction of the native forest 
surrounding the rubber plants would be just a simple technical and scientific matter. 
Rather, these were notions brought about by the historical process regarding modern 
technology for large-scale monoculture. Consequently, pests and other ecological 
issues, which emerged along with this technology, were seen not as simple technical 
matters to be sorted out by science. On the contrary, they were seen from different 
points of view such as (a) the destruction of profitable natural resources which were 
the means of rubber production; (b) the ecological consequences of destroying the 
native forest; (c) a cultural meaning expressed in the use of verbs which expresses 
feelings, as for instance, when it is said that trees suffer*68 with long cuts or when it is 
recommend that young rubber plants should be treated with affection869 etc. This 
cultural meaning requires an investigation in its own right which is not the task here.
What has to be stressed, however, is that preservation, as an intrinsic part of the 
process of production, constitutes a specificity in relation to the view of nature 
intrinsic to the Western notion of civilisation and progress and to the debate on nature 
in Western Europe in the 19th century and beginning of the 20th century. This debate 
was marked by the dilemma between preserving or not preserving nature.670 Yet, 
destroying nature was accepted as a necessary part of modern technology which 
was conceived as a symbol of civilisation and progress. It was regarded as the sign 
of superior development or superiority facing other peoples. The dilemma, then, 
stems from the wish to preserve, at the same time, acceptance of the model of 
economic development incorporated in the notion of progress as being positive or at 
least necessary. The result was the transformation of preservation into an issue
668 Revista da ACA, 5, op.cit.
669 Miranda op.cit. p. 102.
670 Bowler 1992, chapters 8, 9 and 10.
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external to the process of production, being synonymous with gardens, parks and so 
on -  that is, the making of nature, not spontaneously growing nature.
In Amazonia, on the contrary, preservation was profoundly connected to the 
process of production itself. The property right in Par£ and Amazonas foresaw the 
preservation of natural resources as one of the conditions for the privatisation of land 
since the 1890s, which was incorporated by the legislation regarding the Acre 
Federal Territory after 1912, as was mentioned in chapter two. Moreover, there were 
regulations to prevent destruction of or damage to extractive forest.671 At the same 
time, the geomercantile relations with nature meant that seringalistas considered 
preservation as a condition for the reproduction of the rubber economy. This is clearly 
expressed in lawsuits against English capitalists who rented seringais in the 1910s. In 
1901-04, the owner of two seringais in Para went to court, claiming that two English 
capitalists who had rented his senngais, in using a harmful method to cut the trees, 
had performed multiple and profound cuts, damaging some trees and killing others.672 
They won the case and the two renters had to pay compensation, based on 
Regulamento no. 737 mentioned earlier. Moreover, in 1913, several foreign companies 
paid an English man (Sr. Arkers) to teach rubber tapers in Amazonia to cut the trees 
according to the modern method.673 This was justified as a technical improvement to 
increase productivity. The majority of seringalistas were strongly against it,674 
however, arguing that rubber plants in Amazonia could be exploited using the local 
methods for 70 years, while the modern methods damaged or destroyed the trees far 
more quickly.675 Even those who recommended agricultural rubber to the government
671 See the Regulamento no. 737 of 25/11/1850.
672 T JE, Autos Clveis anos 1900 a 1905, Bel§m, Outubro/1994 (1904 -Juizo do 2o. District-  
Autos Clveis de Carta Testemunhal).
673 Jornal Forlha do Norte, Debate sobre of Problema da Borracha. Bel6m, Sabado, 
26/4/1913, p.1.
674 Chaves op.cit. p. 34.
675 Ibid.
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were against this because they thought that the modem methods of cutting trees 
were not suitable for native trees.875
Finally, preservation as an intrinsic element of the process of production itself 
meant a shift from the previous colonial economy in which the Portuguese produced 
extractive commodities by destroying natural resources, as was found out in my 
previous research. This also meant that the Amazon forest was preserved677 not 
because people did not use it but because the inhabitants gradually learned to use 
natural resources without destroying them massively, which to a great extent, was a 
result of the absorption of the way the First Nations and remaining nations used 
natural resources.
The Way Seringalists Re-Invested the Profit they Gained from Rubber 
Production
The material presented indicates that the geomercantile view of nature and 
technology, to a great extent, influenced the seringalistas’ decision not to adopt in 
their seringais the model of development and progress represented by large-scale 
monocultural rubber production. However, this technology clearly yielded a higher 
pattern of profitability per hectare,678 challenging the production of less important 
species of gum in Amazonia. At the same time, the higher supply of rubber did 
influence the tendency to decreasing prices after 1913-18. Seringalistas and 
merchani-seringalistas were affected and responded to these issues in different 
ways. Indeed, several seringalistas lost their estates because in the conjuncture of 
the deepest crisis of rubber in 1913-15, as previously mentioned, many indebted 
seringalistas had to give their estates to casas aviadoras as a mortgage guarantee. 
At the same time, casas aviadoras were greatly affected by the successive crises of
676 Costa, J. op.cit. p. 22.
677 The Amazonian rainforest is far the biggest preserved rainforest on earth, with 362 million 
hectares of preserved rain forest (Moran, 1981, p. 3).
678 It was well discussed by Santos, R. op.cit. and Martinelo op.cit.
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the rubber economy. That bankruptcies were quite frequent is indicated by the TJE 
records, by reports and Journals of the ACP and of the ACA and is discussed by 
several authors.679 Many of them changed partnership, investing in different 
businesses. Revistas da ACP and title deeds in CC’s records show increase 
investments in plantations of oily seeds, encouraged by local government after 1912, 
as well as cotton, rice and other cereals, the manufacture of rubber, food industries 
and other industries such as shoes, leather etc. The resulting production supplied 
both the internal and international markets.
In Acre Territory agricultural and pastoral production were increasingly outside the 
densest rubber fields. The census of 1920680 shows that of 1,047 rural enterprises 
analysed, 62% implemented agriculture in association with a pastoral economy, 24% 
agriculture only and 10% pastoral activity only. This production was essentially for an 
expanding internal market as a result of the increase in population mentioned in 
chapter three.
Moreover, in Acre, seringalistas increasingly rented their seringais, particularly in 
less important rubber fields. The number of renters increased from 16% in 1920 to 
46% in 1940.“ ’
However, despite bankruptcies and the abandonment of some less important 
distant rubber yields, rubber production survived the successive crises. Chart 7 
shows that the production of rubber in Amazonia reached its highest point in 1912. 
Thereafter, it dropped deeply until 1920 when it started to increase again reaching 
the maximum point in 1925-26, then dropping to reach a trough in 1932-33. However, 
from 1934-41 rubber production again increased owing to the emergence of an 
internal market resulting from the installation of the pneumatic industry in Brazil. The 
so-called deals of Washington, signed in 1942, initiating the so-called ‘battle of
679 As for instance, Mandes op.cit.; Santos, R. op.cit.; Westein op.cit.; Martinelo op.cit.
680 IBGE. Recenseamento Geral do Brasil em 1/9/1920, Serie Nacional, vol. Ill, Censos
EconOmicos, Rio de Janeiro, Servi^o Gr£fico do IBGE, 1950, p. 44.
681 Ibid.
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rubber’ to supply the extra demand created by the Second World War, augmented 
production by 36% in the period between 1941-45, which means that despite the big 
fuss surrounding the matter, these deals did not provoke an increase in production at 
the expected level.682
Source: Minist6rio da Industria e do Com6rcio -  Superintendencia da Borracha. Anais 
da Primeira Conferencia Nacional da Borracha, realisada no Rio de Janeiro, de 
22 de julho a 9 de agosto de 1946, Rio de Janeiro, s/d, Tomo I, p. 38
Within the rubber estates, economic adjustments were widespread. The effects of 
the constant deep oscillations of rubber prices, and particularly of the crisis of 1913- 
15, were stronger in areas with less density of the best species of gum, which were 
directly affected by the competition from monocultural rubber production, as 
mentioned in the previous chapter. Consequently, the production of inferior species 
was reduced or even stopped in the most distant areas. In Para, a phenomenon of 
the deepest crisis of the rubber economy was the ghost cities and villages, which 
emerged as a consequence of their dependence on the rubber economy, having their 
populations composed mostly of seringalistas and seringueiros, who went away 
during this crisis.683 In this conjuncture, prosperous cities and municipalities were 
those based on diversified economies, such as Alemquer, Obidos and Maraba, which
682 Minist6rio da Industria e do Com6rcio -  Superintendencia da Borracha, s/d, Tomo I, p. 38.
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besides having agricultural, pastoral and primary manufacturing economies, had an 
ascending production of Brazil nuts.684 Several authors noted the increase in 
agricultural and pastoral activities in Para685 and in Acre,686 which characterised the 
periods during and after the deepest crises of the rubber economy.
The diversification of economic activity is confirmed by the analysis of the INCRA- 
lawsuits concerned with the 105 large early rubber estates in the main area of rubber 
production in Acre. Table 20 shows that until the 1920s, around 67% of them 
produced rubber only, while the rest had diversified economic activities. The estates 
producing rubber only had the highest density of the best species of gum. In several 
of them, rubber was cultivated on a small-scale, as agro-ecology, increasing the 
density of trees per hectare or simply replacing old trees. The 35% that diversified 
their economic activities shown in the Table above, consisted of 10% producing 
rubber combined with cattle and agriculture and 10% performing these activities plus 
Brazil nuts and small factory of sugar cane rum in which Seringal ITU was included, 
as mentioned in previous chapters.
Diversification of economic activities was a strategy for facing the successive 
crises of rubber. Das Neves687 states that his father faced the constant crises of the 
rubber economy by diversifying economic activities, producing for the internal market. 
In 1904, a small cattle farm was established in a specific area within the Seringal ITU 
to supply the city of Rio Branco, the capital of Acre Territory, with meat, milk and 
cheese. This information was confirmed by an analysis of the accountant 
documentation of Seringal ITU. Moreover, after 1912, this estate started to combine 
the production of rubber with the production of Brazil nuts. This was a complementary 
activity whose harvest occurs in the rainy season when it is not possible to get proper 
latex. As a result, Brazil nuts eliminated an important economic issue in rubber
683 Jornal Folha do Norte, Cidades Mortas. Belem, 4a-feira, 1 de janeiro de 1930.
684 Ibid.
685 See, for instance, Cordeiro op.cit.; Barata op.cit; Leite op.cit.
686 See, for example, Pinto de Oliveira op.cit.; De Paula, op.cit.
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production: the idleness of labour for around 4 or 5 months of the year, as a result of 
the seasonal nature of rubber production in a context in which a considerable 
proportion of commercial transactions within the estate was made by exchange of 
goods, generating both debts and the need for labour permanence on the estate as a 
warranty for settlement of debts. The combination of these two activities minimised 
the generation of debts and increased labour rotation on the estate, as discussed in 
chapter four.
Rubber only 65 67%
Rubber, cattle and agriculture 10 10%
|Rubber, Brazil nuts,agriculture,cattle and rum 6 6%
Source: INCRA-Acre lawsuits
Moreover, analysing registers of firms in the Junta Commercial do Acre, I came 
across the fact that the great majority of seringalistas and merchant-seringalistas 
always ran their business by organising partnerships as a strategy for facing the high 
risk of the rubber business, which was sharply affected by the instability of prices. 
Seringal ITU, once again followed this pattern. As can be seen Table 21 from the 
1870s until 1961, this estate was run mostly in partnership. Only for short periods 
such as from 1925-7 and 1932-45 was it run by an individual firm.
This tendency was also expressed in the reduction of the proportion of individual 
property after the deepest drop in prices in 1913. In 1920, 96% of the total number of 
properties in Acre were individually owned, which was reduced to 44%  in 1940, while
687 Neves, 1981.
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other sorts of private property, including partnerships and familial, increased from 4% 
in 1920 to 19% in 1940.688
Another important change in the economy of the Seringal ITU was the 
establishment of financial transactions with banks as mentioned in the previous 
chapter. Increasingly, the performance of transactions was mediated by cash on the 
estate, eliminating the credit attached to the future delivery of rubber.
These changes guaranteed the economic reproduction of the estate as a capitalist 
enterprise. As can be seen in Table 21, the rubber enterprise within Seringal ITU 
presented constant capital in the period from 1904 to 1925. The analysis of the 
accounting document of this estate for the years 1910 and 1913 shows that the 
owner’s investments were driven to a cattle farm and sugar cane rum mostly. At the 
same time, the owner invested in a second seringal, which was sold years later. In 
1913, the balance was negative due to the stock of rubber held awaiting better prices. 
The reduction of capital in 1925-27, illustrated in Table 21, resulted from a split in the 
partnership in which the leaving partner received his 50% capital in the business. 
However, capital expanded in the rubber enterprise for 1927-32. Thus, the rubber 
enterprise was profitable and this profit was re-invested, thereby expanding capital, 
which means that there was capital accumulation in seringal ITU.
688 IBGE op.cit.
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T c d e 2 i  Mcmgers of Seingd ITUs Rubber Enterprise, 187CS-1961
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Conclusion
The seringalistas’ geomercantile view of nature and use of natural resources, to a 
great extent, influenced the way they improved the methods of making rubber and the 
non-adaptation of seringais to the pattern of progress and technology represented by 
rubber plantations. However, this technology clearly resulted in a higher level of
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profitability per hectare and an increasing supply of rubber, influencing the tendency 
to decreasing rubber prices after 1913, particularly after 1918 when over-production 
was a reality. Seringalistas were inevitably affected and responded to these issues in 
different ways. Some indebted seringalistas lost their estates, giving them as a 
mortgage guarantee to casas aviadoras. At the same time, casas aviadoras were 
also greatly affected by these issues, as indicated by the high level of bankruptcies in 
1913-15. Another phenomenon brought about by the crises in the rubber economy 
was the increasing rent of seringais, particularly in less important rubber fields.
However, the rubber economy did survive the successive crises, especially by 
means of concentrating production in the Fina Hard Para, by changing work relations 
and by diversifying the senngais' economic activities. In Acre River District, until 
1920, around 67% of seringais survived producing rubber only because they had the 
densest best species of gum and because they practised agro-ecological methods in 
order to replace old trees or increase the density of Hevea forest. The rest survived 
the crises by diversifying their economic activities, producing for both the internal and 
international markets.
In these ways, early rubber estates in Acre River District guaranteed profitability 
and capital expansion.
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Conclusion
The history of senngais in the 19th and beginning of 20th century represents one of 
the most interesting forms of capitalist relations of production which took shape in 
post- colonial Amazonia. It certainly was raw material production for one of the most 
important industries in the world after the 1870s-1890s - the pneumatic industry - as 
largely discussed by the literature. What has been neglected by the prevailing 
literature, however, is that seringal represents the incorporation of natural resources 
and of labour into the entrepreneurial production of a commodity, organised and 
commanded by capitalists according to their aim to profit, in order to ensure capital 
accumulation. Thus, it was a capitalist social relation of production. It has been the 
purpose of this study to analyse the specific features of this experience in the area 
that produced the best quality and the highest quantity of rubber in Amazonia -  the 
Acre River District in Acre State -  in the period which witnessed the first significant 
steps towards effective and permanent entrepreneurial production of rubber with 
systematic accumulation in extractive rubber.
One of the main points debated when considering rubber production in Amazonia 
has been the supposition of non-permanent appropriation of land and non-systematic 
entrepreneurial production. On the one hand, it has been argued that it was a 
temporary encampment or mercantile undertaking. On the other hand, it has been 
stated that the existence of free land would have shaped pre- or non-capitalist 
relations of production by means of either familial autonomous producers or 
compulsory forms of labour.
The argument of free land shaping supposedly pre-capitalist familial producers in 
Amazonia has been contested by my previous historical research in which it was 
demonstrated that peasantry in Amazonia was neither a new nor a pre-capitalist 
phenomenon and, most importantly, it was not a direct result of ‘free land’, as has 
been suggested by the prevailing literature. On the contrary, it emerged in the region
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from the middle of the 18th century onwards, linked to processes compounding the 
specific form the historical processes of capitalism took in the region. Peasantry here 
was not a pre-capitalist phenomenon as feudal-peasantry was in Western Europe. 
Moreover, commercial relations and permanent occupation of land were not new 
phenomena either. On the contrary, they were intrinsic elements of historical 
processes in the region from the 1615-16. Thus, the investigation contributed to the 
analysis of entrepreneurial rubber production in important respects, particularly in 
revealing that the approaches that view the region as ‘free land’ sweep aside the 
entire historical process of capitalism in Amazonia.
Given this background of former debates, I have tried to question the prevailing 
interpretations of entrepreneurial production of rubber in Amazonia by means of a 
historical perspective. Thus, I have chosen to analyse the way in which capitalist 
social relations of production took shape in the area that became the most important 
producer of rubber in the region - the Acre River District in Acre Territory. Moreover, I 
have concentrated on certain aspects of this experience -  those which, in my opinion, 
lie at the core of capitalist social relations of production in the shape it took in rubber 
production in Amazonia in the second half of the 19th and beginning of the 20th 
century.
The period from 1848 to 1914-15 witnessed the emergence and expansion of 
seringal in the sense of large estates. I have described the main features of the 
private appropriation of the basic natural resources -  the rubber fields (chapter 2). I 
have argued the specificity of this process through the notion of a geomercantile 
privatisation of land based on a highly selective view of natural resources. While this 
was a characteristic of the privatisation of land in Amazonia since 1615-16, the 
geomercantile privatisation of rubber fields was specific insofar as the Hevea forest 
itself was turned into land so that the selectivity was given by location and by the 
density of the best species of gum. The land to be privatised was the land-forest 
rather than the land-soil as in agricultural production or the land-natural grass as in
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the pastoral economy in the region. This is a privatisation/use of natural resources 
governed by the converging relation of men with nature, contrasting with the 
opposing view of nature expressed in the idea of 'mastering’/dominating nature which 
governs the Western notion of civilisation and progress, centred on modem 
technology.
This contrast was interpreted in a particular way by the promoters of the modem 
technology of rubber plantations in British colonies in 1906-08. That is, the Western 
notion of civilisation and progress, which was strongly influenced by the Spencerian 
notion of 'the survival of the fittest’, governed the argument of the incompatibility of 
preserved Hevea forest with civilisation/modem property, associating rubber 
production in Amazonia with the absence of land property. These are the 
subterraneous ideas in the literature post- the 1950s-60s referring to seringais as 
temporary encampments. Finally, the western notion of civilisation and progress also 
influenced the thesis of seringal as non- or pre-capitalist relations of production since 
it results from the a-critical acceptance of Marx’s reference to ‘colonies’ as ‘free land’, 
the conception of non-industrial societies as ‘primitive’ or remnants of the past and 
the concept of capitalist relations of production centred on wage labour and on the 
specific shape it took in industry in England.
Given these findings, I have discussed three points: (a) the Western notion of 
civilisation and progress centred on the idea of ‘mastering’/dominating nature by 
means of modern technology and its consequent biased view of peoples using 
natural resources with methods based on a converging interaction with nature, 
associating them with ‘wildness’, incivility and of being unfit; (b) the way this biased 
view was expressed in the Marxian view of non-industrial societies as ‘primitive’ or 
‘tribes’ which is linked to his reference to ‘colonies’ as ‘free land’, ignoring the entire 
specific historical process in which capitalist social relations of production were 
forged in those areas; (c) the questions the investigation into social relations of
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production in seringais raise to this and to Marx’s concept of capitalist relations of 
production.
The first step in this direction was a quick reference to my previous historical 
investigation and to the literature to point out that the First Nations in South America 
and in Amazonia were not ’primitive’ ‘tribes’ but societies having political, economic, 
cultural organisations and sophisticated knowledge in many fields. Moreover, I have 
argued that in Amazonia there was not a colonisation of empty territories after 1615- 
16, but a process of geomercantile privatisation of land which presupposed the 
freeing of land from the First Nations.
Throughout this thesis I have argued the influence of the geomercantile 
privatisation of land and the use of natural resources in the pattern of capitalist social 
relations of production in seringais. First, it involved a relation of property in which 
land was appropriated as individual ownership. Second, in this social relation of 
property, access to the best lands was socially unequal since the best lands tended 
to be privatised by entrepreneurs, who, besides privatising the best lands, created 
strategies to prevent direct producers from doing the same, so constituting one of the 
most important processes influencing the emergence and consolidation of a free 
labour market (chapter 3).
In this social relation of property direct producers had access to lower quality lands 
mostly, reducing the extent to which they could survive as autonomous producers. 
Regarding rubber fields, although a reasonable parcel of peasants had properties in 
such areas, the best Hevea forest was majority owned or even monopolised (as, for 
instance, the stretch with the densest rubber fields in Acre) by entrepreneurs. 
Consequently, the direct producers of rubber, in general, could perform their job in 
the densest rubber fields only under the command of the seringalistas. Moreover, 
even peasants were attracted to work in seringais as subordinate labour, particularly 
in the conjuncture of far higher rubber prices in comparison to cereals prices,
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revealing the engagement of peasant-workers (peasants in the hybrid condition of 
peasant and temporary labour).
These findings raise questions to Marx’s idea of 'free land’ favouring the 
flourishing of peasantry and putting obstacles in the path of capitalist relations of 
production. When rubber fields started to be appropriated and were effectively 
incorporated in capitalist production of rubber in the period 1848-1870s, there was 
already an internal free labour market from which labour could be drawn, despite the 
existence of non-privatised lands in Amazonia.
Most importantly, the emergence and consolidation of this labour market was not a 
mechanical result of social relations of the property of the means of production. The 
historical process in which the direct producer of rubber was turned into the social 
condition of subordinate labour, while seringalistas emerged as owners/commanders 
of the process of rubber production, was varying, multi-faceted and dynamic. Apart 
from the strong influence of the social relations of land property, this process was 
influenced by unequal access to the property of the means of transport and to the 
system of credit, by the high rubber prices and low cereals prices, by difficulties in the 
official immigrant peasants’ settlements and by spontaneous immigration. The 
expansion/increase in production of raw material to meet the steadily increasing 
industrial demand, particularly after the 1870s-1990s, revealed the insufficiency of 
this internal labour market, especially to meet the demand by distant rubber estates 
in Acre. This was tackled by increasing the recruitment of immigrant labour in other 
regions of Brazil. Actually, this process led to the creation of an internal free labour 
market even in the Acre Territory, which was already apparent in the 1910s.
Third, the geomercantile privatisation/use of rubber fields represents the shape 
that the converging relations with nature (intrinsic to the First Nations’ methods of 
making rubber) took when adapted to capitalist production. This meant that in the 
pattern of capitalist social relations of production in seringais the search for profit did 
not necessarily imply ’mastering’ or 'dominating’/destroying nature. This was
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manifested in the selective privatisation of land-forest based on the search for great 
density of the best species of gum (chapter 2), in technological changes and 
decisions of re-investments based on criticisms of the modem technology of large- 
scale monocultural rubber (chapter 7) and on the organisation and rationalisation of 
space/nature to reduce the time for production and to define potential labour 
productivity (chapter 4).
The geomercantile use of natural resources played an important role in the way 
work was organised. Seringueiros were engaged as labour paid by results instead of 
as wage labour and they paid rent for the exploitation of rubber paths. Most 
importantly, the administrative procedures of control/discipline of their labour and of 
quality control were also measures taken to preserve the Hevea forest.
The setting up of a complex system of commercial relations within the estate was 
necessary complement to the productive structures located far away from markets. 
This same condition of distance of markets, reducing the frequency and velocity of 
commercial transactions, reduced the volume of money mediating those transactions 
physically, and shaped a great proportion of commercial transactions based on 
buying on account, through current accounts, in which money acted as an ideal 
measure. The existence of a commercial house within many estates and the fact that 
casas aviadoras used to contract managers to run their seringais, particularly after 
the 1870s-1880s, and seringalistas did the same when they had more than one 
seringa!, have been used to argue that seringalistas personalised commercial-usury 
capitalists not very keen on investing in production. Consequently, seringa/ is 
classified as a mercantile undertaking.
I have demonstrated that these particular commercial relations constituted 
circumstances, which were gradually eliminated as a local market emerged and 
expanded.
Most importantly, I have argued that the seringalistas’ rule as commanders of 
productive activities was deeper than their supposed absenteeism suggests. There is
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plentiful evidence of seringalistas exerting direct command over the process of rubber 
production. And what has to be pointed out is that they did not need to be in direct 
command of production to be considered productive capitalists since even when they 
contracted managers at the apex, they still retained overall control.
The circumstance of distance of productive structures of rubber production also 
imposed on seringais the engagement of indebted immigrant labourers until around 
1912, in Acre River District. This has been used to define the work relations that 
existed as non- capitalist or compulsory forms of labour. Instead, I argue that the 
engagement of indebted immigrant labour was a circumstance gradually surpassed 
by the gradual emergence and consolidation of an internal labour market as there 
was an increase in the settled population and the local system of transport was 
improved. Moreover, the evidence points to the command of the process of 
production by capitalists and the labourers’ class condition of subordinate forms of 
labour. In seringais as in any other capitalist enterprises, the capitalists’ will and 
command over the process of production assumed the form of administrative rule 
and bureaucratic procedures of direct and indirect means of retaining, controlling and 
disciplining labour, including inspection, control of credit/debt, different strategies of 
motivation and ways of retaining labour, for instance, by incentives and rewards in 
the form of bonuses, gratification or discounts.
These were the circumstances under which labourers identified issues and built 
responses, influencing the course of class relations within the estate. Seringal was an 
enterprise based on the work of different categories of labour such as wage, salaried 
and labour paid by results. The direct producers of rubber were engaged and 
performed their jobs under the condition of seringueiros - a form of individual 
subordinate labour, specialised and exclusive producers of rubber, paid by results. In 
spite of paying rent and being said to be partners in the business by the 
propagandistic discourse of labour recruitment, they were subdued by capitalists’ will 
and objectives both directly and indirectly. Their subordination was manifested in both
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the work process and the commercialisation of rubber. Their labour was the object of 
retention, control and discipline by means of administrative measures, and they had 
an obligation to deliver the rubber they produced to the owner and they had to sell it 
according to internal work conditions. As a result, their remuneration was defined not 
just by the quantity and quality of rubber produced, but also by the conditions under 
which they commercialised it -  under pre-determined rules.
Under such circumstances, the seringueiros' bargaining powers were manifested 
in different manners such as: (a) in different forms of resistance to the use or role of 
debt as a form of retention such as collective forms of resistance and mutual aid by 
means of lending cash/credit to each other, assuming debt of colleagues willing to 
leave the estate, negotiating debts with the boss etc; (b) by performing temporary 
wage labour within the estate; (c) by selling as much rubber as possible by 
consignation.
This social relation of production does not fit the Marxian concept of capitalist 
relations of production - centred on wage labour and in the specific shape it took in 
industry in England. Actually, the social relations of production in seringais raises 
questions about this concept. Thus, I have discussed the controversies around this 
concept and systematised a concept of capitalist relations of production defined not 
just by wage labour. On the contrary, it is defined by the private property of the 
means of production in which the owner commanded the process of production, 
subordinating labourers to his/her objective of profit in order to ensure capital 
accumulation. In this definition, class is not an impersonal category of analysis but a 
social condition built historically involving different social relations. This and other 
circumstances - such as the geomercantile use of natural resources, the fact that 
production was greatly affected by the cycle of harvesting defining labour idleness 
during approximately four months of the year, specific conditions of access and life in 
distant seringais - defined a pattern of work relations based not just on wage labour
253
but on different categories of labour in which accumulation was sustained by the 
extraction of surplus, rent and profit.
This definition is implied in the discussion not just of work relations but also of 
profitability and capital accumulation. The literature has neglected this matter by 
viewing seringais from the perspective of the Western notion of civilisation and 
progress, so, automatically attributing a character of ‘failure’ to the non-adaptation of 
these enterprises to the pattern of development and progress represented by the 
modern technology of large-scale monocultural rubber. Actually, the subject requires 
an investigation in its on right. I have undertaken a subsidiary discussion on certain 
aspects of this matter -  those which in my opinion are central to enforcing the thesis 
of capitalist relations of production and which reveal the weaknesses of the prevailing 
interpretations on the subject. Considering that the main problem in this literature is 
the over emphasis on the previously mentioned pattern of progress, neglecting the 
local capitalists' own project of economic and political changes and actually ignoring 
the way they invested the profit they got in rubber production, I have explored this 
issue by trying to understand the seringalistas’ own project of economic and political 
changes and their geomercantile relations with nature, governing their political 
demands and decisions on re-investments and changes in their estates.
This was done by focusing on both the double movement English rubber dealers 
versus seringalistas (chapter 5) and on re-investments and changes in rubber 
estates, particularly in one middle sized seringal located in the Acre River District 
(chapter 6).
The attempt to understand their project of economic and political changes by 
discussing the double movement is due to the fact that this project was not readily 
achieved, but was built and changed over time according to the way they conceived 
and responded to obstacles to profitability and capital accumulation imposed by the 
historical circumstances in which they were making decisions. One of the main 
obstacles was the way they were related to foreign rubber dealers, particularly the
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English rubber dealers, who in partnership with Germans and Portuguese controlled 
part of the credit available for rubber production and around half of the rubber 
exported from Amazonia, using this position to impose low prices on local producers and 
in fact used it to provoke constant oscillations in rubber prices in Bel§m (chapter 5).
There are controversies over the interpretation of the relationship between local- 
foreign capitalists. I have given a quick account of these controversies in order to 
make precise my argument. The main weakness of the prevailing interpretations on 
the subject -  this is the Marxist notion of imperialism, and the nation-state 
approaches of imperialism - has been the Eurocentristic explanations of the world, 
confusing different matters. The Westerners’ movement towards different economies 
all over the world has been focused on not just as an explanation for the metropolis 
economy or for the character and purpose of their presence abroad. It has been 
applied as a general explanatory model for exploitative relations as an intrinsic 
element of capitalism all over the world. Consequently, the form capitalist exploitative 
relations took, as for instance, in rubber production in Amazonia, has been neglected, 
the local capitalists/workers have not been recognised as historical actors, while their 
views and ways of interacting with particular historical circumstances, including 
foreign investments, have been focused on by means of biased presuppositions. 
Ironically, even the nation-state approaches of imperialism ignore the fact that foreign 
rubber dealers were entering into a constituted nation. Consequently, the relationship 
between local-foreign capitalists was necessarily shaped by the dynamics governing 
the Brazilian State allowance and intervention. Finally, the Western capitalists’ 
movement towards the rubber economy in Amazonia has not been distinguished from 
their home States’ own movement towards this economy.
These views shadow the fundamental character of the relationship between 
seringalistas/merchani-seringalistas and foreign rubber dealers: that of being an 
inter-class relationship. The plentiful evidence on this drove my attention to Polany’s 
notion of double movement, which was re-thought particularly by incorporating
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specific features of the relationship between seringalistas/merchani-seringalistas and 
foreign rubber dealers. Thus, I used a notion of double movement which recognises 
the importance of the indirect influence of foreign rubber dealers insofar as 
seringalistas built their project of economic-political changes and decisions of re­
investments, to a great extent acting-reacting to their movements towards the rubber 
economy. Yet, the emphasis is on the crucial role played by local investors at the 
same time that the historical circumstances they were dealing with were considered.
The results revealed that although they had converging class interests, they had 
specific interests, these originated in their different economic condition of 
landed/productive capitalists versus commercial-financial capitalists and in their 
different nationalities, and diverse ideologies, provoking clashes. Even the ideology of 
liberalism and the self- regulated market took a specific form when defended by local 
landed/productive capitalists. Actually, they resisted the meaning this ideology took 
when defended by foreign rubber dealers, particularly the English rubber 
dealers/British State, whose principles of liberalism and the self-regulated market 
were strongly mixed with the Spencerian principle of the ‘survival of the fittest’ and 
imperialistic mentality, implementing actions to sweep aside local 
financial/commercial capital and rubber production itself, especially in 1906-08. 
Moreover, seringalistas' geomercantile interaction/use of natural resources shaped a 
critical view of the technology of large-scale monocultural rubber. This, to a great
extent, influenced the way they improved the methods of making rubber and the non-
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adaptation by senngais of the pattern of progress and technology represented by 
rubber plantations.
Therefore, the difficulties faced by their enterprises as a result of the foreign 
rubber dealers’ movement towards the rubber economy and of the emergence of this 
technology were responded to in different ways. Firstly, the seringalistas' project of 
economic and political changes was concerned with the control of markets and 
banking, improvements in transport facilities, taxation, labour cost etc and not with
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large-scale monocultural rubber. Their demands regarding this project were frustrated 
by the central government’s partial response and intervention guided by the Western 
notion of civilisation and progress, trying to adapt rubber production to the plantation 
technology, clashing with their geomercantile view on the use of natural resources.
Secondly, once left practically to themselves, the seringalistas’ response to 
obstacles to profitable rubber production, was guided by their own evaluation of the 
rubber economy and views on technology. In the deep crisis of the 1910s, some 
seringais in less important rubber fields went bankrupt as well as there being some 
casas aviadoras, and the rent of seringais increased gradually after that, something 
that became apparent after 1920. However, rubber production did survive these 
difficulties. In the Acre River District, seringalistas concentrated production on Fina 
Hard Para, implemented some changes in work relations and diversified economic 
activities, producing both for the external and the internal market. In these ways they 
guaranteed profitability and capital expansion.
This evidence points to the need to revise two other suppositions surrounding the 
idea of non- or pre-capitalist relations of production in Amazonia. Firstly, it raised 
questions about the notion that there was an extensive expansion of productive 
activities only by means of investments in new lands. Rather, production was 
intensified by investing in technological improvements and in the diversification of 
economic activities within the same estate as well as by intensifying the level of 
labour exploitation in times of crisis in rubber prices by means of increasing the 
number of rubber plantsVcompounding paths and reducing the number of labourers.
The second assumption questioned by the findings is that of labour immobilisation. 
I have noted that changes such as the diversification of economic activities within the 
estate and in the seringueiros’ condition as exclusive producer of rubber provoked a 
concomitant gradual increase in the engagement of both wage labour and labourers 
paid by results, which were accompanied by increasing levels of labour rotation.
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This research focused on the process of accumulation in rubber production in a 
necessarily incomplete manner. I have made only side references to certain very 
important aspects of the process of diversification of economic activity and to the shift 
from the mediation of casas aviadoras/casas exportadoras in the credit system to the 
direct transactions with banks after the middle of the 1910s, and particularly in and 
after the 1920s. Moreover, I have limited the analysis to one rubber estate situated in 
Acre River District, leaving aside the rest of the estates in this area and the rubber 
production and economy as a whole. Finally, I have not referred to how 
surplus/profit/rent was generated and accumulated in the sector as a whole, and how 
distribution affected those directly involved in it.
This constitutes a subject of research in its own right and the time-consuming and 
very expensive conditions in which the historical investigation was carried out made it 
clear that to focus on such aspects would require much more time and financial 
support than I actually had.
258
Appendix 1
Form for the Records ‘Seringais Register of Deeds’ in ITERPA (Instituto de 
Terras do Para)
Municipality: _________________________________________________
Date of Register: _____________________________________________
Property Denomination:_________________________________________
Extension: ___________________________________________________
Boundaries: __________________________________________________
Benfeitorias: __________________________________________________
Economic Activities (and the number of rubber paths):___________________
In what way was the property acquired? (squats, heritage, sale, donation, etc.) 
When was the land acquired?
OBS:
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Appendix 2
Form for Acre-INCRA Lawsuits Records -  Seringais in Acre River 
District
Municipality:____________________________________________________
Property Denomination:___________________________________________
Owner:________________________________________________________
Date of acquisition_______________________________________________
Extension______________________________________________________
Boundaries:____________________________________________________
Number of Colocagoes: ___________________________________________
Number of Rubber Paths__________________________________________
Benfeitorias: ___________________________________________________
Is the estate carrying out any other activity in conjunction with rubber production? 
( ) Yes ( ) No
If yes, which economic activities?___________________________________
Is there any information on work relations? What is i t? ____________________
Domain Net:
1. Transmission by heritage (date, people):____________________________
2. Transmission by sale (date, people)_________________
3. Transmission by donation (date, people)____________________________
OBS: In the case of firms or companies, please, specify
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1.Sebastopol A.O.Cezar left bank o f Purus river
2.Cachoeira Commendaro Hilario left bank o f Purus river
3.Realeza Colonel A.E.Fayal both banks of Purus river 80 tons
4.Luiz de Mamoria Colonel J.Luiz right bank of Purus river
5.Serury P.V.Nascimento right bank o f Purus river 12 tons
6.Entre Rios Colonel M .F.Maciel right bank o f Purus river 15 tons
J.B. Silva(businnesman from
7.Campinas Para) left bank o f Purus river 15 tons
S.F.Mello(businessman from
8.Porto Central Manaus) left bank o f Purus river 150 tons
9. Novo Axioma Captain R.C.Falcao right bank o f Purus river from 100 to 130 tons
lO.Central Putiary Captain R.C.Falcao
11. S.Jose Captain R.C.Falcao Inland
12. Foz do Acre Major A.O.Lim a right bank o f Acre River from 130 to 150 tons
13.Boa Vista M .M .Hall right bank o f Acre River from 25 to 30 tons
14. S. Francisco Captain M.Cunha right bank o f Acre River from 80 to 100 tons
15. Novo Encanto Captain M.A.Bezerra right bank o f Acre River from 40 to 50 tons
16. Mundo Novo Nogueira &  Irmaos left bank o f Acre River 80 tons
17. Granada J.I. Dos Santos right bank o f Acre River 70 tons
18. Macapa Marques N .&  Cia. right bank o f Acre River from 180 to 200 tons
19. Caqueta Colonel J. Victor from 25 to 30 tons
20. Andira Anna U. Pontes left bank o f Acre River 50 tons
21. Lua Nova Anna U. Pontes left bank o f Acre River 30 tons
22. Redempcao Cor.F.P.Franco(shopkeeper in Manaus) from 30 to 35 tons
23. Floresta G.A. Miranda(Commercial House from Belem) 40 tons
24. Gloria G.A. Miranda(Commercial House from Belem) from 10 to 15 tons
25. Bom Destino Colonel. J.V. da Silva right bank of Acre River from 120 to 150 tons
26. Carupaty Captain A.L.Barbosa left bank o f Acre River 80 tons
27. Huaytha Captain A.L.Barbosa right bank o f Acre River 25 tons
28. Boa Uniao heirs o f J.F. Silva left bank o f Acre River 20 to 25 tons
29. Transwaal Moreira &  Irmao right bank o f Acre River 40 tons
30. Baixa Verde L.de Mendonca &  Cia right bank of Acre River from 40 to 50 tons
31. Non-denomination L.de Mendonca& Cia inland
32. Nova Olinda Captain P.da P.Sa right bank o f Acre River from 120 to 150 tons
33. Vista Alegre D.M.R.Azevedo right bank o f Acre River from 35 to 40 tons
S.F.Mello(businessman from
34. Catuaba Manaus) right bank o f Acre River from 150 to 200 tons
35. Alto Alegre M.P. Vianna inland 15 tons
Alves Braga &  Cia (from
36. Panorama Belem) left bank o f Acre River from 25 to 30 tons
37. Nova Empreza Alves Braga &  Cia 40 tons
38. Recreio Alves Braga &  Cia
39. Esmeralda Alves Braga &  Cia Acre River
Lopes Brito &  Cia (from
40. Empreza Para) left bank o f Acre River from 80 to 100 tons
41. Forte de Veneza Colonel A.J.Silva left bank o f Acre River from 40 to 50 tons
42. Bage Colonel P.E.Ferreira left bank o f Acre River 100 tons
43. Riosinho I Colonel Dias &  Cia left bank o f Acre River 100 tons
44. Riosinho I I heirs o f F.A. Santos right bank of Acre River 30 tons
45. Bemfica Pedro Braga &  Cia right bank of Acre River 100 tons
46. F.C. Mourao F.C. Mourao left bank o f Acre River from 30 to 40 tons
47. ITU Honorio Alves &  Cia right bank of Acre River from 100 to 120 tons
48. Remanso A.F. Mesquita both banks o f Acre River from 120 to 130 tons
49. Santa Severina A.F. Mesquita both banks of Acre River
50. S. Luiz F.A. Sombra right bank of Acre River 50 tons
51. S. Gabriel Major A,F.S.Jacanna right bank of Acre River 60 tons
52. Nova Floresta Soares &  Hermanos right bank o f Acre River from 15 to 20 tons
53. Santa Flora Colonel J.S. Monte left bank o f Acre River from 35 to 40 tons
54. Perseveranca Coronel A.A.Alencar right bank of Acre River 50 tons
55. S.Francisco de
Iracema F.A. Brito left bank o f Acre River from 90 to 100 tons
56. Joao de Iracema F.A Brito left bank o f Acre River from 30 to 50 tons
57. Iracema Coronel R.V. Lima left bank o f Acre River 100 tons
58. Liberdade Coronel R.V. Lima
59. Independencia P.J. de Araujo both banks o f Acre River from 45 to 50 tons
60. Pao Mary J.R. da Cunha right bank of Acre River 20 tons
61. Paris A.P. Mesquita both banks o f Acre River from 30 to 40 tons
62. Carao Fiuzas &  Cia (from Para) right bank of Acre River from 50 to 60 tons
63. Mucuripe Fiuzas &  Cia right bank of Acre River 200 tons
64. Aquidabam Fiuzas &  Cia right bank of Acre River 100 tons
65. Soledade Souza &  Cia left bank o f Acre River from 180 to 200 tons
66. Equador Colonel C. Silva right bank of Acre River from 20 to 25 tons
67. Vista Alegre Pio &  Irmao right bank o f Acre River 10 tons
68. Boa Vista Pimenteira &  Fernandes left bank o f Acre River from 70 to 80 tons
69. Esperanca left bank o f Acre River
70. Siberia J.Soares &  Sobrinho left bank o f Acre River from 30 to 35 tons
71. Porto Manso Colonel Maia 230 tons
72. Tupa Colonel Maia
73. S. Pedro Colonel Maia
74. Pindamanhangaba Colonel Maia
75. Riosinho Colonel Maia
76. S. Cristovao Colonel Maia
77. Primavera Colonel Maia
78. Floresta Sa, Dutra &  Cia from 100 to 120 tons
79. Santa Anna Sa, Dutra &  Cia
80. Villa Nova Sa, Dutra &  Cia
Source: Falcao, E. A lb um  do R io A cre, 1906-07, Para.
Appendix 4
According to Chaves1, the method of extracting latex involved the following steps:
1. It started in the middle of April with the task called sangria, which consisted of cutting the 
rubber tree bark, exciting the flux of latex and directing it to the point were the cuts were 
made. This was done with a small axe that had to be very sharp in order to prevent damage 
to the tree. The cuts needed to be as bright as possible. The owner prevented unskilled 
labourer from doing sangria because of possible damage to the tree. Thus, newcomers were 
taught this method by skilled rubber tapers before extracting latex themselves.
2. After the sangria, the rubber trees were left for 3 to 4 days for resting. Then, the extraction of 
latex and making of rubber began.
3. The seringueiro began working very early in the morning starting with the called reacgQes, 
which were cuts ordering the flux of latex according to the methods chosen.
4. After doing the reacgQes the rubber tapers adjusted the tigelinha or small balls to the right 
position for receiving the latex dropping from the reacgQes. This task was carried out for 
each of the 200 trees, compounding two paths.
5. Then, when the seringueiro finished this task he return to his house to have lunch.
6. Next, he returned to the rubber paths in order to collect the latex from each tigelinha.
The seringueiro finished these jobs around 11 or 12 o’clock, when he started to perform the 
task of smoking the latex and making rubber.
The methods of making rubber2
The smoker was a small hut with a straw roof in which there was an opening from where the 
process of smoking was done. The tools used for this job were two wood fork serving as 
supports to a thick wood pole. Above this pole rested the cavador, which was the small 
wooden pole over which the rubber ball or peile, which was an oversized rugby football of 
rubber, was made. The cavador had one extremity attached to the roof by means of a rope 
which allowed the rotation of the cavador. The cavador was placed above the clay container 
producing steam for smoking the latex.
The seringueiro's labour consisted of the following tasks:
1. Seated on a trunk, the seringueiro had the basin with the latex on his right. With his right 
hand using a ladle made of cabaga he took the latex from the basin and irrigated the 
cavador with it right over the steam coming from the container, and with his left hand he 
rotated the cavador, allowing the steam to reach all over the cavador’s surface. Then, the 
steam coagulated and smoked the first layer of latex. After that he took another small 
quantity of latex and prepared another layer of smoked latex above the first one and so on, 
until he had made the so-called pelle. In four or five days the seringueiro could smoke one 
container of latex with 45 to 50 kilos.
2. When he finished the last layer of latex, he brought the hot ball to the plank, pressing the 
ball against the plank in order to mould the ball into plain surfaces. This process also 
eliminated residues of water that could remain in the rubber and prevent the formation of 
opening troughs trough which air could penetrate the rubber, damaging it.
1 Chaves 1913 p. 47.
2 Ibid. pp. 47-49.
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Appendix 5:
The Coutinho’s method of making rubber was as follows:
Tolls:
1. A hollow roller was used with a rotating movement, a shaft in the middle and a 
circular opening on both extremities with 3/5 of the diameter, being the total 
diameter of the roller of around V% of its length;
2. The roller was supported by crossed legs with vertical equal angles;
3. A hung cone with grill and conductor tube ending in a squashed cone which was 
inserted into the roller with the base turned up;
4. A horizontal shaft having fixed pulleys;
5. Moving guiding pulleys with the legs in the shape of fixed rollers;
The way this system operated was the following:
1. The seringueiro put the latex into the roller and heated the cone grill by opening the 
conductor tube above the cone, removing it from above the grill;
2. After made the fire he put the cone full of firewood or on other fuel on the grill;
3. When the combustion started, the seringueiro would observe the proper smoke 
thickness and temperature for starting the process of smoking the latex, adjusting 
the conductor tube to the superior part of the cone so that the other extremity of the 
tube was inserted into the roller in which a slow rotation started;
4. Due to the type of rotation movement and also the great viscous quality of the latex 
it followed the roller in its movement at the same time as receiving the smoke on the 
superior face of the roller, and while the latex received the smoke it adhered to the 
roller according to layers of rubber, due to the device of the cone at the extremity of 
the conductor tube already being inside the roller with the base up. So, the latex 
would pour into the roller adhering gradually in layers wrapped up and put on top of 
the previous ones.
When the roller chilled, the rubber was removed easily. It had homogeneous 
thickness proportional to the latex poured into the roller, and with elasticity and other 
qualities equivalent to that prepared by the original method. There were special 
forms of controlling the degree of smoking by this device. Moreover, this device 
could be used on consecutive days, until it filled the roller completely, and the latex 
could be removed at any time it was necessary. The rubber produced by this 
method received a high price in Belem in 1913.
The Amandio Mendes’ method consisted of a range of improvements to the First 
Nations’ methods, consisting of the substitution of the cavador by a hollow roller. 
The latex was poured into the roller that received the smoke while the operator gave 
movement to it, and this movement led to the formation of layers put successively 
one on top of the other.
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Appendix 6:
Exchange Rates (Pence/Mil Reis)
1910 1913 1930 1911 1914
January 15,14 16,26 5,62
February 15,08 16,22 5,64
March 15,06 16,14 5,79
April 15,48 16,08 5,87
May 15,84 16,09 5,88
June 16,34 16,05 5,71
July 16,65 16,06 5,40
August 17,06 16,08 5,05
September 17,81 16,08 5,14
October 17,37 16,08 5,29
November 17,22 16,08 5,23
December 16,16 16,08 5,46
16,12 16,06
16,01 16,05
Source: Funda?§o Institute Brasileiro e Estatistica -  IB G E . (1990 ). Estatlsticas Histericas  
do Brasil -  Series Economicas Dem ogr£ficas e Sociais de 1550 a 1988, R io  de 
Janeiro, IB G E , pp. 591-598.
OBS: All the data in pounds are based on such exchange rates and when there was 
missing information on the month in which the commercial transaction was 
performed the annual average was considered.
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